W. M. L. DE WETTE (1780-1849)

AS THEOLOGIAN AND EXEGETE

by

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PREFACE

As the title of this dissertation indicates, it is a general inquiry into the historical background and thought of a nineteenth century German theologian. Because of the vast scope covered by the terms "theologian" and "exegete," limitations have been necessary.

The term "theologian," in this context, has been understood to apply specifically to the field of systematic theology. Thus little or no reference is made to de Wette's work in the area of ethics.

The term "exegete" has been similarly limited. The philological, textual-critical and linguistic sides of de Wette's labors have been touched upon only as they were found necessary for an understanding of his historical-critical and exegetical work.

All translations from the original German texts are the author's unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes.

The form and style of this dissertation is that suggested by K. L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Dissertations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950) and A Manual of Style (11th ed.; Chicago: Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1947). The spelling is in accordance with Webster's New International Dictionary (Springfield: G. Merriam and Co., 1934).

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Of de Wette, one historian remarks that he "is the most complete expression of the philosophical movement of the Eighteenth Century applied to theology."[1] That century and the one following, marked the zenith of Germany's development. In order to understand the significance of the man who is to be the subject of our study, we must first view briefly the historical situation in which he appeared.

A The Aufklärung

The age of confessional wars ended with the "glorious revolution" and the Act of Toleration under William III of England (1688 f.). The church history of the following decades shows a totally changed picture. The tremendous religious forces of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation were beginning to weaken and grow weary. The sharp confessional differences, which led to the religious wars, were forgotten, and religion and the church had less influence in public life, particularly in the political realm. A new secular culture began to unfold and develop apart from the guiding

hand of the church. This revolution in cultural life and the change in the churches' view towards the various branches of culture is the most important fact of post-Reformation church history.[2] The intellectual side of this cultural revolution consisted in the turning away from the supranatural world-view of the church and its replacement by a new world-view independent of the traditional authorities. This process was the Aufklärung or Enlightenment.[3]

Although the form of the Aufklärung varied from country to country, the common ground was the basic direction of the questing spirits. In the place of the faith in authority, which former generations had accepted, came the almost ruthless rush for independent knowledge -- nothing was valid which could not be justified by reason. A this-worldly and happiness-in-this-life attitude soon displaced the more ascetic other-worldly emphasis. An optimism in regard to creation and the goodness of man replaced the pessimistic view which held that the world and man were under Satan's sway. Generally, a flat utilitarianism accompanied this optimism. This belief in progress resulted in a zeal for reform in many areas including the church. The continuing withdrawal of the religious led to an increasing emphasis on the moral.

The concept of natural law and reason as the ultimate criterion is perhaps the most characteristic single feature of this movement. Religion, morals, theories of state, economic order, right and justice -- all were based on reason and on natural law. What existed as a historical reality was judged by its coincidence with reason and nature. Lack of agreement showed deviation from the original condition and intention and necessitated replacement or change.

B Political Developments

The secularization of culture progressed most rapidly in the political area. Since the time of Cardinal Richelieu in France, confessional differences seem to have played little part in political alliances. Turkey, for example, was looked upon as a perfectly legitimate partner in a pact. The idea which motivated the Crusades had been forgotten.

This secularization became evident in the new theories of state which were both independent of and indifferent to the church. In place of the scholastic view, which based and grounded the state directly on a religious fundament, such men as Hugo Grotius, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf, propagated the natural rights conception, whereby the state was seen

as the result of a contract between the governed and the governing. The concept of the "Divine Right of Kings" or of "King by God's Grace" disappeared, for the state was temporally determined and in principle freed from the authority of the church. Now the ruler was no longer responsible for the spiritual welfare of his subjects, and the consequent result was the age of tolerance.

However, in practice, the church and state remained closely bound together. It was accepted without question that the ruler of the country should also be the summus episcopus. In the older system the power to govern the church was seen as the continuation of the jurisdiction of the bishops, but in eighteenth century Germany, the prevalent polity of the "Territorial System," placed the church under the control of the state.[4] This control was seen as a natural part of the state's sovereignty and a manifestation of its inherent power and right. Pufendorf, Thomasius, and Böhmer were leaders in developing this "Territorial System." In opposition men such as Pfaff strongly supported the contrasting Kollegial System, which maintained that the church was an independent body within the state, and therefore had the right and duty to govern itself.[5] Only in those countries which underwent

a radical revolution and a complete change of government, such as France and the United States of America, were the logical conclusions of the Aufklärung fully drawn, with its resultant separation of church and state.

The eighteenth century has been referred to as a period of absolutism.[6] It is only natural that the political developments of this age should evidence this absolutist impulse.

The Holy Roman Empire had been a concrete denial of the aspirations towards absolutism.[7] Tensions existed between the subjects and rulers of the individual territories, but these rulers were in turn responsible to someone higher than themselves, the Emperor. Even the Emperor, in designating his office as by "God's Grace," admitted that he was not the ultimate authority, but that he with his subjects must bow before the Ultimate Giver of Power. In this the rights of the people were also acknowledged. The concrete form of this transcendent power for the territorial rulers was the Empire itself. With its disintegration the ruler became absolute, and the people lost their rights. Only after the fall of the Empire and the French Kingdom was a Louis XIV possible.

The absolutist impulse finds its expression in two forms of revolution. The first is the "descending" revolution, or that which is motivated by the absolute claims of the individual territorial ruler. In order to secure his position the territorial ruler had to weaken the nobility in his domain, since they represented the most serious challenge to his claim. Consequently the nobility banded together to maintain their status, and the ruler found it necessary to strengthen the common people, particularly the merchant class, so that he could enforce the deprivation of the rights of the nobility. Not only did he need the unifying influence of a strong lower and middle class, but he needed a constant source of income which the merchants could provide. He needed money to maintain his military strength, and he needed military strength because his territory was confronted by other territories -- an obvious contradiction to his absolute claims. He strove to better his own position through marriage, inheritance, purchase, or war. Wars became a frequent necessity because of the need for extending or defending his absolutist aspirations. All available means were utilized to assert his pre-eminence -- arbitrary principles of justice in the courts, exorbitant claims on the economic resources of the land, even architecture, art and literature must conform to his wishes.

A second variation of this "descending" revolution can also be observed. Instead of being worked out extensively, it was worked out intensively -- not aesthetically but rationally -- not for the benefit of the ruler but of the ruled. Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia is an example of this type. He carried out reforms in regard to land, culture, economics and industry as well as in the sciences and arts. These were for the welfare of his people.

The revolutionary movement of the masses was a diametrically opposed type of political absolutism. Those at the bottom of the economic and social ladder saw the rulers as the robbers and usurpers of their rights and, therefore, as enemies. The end result was the complete reversal of the traditional position, and he who had been the victim of this absolutism, becomes the absolute despot himself.

France and the United States of America are the most characteristic of this "ascending" revolution. The United States Declaration of Independence in June of 1776, and the French Declaration of Human and Civil Rights in August of 1789 are the classic documents. Both speak of self-evident truths and natural rights and hold that men are born equal and have certain inalienable rights including those of life, liberty,

and the pursuit of happiness. Governments are instituted among men to preserve these rights and derive their power and authority from the consent of the governed. Law is the expression of the general will of the people. Furthermore, if a government fails to preserve these rights, then it is the privilege of the citizens to change governments. If the government becomes despotic, it is their right and duty to overthrow it.

Neither of the "Declarations" mentions the name of God, although the American document presupposes a vague Deism. To Barth, the American form represents confused Calvinism, while the French displays confused Catholicism.[8] Although the general form of this "ascending" revolutionary movement was the opposite of that imposed from above, both remain within the vicious circle of political absolutism.[9]

1 Political Philosophers

The two philosophers whose theories of state and of politics were almost determinative for this period are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704). Both the princely and proletarian revolutionaries looked upon Hobbes as their spiritual father since his teaching could be adapted to either movement.

In his De Cive, Hobbes states that Aristotle and Grotius are false in asserting that the state originates in the social impulse, for

> man is essentially not social, but selfish, and nothing but regard for his own interests bids him seek the protection of the state: the civil commonwealth is an artificial product of fear and prudence.[10]

The ultimate motivating drive in man is his instinct for self-preservation, but this is also his highest good. Since everyone in his natural state must fear and mistrust everyone else, men are forced to join together in search of peace and the establishment of an ordered community.

> Peace is attainable only when each man, in return for the protection vouchsafed to him, gives up his natural right to all. The compact by which each renounces his natural liberty to do what he pleases, provided all others are ready for the same renunciation, -- to which are added, further, the laws of justice (sanctity of covenants,) equity, gratitude, modesty, sociability, mercifulness, etc., whose opposites would bring back the state of nature, -- this compact is secured against violation by the transfer of the general power and freedom to a single will (the will of an assembly or of an individual person), which then represents the general will.[11]

This civil contract consists firstly of renunciation, and secondly of irrevocable transference and submission. Through the second, the people are united in a civil personality through which they can live a happy life. Although this social contract theory was often given a

democratic interpretation, Hobbes himself preferred the absolute monarchy. This sovereign would also be the spiritual ruler and no religion unsanctioned by the state would be tolerated.

John Locke, on the other hand, disliked the despotic absolutism of Hobbes. Locke viewed the state as the result of a contract concluded for the security of property. People submit themselves to this community, whose expression is the will of the majority, with the understanding that the general good will be kept in view in directing the life of the state. Locke divided the powers of government into three branches -- legislative, executive, and federative. All men were born free and with equal capacities and rights. Submission to the authority of the state was a free act, and by the natural contract made, natural rights were guarded rather than destroyed. The political power should not be tyrannical, for arbitrary rule is no better than the state of nature, nor should it be paternal, for rulers and subjects are on an equality in the use of reason.

The rulers too are subject to the laws that are made, and should they go contrary to them, they then forfeit their right to govern and the sovereign authority reverts once more to the people. As the

sworn obedience of the subjects is to the law alone, the ruler who acts contrary to law has put himself in a state of hostility to the people. Revolution becomes merely a necessary defence against aggression.[12]

C The Natural Sciences

This absolutist tendency in the man of the Aufklärung shows itself again and again in his desire to make everything conform to a system which he could manipulate and control. Since the controversial discovery of Copernicus, the geocentric world-view had been discarded. The result was not the increased humility of man, as one might expect, but rather a stronger anthropocentric conception. The resurgence of renaissance humanism, no longer challenged by the Reformation, gained the upper hand. Man was the measure of things and their master as well. One of the chief fields of research, which provided means for exercising control over both man and nature, was in the realm of what we now call the "natural" sciences.

The previous century had been the one of mathematical discoveries. Within a short period Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Gassendi, Newton, Leibnitz, and others had laid the foundations on which the new theories of mechanics, mathematics, and astronomy were to be

built. This, together with the geographical knowledge of vast new areas and lands, gave the general feeling of "unlimited horizons." Travel books and diaries of the explorers were common in most homes. People began to travel to other countries and met new people -- to be considered a cultured person one must, at least, have been to Paris. There was so much to be subjugated and brought under control, and one of the means was scientific knowledge.

Logic, observation and mathematics were the three decisive elements of power now discovered in science. Each new discovery and invention increased man's power over his environment. Among the achievements of this century were: Hooke's optical telegraph in 1684; Papin's steam cylinder in 1690; spring suspension came in 1707; in 1714, Fahrenheit constructed the mercury thermometer; 1718, vaccination introduced by Lady Montague; 1720, metal boring machines; 1738, improved weaving machines; 1745, steam heating; 1747, process for making beet sugar; 1751, the breech loading gun; 1764, James Watt's steam engine; 1770, oxygen discovered by Priestly; 1780, Galvani's electrical experiments, etc.[13]

The results were often disappointing to the church. In spite of the fact that these men did not

intentionally rebel against the authority of the church, their discoveries were often incompatible with the view of the world found in the Bible and promulgated by the church. Two things happened -- first, the scientific thought took a new turn. Freed from the fetters of the church, the outlook became more and more rationalistic and human reason, which had partially solved some of the cosmic problems and seemed able to control the powers of nature, must also be capable of solving most of the other problems confronting man. The second result was the destruction of the mythical world-view of the New Testament writers with its three-story construction of heaven, earth, and hell and its spirits, demons, and belief in miracles. The world appeared more and more as if it were in perpetual motion and God, at most, was only the "prime mover."

D The Arts

1 Literature

Although German literature did not reach its zenith until after the time of Goethe; who, properly speaking, comes after the Aufklärung; it is extremely doubtful whether these heights could have been reached if the enlightenment had not preceded it. The first half of the eighteenth century produced no classic

German authors to compare with Racine, Corneille and Moliere of France, but it did produce the period of "classicism" which was the immediate forerunner of German classic literature.[14]

Since the Middle Ages, the philological emphasis had been on the ancient languages. Largely through Luther's translation of the Bible, a universal German language came into existence. Yet even more than a hundred and fifty years later, Latin was still the only language used in the universities. Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) caused a tremendous stir of excitement when he delivered the first lectures in the German language at the University of Leipzig.

The most important forerunner of the Classic Period was the literary critic, Johann Christian Gottsched (1700-1766) of Leipzig. Although largely dependent on the French tradition and pattern, he held that language too could be controlled and mastered by man, and he set out to make Leipzig for Germany what Paris was for France. He wrote books on Sprachkunst, Redekunst and Dichtkunst.[15]

With Klopstock's Messias in 1748 and with the work of Wieland and Lessing, German literature began its ascent.[16] But the two names which signify German classic literature, are those of Friedrich Schiller

(1759-1805) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832). Lichtenberger says of Schiller, that no one presents

> an incarnation of German genius at once so complete and so living; nor has any one exercised a more powerful influence over his countrymen.[17]
>
> Schiller is filled with a burning wrath against all that debases man, against all that degrades reason, against all that is directed against the dignity of our race. He exhorts us to hate with him the lower powers of our being, to withdraw ourselves into the world of the ideal in order there to take up our abode.[18]

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe is admittedly the greatest poet that Germany has ever produced.

> No existence has been more envied; no mortal has been more idolized. Germany is prouder of Goethe than of any other of her sons; she has lavished upon him an inexhaustible admiration.[19]

As is true of most men of genius, Goethe defies simple classification.

> He regards life -- with all its errors, and failure and mysteries -- as a process of education, and believes that it is controlled by an unknown Power, whose designs are mostly revealed in nature and in human experience.[20]

Religiously, Goethe has been classified by various scholars as a pantheist, a rationalist, a heathen and as a Christian. Gostwick says that three things can be established from his writings:

> He rejected the central tenet of Christianity; he found for himself and others like himself, but 'not for all men' -- this he expressly tells us -- that moral and aesthetic culture might serve partly as a substitute for religion; lastly, in the time of his old age, he entertained feelings of veneration for the leading ideas -- even for the mysteries -- of the Christian faith.[21]

However, in the field of literature, it was not long until the Romanticists gained the upper hand.[22] The Schlegel brothers, August Wilhelm (1767-1845) and Friedrich (1772-1829), were the leaders of the Romantic school. To them, the feelings of beauty, restlessness and sentiment were more important than reasoned principles. Clemens Brentano (1778-1842) and Achim von Arnim (1781-1831) are two more important representatives from this group. The most religious of the poets was Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801), better known by his literary pseudonym of Novalis.

A few years later, when Germany was struggling to shake off the yoke of bondage imposed by Napoleon, this Romantic strain was continued by the "Patriotic Poets." Among the better known of these men was Theodor Körner (1791-1813), a disciple of Schiller, who "left his family, a brilliant position, and a bride in tears, to join the black hussars of Lützow, and to find death on the field of battle."[23] Ernst Moritz Arndt, (1769-1860) at one time a theological student but later

a professor of history, sought to re-animate the patriotic sentiment which he felt was sadly lacking in his people. He was a zealous and enthusiastic defender of the Germanic idea. The most ultra-Germanic of the "Patriotic Poets" was Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), who took a direct part in the war of liberation and was filled with a burning hatred of the French. He wished that the French language and French influence would be banned from Germany forever. He longed for German unity and advocated the creation of a new capital to be called Teutonia, located somewhere on the banks of the Elbe.

Following these troubled years, poetry passed rather rapidly through the sentimental and lyrical phases until the complete dissolution of the Romantic school was marked by the name of Heinrich Heine (1799-1865).

In eighteenth century Germany, the stage and drama played a unique role. The stage was looked upon not as an enemy of theology as was common in Puritan England and America, but as an ally and an additional medium for reaching the people. Schiller declared in a lecture at Mannheim that the theater was

> a living mirror of morals and a school of practical wisdom, an infallible key to the secret passage of the human soul; only there do men of the world hear the truth and see man in his true character.

It is unusual to us as Anglo-Saxons that a man such as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), who influenced the scope of German theology, should also be the renovator of German drama. His play, Nathan the Wise, written in 1779, exercised a tremendous influence on the people of that day. It was a sign of its time in its optimistic appeal to humanity and its naive implication that Judaism, Islam and Christianity were of equal value religiously. Undoubtedly, Lessing and Friedrich Schiller were the most influential dramatists of this period. However, as Drummond points out,

> But it was not altogether wholesome that the theater should be elevated into a school of morals at the cost of reducing the church to a proscenium of oratory. Confusion resulted when the preacher mimicked the high-flown declamatory style of the actor, while the actor moralized like a preacher on the stage.[25]

2 Art and Architecture

In the areas of art and architecture another form of absolutism expresses itself.[26] The richness and variety of material nature; the various possibilities of rhythm, pattern, and harmony of sound and color; the method and form of human speech; even the individual development and social groupings of people; -- all these, to the man of this age, were a mass of given stuff over which he himself was the master. The proof of his

superiority was clearly evident in his ability to bring things into a pattern or form which was pleasant to himself. Thus the formal garden became an expression of his mastery over nature. His architecture was proof that the various materials could be made to look like whatever he determined they should look like. The result was the artificiality of a Schloss Brühl, where stone dares no more be stone or iron look like iron; everything must be transformed according to the arbitrary whim of the master.

This was the transition period between the Baroque school, with its excessive ornamentation; and the Rococo, with its stiffness and affected manner. In the first can be seen the emotional excesses of Pietism, while the cold aridness of Rationalism is plainly visible in the second.

3 Music

The desire to reduce the given "material" to a definite form finds its clearest expression in the field of music. Yet, one must admit that no other century in world history has produced such a formidable list of great composers and musicians. The names Bach, Haydn, Händel, Gluck, Mozart and Beethoven still today represent music at its best. As Barth points out, "At this

time art was still decisively dependent upon ability."[27] These men were, first of all, masters in the control and use of the instruments from which they gained their fame. Art was, in one sense, preparedness and training. Art was not primarily sensitivity, or experience, nor the expression of mysticism or protestantism, but the display of mastery and ability, a control of necessary rules, and the following of objective laws such as are necessary in the writing of a fugue. The artist's mastery consists of his sovereignty and control over the musical instrument and his ability to utilize and shape the various patterns and possibilities of sound of which the instrument is capable. He who knows the laws of harmony and tonality and, despite their complexity, knows how to control and use them to produce beautiful sound through his chosen instrument -- he is a maestro.

Yet, when all that has been said, there still remains in the music of this period, a sense and quality of the Infinite that has rarely since been re-captured. As Goethe once said of Bach's music,

> it was as if the eternal harmonies were conversing with themselves, much as they may have done in God's breast shortly before the creation of the world. The very depth of my soul was moved so that it seemed I neither possessed nor needed ears, sight, or any other senses.[28]

E Education

The men of the Aufklärung felt that they could also control the inner development of the individual. They were convinced that through education young people could be led into real life in its fullest sense. Education was seen as a business and an object of study. We find here the beginnings of pedagogical literature and of teacher-training seminars. Increasing emphasis was laid on the study of one's own language, on physical training, and on manual and vocational skills.

Pietism and the Aufklärung may have differed in their educational goals, but they were agreed in their optimism about the attainability of these goals. They were convinced that the proper method must have the proper result. They made an honest attempt to understand children from the child's point of view, and much of the educational material was re-written to suit the particular age and development of the child.

The "enlightened" monarchs, such as Friedrich II and Josef II, as well as their predecessors Friedrich Wilhelm I and Maria Theresa, looked upon the educational reforms as one of the most important parts of their betterment programs. In 1717 Friedrich Wilhelm I introduced a system of compulsory education, and began building two thousand new schools. Since man, in

accordance with his nature could be educated and trained, he must not forego this enriching process. State control of the schools was the only feasible way of enforcing compulsory education.

The church was no longer the supreme authority in the educational field. The state controlled school tended to replace and crowd out the church controlled school and thus the previous authority of the pastor was challenged and usurped by the authority of the schoolmaster.

There can be no doubt that some reform in the field of education was necessary. The religious education of youth had too often been restricted merely to memorizing the catechism and crowding the mind with biblical and theological details that remained undigested in the brain, rather than becoming a vital part of the total man. Francke and the able teachers of the Orphan School at Halle had exercised a large and wholesome influence, but "with this exception, there was nothing in the educational field of Germany from which good could be expected."[29]

The pioneer educational reformer in Germany was Johann Bernard Basedow. Born in Hamburg in 1723, the son of a pious and rigidly orthodox hairdresser, he left home at an early age in rebellion against the

rigid parental discipline. He later returned to study at Hamburg under Reimarus and also at Leipzig, where he read many of the deistical and apologetical works of that day. He became a private tutor to a wealthy family and, inspired by the ideals of Rousseau's Emile, began to apply the educational principles it suggested.

In 1774 Basedow established the first Philanthropinum at Dessau, which was to give the lead in a new type of education. While the former system had viewed the minds of children as vessels into which a certain amount of knowledge and faith was to be infused, whether it be easy or difficult, Philanthropism viewed these vessels as the chief thing, and the amount of knowledge as only secondary. Their object was not to train scholars or gentlemen or even Christians but to educate the children to become men. From a religious standpoint it was indifferent, making no distinction between Catholic, Protestant, or Jew. While formerly education consisted largely of imposing knowledge from without, the new system strove to guide and develop the latent powers and natural good which they were convinced were in the hearts of these children. Nothing was to be forced -- freedom of expression was encouraged and learning was made to be play. The children were to be prepared for all the exigencies of life, and Robinson

Crusoe, a literary product of the age, became the ideal for many of them. But it soon became evident that linguistic knowledge and matters of the memory would not survive under this system. "A universal superficiality of knowledge followed, a want of consistency in moral and religious training and a premature scepticism among youth."[30]

Even though Basedow with his bad temper, rudeness, and quarrelsome nature was temperamentally unfit for this type of profession, he was not without a goodly number of followers who in many ways were more competent. Walke, Trapp, Salzmann, Campe, and Rochow are but a few of those that could be mentioned.

At almost the same time as Basedow and his followers were carrying through their reform with great public acclaim, a small school for the poor was opened at Neuhof in Switzerland. Here the humble former law student, J. H. Pestalozzi (1746-1827), was the schoolmaster. It was not until a quarter of a century later that he began to attract attention by his methods, but his influence has remained, even in our present day systems.

Temperamentally, Pestalozzi was much better equipped for his task than was Basedow. He had a sensitive, generous, and deeply religious nature; although

some have doubted the orthodoxy of his faith.

> The Philanthropists and Humanists had aimed at producing cultivated man; Pestalozzi's education aimed at the moral and spiritual salvation of the neglected people.[31]

Pestalozzi gained fame during the misfortune that burst upon Germany from France, when in the year 1798 on the smoking ruins of Stanz, he gathered the orphans around him and founded an institution. His popularity spread rapidly, and people from all corners of the world came to his school to observe and adopt his methods.

> The secret of his success lay in the circumstance that he brought into the educational extablishment the family spirit, whose influence he had himself experienced. He planted the school in the soil of the family ... This man's inexhaustible love, child-like humility, and increasing efforts have certainly been influenced by the Spirit of Jesus Christ; only, the gospel was not the central and culminating point of his educational system, by which, however, many a noble soul has been led to the Lord.[32]

F Society

The desire to manipulate and mold did not stop with the individual but soon extended to groups and social relationships as well. Prior to this time most of the social communities and organizations were created by pressures from without. It is significant that now the emphasis is placed upon inner unity and common interest, thus again allowing for the freedom of

expression of the "enlightened" man. Barth points out that this is probably the fruition of the impulse that made the Jesuits designate themselves as a Society rather than an Order.[33] This type of society meant fellowship with implied freedom of choice as compared to an order which is imposed from above. It was the banding together of like-minded colleagues in a sense of brotherhood and comradeship with a basic optimism as to their own abilities and importance. Mozart mirrors this attitude in "The Magic Flute" when he says, "He is a Prince, but what is more, he is a man."[34]

This realization of brotherhood cut across the established bonds of social strata or religious confession. Dissatisfied with the old forms which were largely controlled by the church and determined by social position, they became aware that it was entirely possible to build a fellowship on the basis of their common humanity. Here they felt a position of superiority over the old order; here they could speak optimistically of the future and sense the psychological security of "belonging." This frustration of expression under the established order found its outlet in such groups as the Freemasons.

Freemasonry apparently originated in England but spread rapidly through Germany in the beginning of

the eighteenth century. It took the English building lodge of the Middle Ages as its pattern and ascribed symbolic meanings to its forms. God, the omnipotent Architect of the universe, stands to the world substantially in the relation of Creator, and man has to do nothing but to cultivate and develop the innate natural foundation by directing his knowledge to wisdom, his will to strength, and his sentiments to the beautiful. Out of the materials of natural humanity, the Freemasons would rear a temple of virtue.[35] As one of their songs puts it, "Search for truth, practice virtue, love man and God with your heart -- that is our motto."[36]

It is strange that Freemasonry, which was motivated by deistic rationalism which frowned on any miracle and made the measure of all things the natural reason of man should take refuge in a highly mysterious, secret symbolism which was far more irrational than that which they had despised. In the very titles used for the officers and members, we see a wish-projection of the absolutist desires so prevalent in this age. If in real life their claims of superiority were contradicted, in their lodge at least, they could be Grand Masters and Potentates.

An interesting combination of the methods of Freemasonry and those of the Jesuits appeared in the

newly formed "Order of the Illuminati." The Illuminati was to do for the Aufklärung what Freemasonry had done for Deism and the Jesuits for the Papacy. Weishaupt, a former professor of ecclesiastical law at the Jesuit University of Ingolstadt, took the form of organization of the Jesuits and founded the new order in 1776. This was combined with the objects of Freemasonry by Baron von Knigge in 1780.

> Its aim was to free men from all limitations, and therefore, ultimately, from those of nationality, and of civil ties, further 'faire valoir la raison,' and therefore to begin a battle against pedantry, intolerance, theology, and constitutional rule.[37]

However, just when the movement was at the height of its success, the ex-Jesuits, who were still active in spite of their suppression, were instrumental in an order of prohibition against the Illuminati from the Bavarian Government. Internal dissension and jealousy between Knigge and Weishaupt made the dissolution a relatively easy matter.

G Philosophy

Although the philosophical and theological thought of this period are closely related and interwoven, it is necessary for practical purposes to attempt a brief survey of each of them separately.

In philosophy, the revolution against the ruling Scholasticism was led by two men, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677). In contradistinction to the realism and objective certainty of the Aristotelians and Thomists, Descartes began by doubting all ulterior certainties. One thing, however, is impossible for him to question, namely, that he himself, who exercises this doubting function, exists.

> I can doubt everything except that I doubt, and that in doubting, I am.[38]
> Thus the starting point required for knowledge is in the self-certitude of the thinking ego. Accordingly, I may conclude that everything which I perceive as clearly and distinctly as the cogito ergo sum is also true, and I reach this general rule, omne est verum, quod clare et distincte percipio.[39]

Descartes disputed only the certainty of knowledge previously attained and never questioned the possibility of knowledge since he was a rationalist and not a skeptic. He proceeds to show his belief in God by arguing from the intuitive knowledge of his own existence. The ideas of God as infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, and as creative substance, have not come to us through our senses, nor have we formed them ourselves. The power to conceive a perfect being can only come from someone who is perfect in reality. Since the infinite contains more reality than the finite, this idea cannot have been derived from the finite by negation and

abstraction. To this empirical argument which derives God's existence from our idea of God, he also joins the ontological argument of Anselm which deduces the existence of God from the concept of God.

> God was now recognized as a Reality who more directly confronts us than do the things of sense, and our certainty of Him became prior to the certainties of science rather than dependent on them,

but at the same time,

> when after retreating from nature to God, Descartes went on to retreat further from God to Descartes, it is doubtful whether he was not after all setting himself in worse case than he was before.[40]

It was within this sphere of thought that Spinoza, too, took his stand. Baruch or Benedictus de Spinoza came from a Jewish family of Portugese or Spanish origin, which had fled to Holland to escape persecution. He held also to the formal principle of clarity and the mathematical method, preferring, however, the geometrical rather than the analytical system of Descartes.

Spinoza disagreed with Descartes' dualism of mind and matter. Descartes maintained that substances are distinct from one another when we can clearly and distinctly cognize one without the other. He said we can conceive of mind without a corporeal attribute and body without a spiritual one; the former has nothing

of extension in it, the latter nothing of thought; hence thinking substance and extended substance are entirely distinct and have nothing in common. To Spinoza it appeared inconsistent to allow two finite substances to stand beside the absolute substance; consequently he recognized only one ultimate substance or God. The denial of substantiality to individual beings, brought in by the Occasionalists, is completed by Spinoza, and he boldly and logically proclaims pantheism on the basis of Cartesianism. Furthermore, he gives this divine "All-one" of God a naturalistic rather than a theological character. The starting point of his philosophy is the logical presupposition of all that exists, namely this unconditioned substance. This is his causa sui; this substance alone exists and it combines in itself omne esse. Although he calls this substance God, it has not the customary religious significance and he uses the terms Deus and Natura almost interchangeably.[41]

Descartes' ultimate conclusion, that God alone was substance, provided a theme for Spinoza. Spinoza, starting from this point, was driven to the view that individual existences were of the nature of substance, and thus he provided the theme for the thinkers of the succeeding period. From here we see the development

of the realistic and idealistic systems. France showed a preference for the realistic type, while Germany preferred the idealistic monistic system. If Britain were to be included in the survey, one would probably divide the schools of thought into empirical and rational; Britain's philosophers usually started from experience, while those on the continent preferred to take reason as their basis.

The man, who more than any other, formed the philosophical basis of the Aufklärung, was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), the son of a Leipzig moral philosophy professor.

Leibnitz agreed with Descartes and Spinoza that the concept of substance should be the cardinal point of metaphysics, but he disagreed with the dualism of the former and the individual-denying monism of the latter. In the place of these concepts of substance, Leibnitz substituted the notion of reality as essentially dynamic -- a universe construed as a system of forces. A monad is the name given to simple unextended substance, i.e., a substance which has the power of action. The world is filled with these force substances or monads, which are indivisible, independent and impenetrable. Each is like the other yet no two are identical, and they can in no way influence one another.

The monads extend in a hierarchy from the lower material, inanimate forms where passivity predominates up through the living creatures to the central monad or God who is pure activity. In the so-called higher bodies, such as plants, animals and men, one of the monads perceives the universe more clearly than the rest. Such a monad is called the ruling monad, the entelechy, soul or mind. Every finite monad has the clearest perceptions of those parts of the universe to which it is most nearly related; from its standpoint, it is a mirror of the universe.

The succession of ideas in each monad is determined by an immanent causality; the monads have no windows through which to receive influences from without. On the other hand, the variation in the relation of monads to one another -- their motion, combination, and separation -- depends on purely mechanical causes. But between the succession of ideas and the motions of the monad, there exists a harmony pre-determined and pre-established by God. The soul and body of a man agree like two clocks, originally set at the same time and keeping the same pace.

Leibnitz was a devoutly religious man, and he saw no conflict between reason and Christianity. Because of the harmony existing between divine and human reason,

man, by his very nature, has faith in God and immortality. Leibnitz was concerned with reconciling the mechanical and teleological views of the world and attempted to unite the scientific and religious interests of his time.[42]

Just as Realism in France culminated in the materialistic "enlightenment", so Idealism in Germany led to the rationalistic Aufklärung. The philosophical school that dominated the eighteenth century until the time of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 was founded by Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Because of the disfavor he found in pietistic circles, Wolff was dismissed from his professorship at Halle in 1723 by Frederick the Great. Like Thomasius, Wolff lectured in the German language, and he was instrumental in introducing and creating many of the terms and words still current in German philosophical usage.[43] He was not an original or creative thinker, but rather, his power lay in the area of systematization. He was almost completely dependent upon Leibnitz, and his school is often referred to as the Leibnitzio-Wolffian tradition.

Wolff's systematization and reduction hardly did justice to Leibnitz, for in the process, the two leading ideas of the theory of monads and the pre-established harmony lost their force and were given a different meaning. He weakened the first by denying perception

to all monads which were not souls and limited the pre-established harmony only to the case of body and soul. Philosophy is for him the science of the possible, that is, of that which contains no contradiction. He divides knowledge into two parts -- the theoretical and the practical. The former develops that which reason teaches, and the second that which experience shows to be real. He relied on the analytical and mathematical methods of demonstration which he held to be equally valid for all areas of human knowledge. His moral principle is the idea of perfection.

Some of the more important adherents of the Wolffian school were Ludwig Philipp Thümmig, (1697-1728); Georg Bernhard Bilfinger, (1693-1750); Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, (1714-1762); Johann Christoph Gottsched, (1700-1766); Kant's teacher at Königsberg, Martin Knutzen, (1713-1751); and Friedrich C. Baumeister, (1707-1785).[44]

The opponents of Wolff arranged themselves under the banner of Eclecticism. The three most notable were the theologian, Johann F. Buddeus, (1667-1729); the philosopher and physician, Andreas Rüdiger, (1673-1731); and Christian Adolf Crusius, (1712-1776), who opposed the optimism and determinism of Wolff and based ethics on the Will of God as the constitutive law.

The later heirs of the Wolffian philosophy became known as the Popular Philosophers. Most of these, too, were eclectics, who attempted to unite empiricism and rationalism. Metaphysics and natural philosophy were laid aside as useless subtleties, and man as the individual became the center of concern. Hand in hand with this narrowing of the content of philosophy went a change in the form of presentation. The chief aim of these men was not so much the search for truth as the dissemination of the truth, which they never doubted that they possessed. The style became light and flowing, the method of treatment facile and often superficial, and common sense was the criterion of judgment. As Mendelssohn said,

> The only business which I assign to my speculation is merely to rectify the utterances of sound common sense, and to change them, as much as is possible, into rational knowledge.[45]

The headquarters of this group was in Berlin, where Mendelssohn's writings were published, and where Nicolai edited his Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek. These publications rapidly spread their ideas throughout the whole of Germany. Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), was of Jewish extraction and primarily interested in philosophy of religion. He reduced all religions to the lowest common denominator of reason and fought

against intolerance. Friederich Nicolai, (1733-1811), was a self-taught man, who gained fame and influence as an editor. Lacking imagination, yet fighting for tolerance, he was extremely intolerant of all that he could not understand or absorb. Other names connected with this school are those of Sulzer, (1720-1779); Garve, (1742-1798); Abbt, (1738-1766);Engel, (1741-1802); and Platner, (1714-1818).[46] Two others of importance were the psychologist, J. N. Tetens, who influenced Kant by his three-fold division of the activities of the soul into knowing, feeling and willing;[47] and Reimarus, (1694-1768), a thoroughgoing rationalist, who later achieved fame as the anonymous author of the Wolfenbüttel Fragments.

In reaction against the coldness of rationalism, yet independent and critical of Kant, stands a group of thinkers known as the "Faith Philosophers." They stand in the same relation to the Aufklärung in Germany as Rousseau did to the French Enlightenment. Here the rights of feeling or intuition are vindicated as over against the reason. Three of the leaders of this anti-rationalistic tendency were Johann George Hamann, (1730-1788); Johann Gottfried Herder, (1744-1803); and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, (1743-1819).

The conflict and tension between the rival schools of Rationalism and Empiricism had continued without any apparent solution. The most significant reconciliation and fruitful combination was in the transcendental critical system inaugurated by the greatest thinker of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He was the son of an artisan family of Scottish descent that had formerly written its name Cant. Throughout his life, he is said never to have travelled more than forty miles from his native city of Koenigsberg. He never married and until his death in 1804 lived a life of the strictest self-discipline and regularity.[48]

Kant was trained in the dogmatic philosophical tradition of Wolff, but, influenced by the skepticism of Hume, he found this position no longer tenable. Kant was in agreement with Hume that the epistemological problem was the correct starting point for philosophy.[49] Kant held Empiricism to be in error in that it denied and discounted the active function of mind in the determination of knowledge. Kant disagreed with Rationalism and Dogmatism in that they transcended the sphere of experience without having previously justified this act by an examination of the faculty of knowledge. On the other hand, he retained Rationalism's theory

that the mind can construct truths and thus attain certainty for them. Kant's theory of knowledge held that the objects must conform to the faculty of perception and not vice versa. However, the object still formed the content of knowledge while the mind only systematized and formed judgments. Kant termed his system as transcendental or critical.

In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant proceeds to show the reasonableness of belief in the noumenal world and to prove that some of man's experience demands the postulation of such a noumenal order. All the ends to which desire may be directed are empirical and are motivated by sensuous and egotistical motives directed towards personal happiness. However, according to our moral consciousness, this is against the principle of morality. As motive for the moral will, Kant retains, after excluding all material motives, only the form of possible universality in the law which determines the will. This law comes as an unconditioned command or "categorical imperative."[50] On the moral consciousness are founded three morally necessary convictions which Kant terms "postulates of the pure practical reason." They are moral freedom, immortality and the existence of God.

The direction that philosophy took after Kant

is exemplified by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Like the Romanticists, they rejected the thinking of the Aufklärung, and then went on to build the new subjective philosophy of post-Kantian Idealism.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, (1762-1814), influenced first by Spinoza and then by Kant, carried out in theoretical philosophy the principle of the limitation of causality to phenomena more fully than Kant had done. He maintained that the "matter" of representations was not derived from the action of "things-in-themselves" but held that both the matter and form were the result of the activity of the Ego and that they were furnished by the same synthetic act which produces the forms of intuition and the categories. The contents of experience are produced by a creative faculty in ourselves. The Ego posits the non-Ego and recognizes itself as one with it. The process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis is the form of all knowledge.

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, (1775-1854), took as his starting point Fichte's doctrine of the Ego and transformed it into his System of Identity. Object and subject, real and ideal, nature and spirit are identical in the absolute. We perceive this identity by intellectual intuition.

The philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

Hegel, (1770-1831), was largely determinative for the nineteenth century. He developed the principle of identity postulated by Schelling and subjected it to the forms of demonstration according to Fichte's method of dialectical development and arrived at the system of Absolute Idealism. Philosophy is the science of the absolute. The absolute reason alienates, externalizes itself, becomes the other of itself in nature, and realizes itself in Spirit. There is a three-fold self-development: in the abstract element of thought; in nature; and in spirit -- thus corresponding to the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

H Theological Trends

The first reaction to the strait-jacketing hold of orthodoxy was the religious movement known as Pietism. Pietism, with its headquarters at the University of Halle, was the reigning force from approximately 1690 to 1730. It appeared first in the Reformed Church and came to Germany via Holland and Switzerland. However, the roots lie much deeper. The rigid severity, the strict formalism and the coldness of Orthodoxy had never quite suppressed the warm "heart" religion of the Reformation. In the mystics, such as Schwenckfeld, Weigel and later Böhme, this tradition had remained alive. The hymns of Paul Gerhardt and Johann Arndt's True Christianity

also helped to prepare the soil. The German movement was only a part of a great inter-confessional surge of re-awakening, finding its parallels in the Jansenists in the Roman Catholic Church and in the Puritans, Quakers and Methodists in Britain.[51]

Pietism was subjective Christianity. It cultivated and encouraged a lively introspection and the personal religious experience was valued more highly than dogma, conversion more than baptism. It insisted that faith should issue in works and the praxis pietatis. It made a clear distinction between the believers and those of the world, often adopting a strict ascetic legalistic code, forbidding participation in any of the "worldly" pleasures. Many times this was combined with a strong eschatological emphasis. Pietism tended to separate itself from the official church, particularly from the Caesaro-papism of the absolutist rulers and relied more on the fellowship of small groups of like-minded people.

The Pietists, according to Drummond,[52] can be divided into the following four main groups: (1) Those who were church reformers but realized that regeneration would depend on a minority of both the laity and the clergy. (2) Those who had little interest or hope for the church but hesitated, for secular reasons, to cut

themselves off completely. They were nominal church members but found their real spiritual home in the fellowship of the "twice-born". (3) The separatists who formed groups and communities of their own. (4) The wild fanatical and heretical sects which flourished in the early eighteenth century.

The leader of the German movement was Philipp Jakob Spener, (1635-1705), who gained wide attention by the publication of his Pia Desideria in 1675. This was a plea for the renewal of real personal religion. As the "Senior" pastor at Frankfurt-am-Main he began to put his beliefs into practice. Among his friends was Frederick William III of Brandenburg, who was also the patron of the newly founded University of Halle, (1694). Through Spener's influence, the majority of the faculty were Pietists.

The man who carried Pietism through in the most thorough manner, was August Hermann Fancke, (1663-1727), Spener's spiritual successor. Francke was appointed as the first Professor of Greek and Oriental Languages at Halle. He was tremendously popular with the students, and in some years as many as from eight hundred to twelve hundred young theologians came under his influence. His attitude towards scientific scholarship is well summarized in his statement that he valued

"a dram of living faith much higher than a hundredweight of pure historical knowledge; a drop of true love more than a whole sea of scholarship."[53]

However, to his credit must be said that he, more than any other leader of his time, actually put his faith into practice. Witnesses to this fact are the tremendous number of charitable institutions that he founded. This "father of Inner Missions" became also the "father of Foreign Missions" when he was instrumental in sending out Ziegenbalg in 1706 as the first protestant missionary to India. Not only did he start schools for orphans, for the nobility and artisans, and for the poor, but he founded a teachers-seminar, a hospital, a publishing house and a Bible society as well.[54]

Another leader was the Saxon nobleman, Nicholaus von Zinzendorf, (1700-1760). Spener was his baptismal sponsor and Francke was his teacher. Zinzendorf insisted that Christianity without community is impossible. The village of Herrnhut on his estate, originally a refuge for the persecuted Moravians, was the starting point of the Brethern Church.

Although it would have disclaimed all intention of doing so, Pietism, in reality, paved the way for the Aufklärung. By its insistence on subjectivism, individualism and general anthropocentricity, the main foun-

dations of the Aufklärung had been laid. The church was no longer the leading power of this age. She was on the defensive to re-adjust herself to the quickly changing "spirit of the times." Each time she reached a temporary solution, she found that the thought patterns of the age had changed and she was no better off than before. The burning theological question, then as now, was the relationship between the Gospel and the world -- where is the proper balance of being "in the world" yet "not of the world."

The theology of Transition, which bridged the gap between the Pietists and the Aufklärung theologians, is characterized by its scientific spirit, its reserved attitude towards dogma, and its historical interest.[55] The Jena Professor, Franz Buddeus, (1667-1729),[56] and the Tübingen Chancellor, Christoph Mathäus Pfaff, (1686-1760),[57] were alike both in their sympathy for Pietism and their critical attitude towards the scholastic subtleties of Orthodoxy. Both men warned of the danger of separating life from faith, and they encouraged the praxis pietatis. In the field of church history, men such as Johann Lorenz von Mosheim, (1693-1755), Johann George Walch, (1693-1775), and Matthias Schröckh, (1733-1808) deserve to be mentioned.[58] Following Wetstein's example, Johann August Ernesti, (1707-1781), applied

the principles of grammatico-historical interpretation to the New Testament, and Johann David Michaelis, (1717-1791), did the same with the Old Testament.[59]

The leader of the theologians of the Wolffian school was the Halle Professor, Sigmund Jakob Baumgarten, (1706-1767). He did not purposely intend to attack the dogma and the orthodox beliefs of the church but rather sought to defend them by making them clear to the reason. The ultimate result was the same.[60]

The Neologians, dating from about 1760 onwards, were the most typical theologians of the German Aufklärung. Although they did not deny revelation as such, they reduced it to those facts which could be understood by common sense. The three ideas that usually remained were God, Freedom and Immortality.[61]

Of the conservative branch of this development, Christian Fürchtegott Gellert, (1715-1769), is a typical example.[62] Of the radicals, the names of Karl Friedrich Bahrdt, (1741-1792), a thoroughly disgusting and immoral individual,[63] and Hermann Samuel Reimarus, (1694-1768), later famous through Lessing's anonymous and post-humous publication of his "Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes," should be mentioned.

The greatest representative of this group was undoubtedly Johann Salomo Semler, (1725-1791). Semler

was a pioneer in the field of Biblical Criticism. He was the first who applied historical-critical principles to the text of the canon itself. He denied the equal value of both Testaments, questioned the inspiration of the text, and doubted that the written word could be identified with Revelation. Semler insisted on making a distinction between theology and religion and thus insured freedom of critical research. "He believed that a man might be a true Christian in heart and yet not receive with the understanding all the doctrines which are revealed to the intellect."[64]

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, (1729-1781), a contemporary of Semler's, has been described as "the boldest and most penetrating thinker between Leibniz and Kant."[65] His work in the fields of drama and literature and the violent controversy occasioned by the Wolfenbüttel Fragments are superseded in importance theologically by his idea of progressive revelation. In his small brochure, "Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts," he sets forth the idea that, what education is to the individual, revelation is to the whole human race.

> In education the powers of the individual are not superseded, but rather elicited, and the progress must be slow. In like manner, the evolution of higher ideas in the race -- about God and man and duty and destiny -- must come

> through a long world-experience. Human character, as Lessing had himself said in another place, is formed less by the possession than by the pursuit of truth, and it is as sound a principle for the race as for the individual that knowledge, in order to have value, must be got through one's own effort, not disclosed in its completeness from without.[66]

The two-directional tendency of the conservative and critical branches of Neology led to the two schools of thought that were dominant as the nineteenth century dawned. Jena and Tübingen were the two principal centers from which this double current of Rationalism and Supranaturalism issued.

The Rationalists leaned heavily on Kant, adopting those parts of his philosophy that they found useful.[67] To this group, reason was both the last resort and the supreme authority in matters of religion.

Johann Friedrich Röhr, (1777-1848), was one of the more active leaders of German Rationalism. He was an extremely negative thinker who lashed out bitterly against any adversary whom he did not understand. The measure of truth is common sense, and reason has a right to reject every religious doctrine that is repugnant to it, or does not serve a moral end. The end of religion is morality, and this it is that makes Christianity acceptable to reason. The historical elements are valuable only as a means for propagating natural religion, which is the source of true morality.[68]

Julius August Ludwig Wegscheider, (1771-1849), was the most scientific of the group. In addition to works of exegesis and the relation of Kant's philosophy to theology, his Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae, published in 1815, became the official Dogmatics of Rationalism.[69]

The patriarch and the most consistent of the rationalists was Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, (1761-1851). Reacting strongly against the visionary mysticism of his father, he instinctively distrusted anything in religion that contradicted reason. He began his professorial career at Jena, where de Wette was one of his pupils, and later taught at Würzburg and Heidelberg. His most influential works were those on the life of Jesus and the Synoptic Gospels. He

> started from the principle that in the Gospels we must look for nothing but actual facts, not for poetry or legends, and that these facts were natural and not supernatural events, and that they had acquired the appearance of supernatural occurrences, or miracles, partly through the erroneous apprehension and judgment of the narrators. The task of the scientific commentator is to get rid of this false appearance and to see in the stories of the evangelists simple events with natural causes.[70]

He lacked a sense of the divine or religious although he was a man of the highest integrity, ability and sobriety.

The Supranaturalists separated from the Ration-

alists in professing a sincere attachment to revealed truth. Both were in agreement in looking upon Christianity as a kind of teaching or collection of truths and doctrines, which it is necessary to engrave in the spirit of man, but they differed in their view as to how this teaching was communicated to man.

Some of the representative systematic theologians were Gottlob Christian Storr (1746-1805), of Tübingen; Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753-1812);[71] and Johann Christoph Friedrich Steudel (1779-1837), the founder of the Tübingen Review, the chief organ for the dissemination of the Supranaturalist viewpoint.[72]

Also of importance are the pragmatic church historians, Gottlieb Jakob Planck (1751-1833), and the exegetical scholar Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, (1752-1837), who systematically applied the principle enunciated by Semler, Lessing, and Herder that the books of the Bible must be read and criticized as human productions.

It is against this background and in this setting that we must see Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette. Theologically he tried to synthesize what was legitimate and true in the two tendencies of Rationalism and Supranaturalism, but he did not succeed in creating a new and lasting system. It has been stated that de Wette summed up the philosophical influence of the eighteenth cen-

tury on theology

> under the most scientific and religious form, while demonstrating by their very imperfection the necessity of a transformation. He is the most distinguished representative of the criticism of that period which is at once sceptical and confident, which is doubtless more negative than positive, yet which is so from conscience and as if with regret. Viewed both as a man of science and in relation to his character, the personality of de Wette is one of those of which the study is most instructive and attractive. He has been surnamed the Nathanael of the modern theology. And, in fact, the purity of his character, the sincerity of his convictions, and the scrupulous conscientiousness which he exhibited in his work, have deservedly procured him this name: and these qualities recommend him to our attention as in some sort the ideal type of the German theologian.[73]

De Wette never gained the lasting acclaim which he deserved, either in his own country or outside of it, primarily because he was so completely overshadowed by his contemporary and one-time faculty colleague, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Schleiermacher received his early training from the pietistic Moravian Brethren and later was strongly influenced by Kant and by the Greek philosophers. For a time, he was also associated with the Romantic movement in Berlin. He dissolved much of the Rationalist-Supranaturalist controversy by taking Christianity out of the area of dogma and doctrine and making it a matter of subjective and individual feeling -- a matter of the heart. His towering personality, his creative genius and pregnant thought

completely dominated the theological thought of the century in which he lived -- so much so, that protestant theology in modern times is dated before and after Schleiermacher.[74]

CHAPTER II

DE WETTE'S LIFE

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A Childhood and Student Years

1 The de Wette Family

In 1559 the forefathers of Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette fled from Alba, Holland and settled in Germany in order to escape the persecution of the Dutch protestants which Philip II of Spain (1556-1598) had instigated. The de Wette family[1] acquired a small tract of land near Ermsleben in the diocese of Halberstadt in the lower Harz Mountains. Early in the seventeenth century the first de Wette was ordained into the ministry. From that time until the death of W. M. L. de Wette in 1849, there was an unbroken pastoral tradition in the de Wette family.[2]

Johann Augustin de Wette, who was born in Cornburg on April 5, 1744, studied theology and became a pastor at Ulla in 1776. On November 4, 1777, he married Christiana Dorothea Schneider, the eldest daughter of Pastor Immanuel W. Schneider of Rastenburg. A little more than two years later, on January 12, 1780, a son was born to this marriage. He was baptized Wilhelm

Martin Leberecht, having been named after his baptismal sponsors First Deacon Wilhelm Schneider of Weimar and Leberecht Schwabe, the Mayor of Ulla and Lawyer to the Royal Court.

The first four years of young Wilhelm's life were spent in the quiet country village of Ulla, which lay near the main road between Erfurt and Weimar. From 1784 to 1792 his father served the parish of Grosscromsdorf. When Wilhelm was six years of age, his father gave him a Bible for his birthday as a reward for his industry and as an aid to his progress in reading. Little did he realize then that this book was to occupy his attention throughout his life.[3]

In 1792 the family moved again; this time to Mannstedt bei Buttstadt, where his father continued his ministry for twenty years until his death on February 18, 1812. The elder de Wette had been a true shepherd and counselor to his congregation during the difficult years of the Napoleonic invasions. He was a stern father to his children but was very much concerned that all seven of them should have a sound and thorough education.

2 Gymnasium Years

Wilhelm attended the Buttstädter Stadtschule, a preparatory school under the direction of Johann

Daniel Balthasar Schmidt. Rector Schmidt was an able teacher with a thorough knowledge of literature and ancient languages. Because of the proximity of Buttstadt to his home Wilhelm was able to spend the week-ends with his family. During the week he lived with his roommate, Friedrich Carl Peucer,[4] in the home of Wilke, an elderly leather worker.

In the fall of 1796, de Wette entered the Gymnasium in Weimar of which the famous Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) was superintendent. Weimar was at this time one of the cultural centers of Germany. Under the patronage of the Duke of Weimar, Karl August, men such as Goethe, Schiller and Wieland had settled there. Quite naturally the young students were inspired and stimulated by the common sight of these literary masters, and they spent much time reading, discussing and comparing their works. Herder and Schiller exerted a lasting influence on the young de Wette.[5]

De Wette's study at the Gymnasium was temporarily interrupted in the fall of 1798 when he was asked to accompany a French official's fourteen year old son to Geneva. His acquaintance with the boy began when he tutored him in Greek. De Wette's father expressed concern as to the wisdom of the journey but finally gave his consent after he had been assured by the director of

the Gymnasium that it would be quite as valuable as the time spent in the Gymnasium. On November 4, the two young students left by coach and traveled via Naumburg, Leipzig, Dresden, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Schaffhausen and Zürich. Early in December they arrived in Geneva. De Wette was particulary impressed by the architecture of Leipzig and by the Falls of the Rhine at Schaffhausen.

The stay in Geneva was much longer than they had anticipated since the young Frenchman had difficulties with his passport, and de Wette had to remain with his charge. The letters that de Wette wrote to his father during the prolonged stay in Geneva show the clean, upright spirit of the youthful student. In one of his letters he writes,

> Granted, dear father, that I perhaps would have learned more school wisdom in Weimar but my time in Geneva has not been spent in vain. My horizons have been widened, I have learned to know people and countries, strange mountains and beautiful valleys. Even if my longer absence costs more, I am still not spending the money for meals at Weimar and I will be doubly thankful for your continued fatherly and motherly concern and love.[6]

Finally the passport difficulties were settled and Wilhelm was free to return to Germany. After a week spent with his family, he returned to the Gymnasium

with new zeal. The director of the Gymnasium had been right; de Wette was richer in experience, more independent, and had a new vision of what he wanted. In 1799 he passed his Abitur with flying colors and made plans to enroll at the University of Jena.

3 University Years

The following fall de Wette enrolled as a student of law at the University of Jena. Later, through his interest in philosophy, he changed to a theological course.

Jena was at this time one of the leading cultural and intellectual centers of Germany. The faculty included such names as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Fries, Schlegel, Griesbach, Paulus and Gabler, while Goethe, Schiller, Wieland and Herder were frequent visitors.

Philosophically, de Wette was little attracted by Hegel, was stimulated by Schelling but found in Fries the most satisfying system. In his autobiographical novel, Theodor oder des Zweiflers Weihe, de Wette describes the reaction of Theodor (really de Wette himself) to the Friesian philosophy in that he says upon hearing this professor "it was as if through this view, all the fragments of his previous knowledge and convictions had been magically united into a well-ordered whole."[7]

In the theological faculty de Wette's critical interests were awakened and stimulated by the famous critic Griesbach[8] and by his pupil and successor, Gabler.[9] Paulus,[10] under suspicion of heresy and against whom de Wette had been warned by his father, strongly attracted the young theologian. He writes in his autobiographical novel that

> he followed with pleasure the critical and clever combinations through which, out of the customs and concepts of that time and out of the hidden and unconscious references which are pointed out in the narrative itself, the miraculous and inexplicable parts of the gospel stories were resolved into something natural and comprehensible.[11]

However, the result of his first year of theological study was that he began to question all his previous convictions regarding the history of the origins of Christianity. He says that the "holy halo," which for him had surrounded the life of Jesus and the gospel history, had disappeared, and in place of a calm historical clarity he was left with nothing but doubt, insecurity and disorder.[12]

It was in the next year that through Fries he again found a firm footing for his faith, and he remained forever grateful to his teacher. Shortly after the re-discovery of his faith and in a burst of youthful enthusiasm, he wrote Eine Idee über das Studium der Theologie. He says,

> The devotion to God was awakened in my heart with new life and the faith in immortality returned to me in a higher and clearer form. Theology was for me no longer a dark, cold ethical judge or only a daughter of history, theology arose before my eyes to a higher, heavenly majesty, to divine worth. The study of theology now fills my heart completely and inspires me with a vital quickening warmth. It is for me the highest and most heavenly course of study and nothing could make me change to another field. I am happy in the consciousness that by becoming a theologian; I am also becoming the most noble and happiest person.[13]

As the time for his final examinations drew near, de Wette was torn between the desire of his father, who wanted his son to take the examination and become a parish pastor, and his own desire to continue his studies. The fact that he disliked one of the members of the examining consistorium helped him to decide against his father's wishes. His decision to embark on an academic career was warmly supported by Griesbach and Eichstadt. To help finance his studies, he applied for the Lynker'sche Stipendium. One of the stipulations of the scholarship was that the recipient must deliver a Latin lecture defending the Augsburg Confession. This he did on August 5, 1806, with his "Vindicae auctoritatis, qua augustana confessio praedita est, symbolica etc".[14] He stated that the Augsburg Confession was neither obsolete nor was it a fetter inhibiting free

research. It was rather a representative and guardian of the true faith and of freedom of conscience, in that it stood as a defence against heresies and Roman Catholic abuses. The faith expressed there was not that of the general religious belief in reason but the positive faith in Christ.

Under the guidance of Paulus and Griesbach, de Wette began work on his doctoral dissertation. He turned to the critical problem of the Pentateuch and sought to show that Deuteronomy was written at a considerably later date than the first four books. On March 11, 1805, he was awarded his doctor's degree.

In the spring of the same year he married Eberhardine Boye of Bayreuth, a woman five years older than he, whom he had met at the home of one of his friends. He wrote of her that she was neither wealthy nor beautiful, but she was rich in spirit, noble in character, affectionate and worthy of love.[15] Here too, de Wette had gone against the wishes of his father and the tension between the two increased.

De Wette was now lecturing as a Privatdozent under the guidance of Griesbach. In addition, he was expanding his doctoral dissertation in order to publish it. When the work was finished, Griesbach agreed to help him find a publisher and wrote to Halle about the

matter. Unknown to the faculty in Jena, Professor Vater of Halle was in the process of publishing a commentary on the Pentateuch containing much of the same material as de Wette's dissertation. Because of this unfortunate literary "collision," de Wette's hopes of having his work published dwindled. The faculty at Jena, hoping to save his work from a complete loss, advised him to include the Books of the Chronicles in his area of research and thus throw a new light on the whole Pentateuch. This de Wette did and planned to publish his work as a supplement to Vater's commentary. In the fall of 1806, the first volume of his Beiträge zur Einleitung ins Alte Testament appeared with a short preface by Professor Griesbach. Much to de Wette's joy, the book was well received in academic circles. With renewed hope, he published the second volume in 1807, with his own preface and with the sub-title, "Kritik der Israelitischen Geschichte." Here he took issue with the pragmatic historical method introduced by Jakob Plank and viewed the Pentateuch as a theocratic Israelitic epic written in the nationalistic enthusiasm of a later period.

In the year 1807 the young scholar suffered a double loss. In February his wife died in childbirth, and the child was stillborn. She had been a true,

understanding and loving helpmeet and an efficient manager of their small income.

In October of the same year, he lost all his earthly possessions as the armies of Napoleon surged forward, plundering and burning all in their path.

Thus in a period of a few months he lost his wife, his library and his possessions. De Wette turned to his father for aid, but the elder de Wette, because of his son's disobedience in regard to both his marriage and his academic career, refused. However, de Wette's mother took secretly of her small savings and thus helped him through the most difficult months.

B As Professor of Theology

1 Heidelberg

The saving factor for de Wette financially was his call to the University of Heidelberg as Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy with a salary of five hundred gulden. The university there had been founded in 1386 but in the time after the Reformation practically ceased to exist. In 1803 the university was re-established under the patronage of Prince Karl Friedrich and soon grew to be one of the more important German educational centers.

On coming to Heidelberg de Wette was overjoyed to have again the companionship of his teacher and friend

Fries, who had been a professor there since 1805. The two spent long hours together, and de Wette came to philosophical clarity in such a way that he never again changed the philosophical basis of his thought.[16] Daub,[17] Creuzer[18] and Boekh were other members of the faculty there. De Wette had only a small group of hearers, but he was pleased with their loyalty.

In 1809, de Wette was appointed as Ordinary Professor of Theology. In the fall of that year he married Henrietta Frisch Beck[19] the widow of a Mannheim merchant; who unlike his first wife, had little understanding for the academic way of life. She brought with her into the marriage an eleven year old son, Karl.[20]

During these years in Heidelberg, de Wette continued to concentrate chiefly on the Old Testament. In addition to articles in periodicals, he began his commentary on the Psalms. Together with Augusti, he prepared a new translation of the Old Testament. The translation was designed primarily for pastors as a supplement, correction, and elucidation of the Luther translation on the basis of later texts and biblical scholarship.

De Wette was not destined to remain in Heidelberg for long. The government and university administration grew more conservative, and small circles of opposition

began to form.[21] Disunity among the professors and suspicions of unbelief and heresy made the call to a Berlin professorship a welcome one.

2 The Berlin Period

Up until the beginning of this century, Berlin had had no university of its own. However, Friedrich Wilhelm III, hoping to make Berlin the center of his kingdom, decreed in his cabinet order of Christmas 1809, that a university was to be founded.[22] He hoped that this institution would be instrumental in rebuilding and replacing that which Prussia had lost to foreign powers. The general task of organizing the theological department was given to Friedrich Schleiermacher. It was he who suggested to the ministerium that de Wette of Heidelberg be called as a professor of theology to the new university, since de Wette was a "thorough, earnest and truth-loving man."[23] Schleiermacher's suggestion was approved and on July 11, the call was dispatched to Heidelberg. On July 24 de Wette answered:

> I have accepted. This is a move to a new destiny and a new task, and I look forward to working with a more suitable group than I have found here. The hope of your friendship has greatly influenced my decision. I hope to see you soon.[24]

The de Wette family arrived in Berlin in October of 1810. En route they had visited friends at Jena and

and Weimar as well as de Wette's parents.[25] His sixty-six year old father was now reconciled to his son's career.

Upon arrival in Berlin, de Wette was introduced to Schleiermacher but found him "etwas Vornehmthuendes"[26] and felt that it would be impossible for the two of them to be very close friends. De Wette settled with his family in a house in the Georgenstrasse[27] where particularly the garden pleased him.

The new university grew rapidly and in the fall of 1811 there were approximately 600 students, 130 of whom studied theology. De Wette writes proudly that he had 53 students in his New Testament exegetical lectures -- "more than Schleiermacher, which makes me happy" --[28] and about 30 in his other lectures. However, with the wars of liberation in 1812-13, most of the students answered the call of ad arma pro patria and de Wette used the opportunity to continue his literary activity.

In 1811 he published his Commentar Über die Psalmen in which he assigns many of the Davidic Psalms to a much later period and denies any reference to Christ in the Messianic Psalms. Two years later the University of Breslau awarded him an honorary doctor's degree, and for this occasion he wrote his much discussed little work Commentatio de morte Jesu Christi

expiatoria. The same year his Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik came off the press. Based on Fries' philosophy, it was designed to counteract the growing influence of Hegel and Schelling. In 1815 he published Ueber Religion und Theologie, which was to serve as a companion volume to his Dogmatik and clarify more fully the philosophical basis of his thought. Another work of importance published during this Berlin period was his Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen und apokryphischen Bücher des Alten Testaments, which appeared in 1817.

At the first, de Wette had little fellowship with his faculty colleagues. This was due partly to the size of the city, which limited frequent contacts, and partly to personal differences. With Marheineke, who had also opposed him in Heidelberg, he found it impossible to be friends. In 1814 de Wette writes,

> My break with Marheineke is definite. He polemizes against my biblical dogmatics in the classroom. He says it is particularly untheological to base a biblical dogmatics on the philosophy of a Kant, a Fichte or a Schelling, but it is even worse to base it on a philosopher pulled out from under the bench.[29]

Neander[30] and de Wette respected each other but no close friendship developed. Lücke records how he succeeded in bringing the two men together, but that their differences prevented a deeper fellowship.[31] De Wette's

relationship to Schleiermacher was at first strained because of their difference of opinion in calling Fries to Berlin.[32] However later, partly again through Lücke's influence, a deep and lasting friendship was established. In 1817 de Wette wrote to Fries, "This man (Schleiermacher) becomes dearer to me every day. I hold that his position is not as far from us as his method would seem to indicate."[33] Later, at the time of de Wette's dismissal from Berlin, Schleiermacher stood solidly on de Wette's side.

De Wette's relationship to the young Privatdozent, Friedrich Lücke, was particulary close.[34] The latter was almost a daily visitor in de Wette's home, and the two edited a harmony of the Synoptic gospels in 1818. They also planned a theological quarterly and a critical edition of Luther's works. However, this same year, Lücke was called to Bonn, and a year later de Wette was to be a banned person.

De Wette's marriage and home life was not altogether a happy one. Two children were born during the Berlin stay -- Anna,[35] on his birthday on January 12, 1811, and a son Ludwig[36] on November 9, 1812. They were a source of pride and joy to their father but the relationship with his wife was much more difficult. She had little understanding for her husband's academic

life and in addition tended to be moody, jealous, dogmatic and extravagant. After de Wette's dismissal from Berlin, with the exception of a short period in Basel, the two were separated.

3 The Kotzebue Affair and de Wette's Dismissal

During the Napoleonic occupation, a new spirit of nationalism and patriotism grew in Germany.[37] This reached its climax in the war of independence and the final defeat of Napoleon in 1814-15. Liberal and democratic voices became loud and demanded freedom, a united Germany and a constitutional form of government. However, the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 and the Holy Alliance between the monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia heralded the victory of the monarchical form of government and of the forces of reaction. Under the leadership of Prince Metternich of Austria, the intellectual and political movements striving towards freedom were suppressed. The re-awakened religious forces were channeled into the paths of Romanticism and orthodoxy.

The reaction of the students to this restorative tendency was strong and immediate. A new form of student organization (Die Burschenschaften) was openly politically active against the Holy Alliance. The

focal point of this new movement was the University of Jena. The climax was reached at the famed Wartburg-fest in October of 1817.[38] Originally planned as a celebration of the Tercentenary of the Reformation, it turned into a political rally for a free Vater-land. Professors and students delivered passionate patriotic addresses; resolutions were passed, and ob-jectionable books were thrown into the fire.

The reaction on the part of Metternich and the conservative forces was immediate. Fearing a revo-lution, they forbade the use of the sportsfields and the gathering of students in any considerable numbers. At the Karlsbad Congress in 1819, the governments appointed officials to attend the lectures and univer-sity sessions in order to control and report the atti-tudes of the students and the political irregularities of the professors. De Wette had expressed himself clearly against this movement in his article in the Reformation Almanac and in his essay "Zur christlichen Belehrung und Ermahnung" written in 1819.

The immediate cause of de Wette's dismissal was much more coincidental. In the fall of 1818, de Wette and his twenty year old step-son were going to the Rheinland in order to meet Mrs. de Wette and travel back to Berlin with her. En route they stopped at Jena

where de Wette talked with Fries, and Karl Beck, the step-son, was enjoying the company of some Jena students. One of these students, having learned of their prospective journey, asked them to deliver a letter and pay a visit to his parents at Wunsiedel. This they did and were graciously received by Justizrat Sand and his family.

Not many months later a cry of horror rang out through Germany. August von Kotzebue, one time State Consul for Russia and now the editor of a newspaper in Mannheim which spearheaded the conservative forces, had been murdered. Kotzebue had long been considered by the patriotic students as a traitor to his country. The murderer, a young veteran of the war of liberation and a theological student, had been influenced by a Privatdozent in Jena who taught that the end justifies the means. This confused and fanatical student wrote a letter to his parents, and then set out for Mannheim where he murdered Kotzebue on March 23, 1819.[39] His name was Karl Ludwig Sand of Wunsiedel -- the son of the family where de Wette had stayed.

When de Wette heard the news, the thought of the grieving and disgraced parents caused him to write a letter of comfort. He wrote that, although this deed was contrary to the laws of the land and morally

unjustifiable, one must try to understand the motive for it. Writing in the emotion of the moment, de Wette included a couple of sentences --

> He was convinced in this matter. He felt it was right to do what he did, and in this sense he did rightly. -- The manner in which the deed was done by this pious youth, with such faith and confidence, is a good sign of the times.[40] --

that later proved fatal.

A storm of protest broke out against de Wette. In some unknown manner the contents of the letter had fallen into the hands of the reactionaries and they passed it on to King Friedrich Wilhelm III. The man responsible was very probably Baron von Kottwitz.[41] Of course, these men read the letter with very different eyes from those of the sorrowing parents. The king notified de Wette through the rector of the university that he was to appear for trial on August 28. Here de Wette was asked whether or not he had written the letter in this form. He answered that he could no longer be sure of the exact wording but admitted that this was substantially the content. De Wette appealed for a hearing before a more competent body but was refused. He later submitted a written explanation and defence of his cause but to no avail. On October 2, one of the ministers of state, Altenstein, handed

de Wette the verdict. It stated that in the light of past events "he could no longer be entrusted with the teaching of the youth and he was now dismissed from the teaching office."[42]

Dismissal was the last thing that de Wette had expected. He wrote a personal letter of appeal to the king[43] but with no result. The Senatus of the University, upon the suggestion of Schleiermacher and Neander, sent a petition to the king asking him to reconsider his decision, but this too was refused.

The rector of the university, on behalf of the Senate, wrote to de Wette and assured him that their

> unweakened respect and warm sympathy will follow you wherever you go. May this open and hearty assurance be of some comfort to you at your departure and may you soon find the peacefulness and calm of which you are so pre-eminently worthy.[44]

His faculty colleagues; Schleiermacher, Neander and Marheineke; also wrote him saying,

> We suffer as much through this unfortunate matter as do you ... and we beg you to look upon our spiritual unity in the service of truth and the furthering of scholarly endeavor in our field as being untouched by any outward circumstance.[45]

De Wette gratefully acknowledged these words of confidence and comfort.[46] His last letter in Berlin, however, was again addressed to the king. This letter is remarkable for its lack of bitterness or pettiness.

The last words were "Gott segne Thron und Reich."[47]

A group of his students presented him with a silver cup on which were inscribed the last lines of Luther's famous Reformation hymn -- "Nehmen Sie uns den Leib, Gut, Ehr', Kind und Weib." Included was a letter thanking de Wette for his fatherly concern for his students and expressing their gratitude for what he had given them.[48]

The night before his departure a group of friends gathered together to wish him well, and the next morning another group of students gave him a cup inscribed with the words, "auch in der Ferne vergiss mein nicht!" But, in the eyes of the Prussian government, he left Berlin as a persona non grata.

4 The Years as a Banned Person

On November 2, 1819, de Wette and his family arrived in Weimar with no work, little money and no idea of what the future held. The next day his wife decided to take the children and return to Heidelberg, in spite of the fact that she knew that her husband could not follow her since the government of Baden had forbidden his entrance into the city.

His dismissal from Berlin meant that he could no longer hold a university post in Germany; since all

of the governments, out of fear and respect for Prussia, dared not appoint such a suspect person. Through his friend Peucer in Weimar, de Wette made friends in literary circles. The matter of finances was, however, extremely difficult, and for some time a group of his friends, including Schleiermacher, Lücke, Hossbach, Jonas, Schirmer, Wiegand, Schulz, Neander, Reimer and others, took up collections and sent them to de Wette in Weimar.

In the next years in addition to his writing, he traveled extensively in Germany and Switzerland because of the solitude and restlessness caused by the separation from his family. The desire to see his children brought him frequently to Mannheim.[49] The situation with his wife became increasingly strained, and her constant bickering and demand for more money brought him almost to the point of desperation.[50]

The focal point of his work during this period was his gathering and editing of the letters of Luther. Although this critical collection of Dr. Martin Luthers Briefen, Sendschreiben und Bedenken was not published until 1825, the work was ready for the printer by Easter of 1822. Wiegand writes of this work,

> Yes, it is a fact that de Wette with this five volume work has erected a worthy monument in the field of church history and both the church and protestant theology owe him a debt of gratitude.[51]

In addition to his Actensammlung über die Entlassung des Prof. de Wette vom Theologischen Lehramt zu Berlin in 1820 and several articles in periodicals and encyclopedias, he also prepared a second edition of his Ueber Religion und Theologie.

De Wette also tried his hand at an entirely new type of writing, that of the novel. His motives were two-fold: firstly, to help stabilize his delicate financial position; and secondly, to try and show in a more popular form the spiritual forces of the time and the problems they involved. The result was his Theodor oder des Zweiflers Weihe, Bildungsgeschichte eines evangelischen Geistlichen which was published in 1822. This obviously autobiographical novel concerns the development of a young theological student, Theodor; who, through doubt and despair caused by the rationalism and critical scepticism of the time, is temporarily diverted from the path of the ministry. He later meets a philosopher (Fries) who gives him the foundation for a stronger and more mature faith, and thus Theodor again takes up the ministry. Rudolf Otto states that,

"In church history the book may be called a first authority: it contains the personal experience of a specialist".[52]

De Wette knew that he could not live indefinitely on his literary ability alone, but other opportunities and possibilities were difficult. On his travels he had met two pastors in Strasbourg who had informed him of a vacancy in the faculty there. However, after writing to friends in Paris and checking the possibilities, he was informed that this appointment in the border city would be politically impossible, although he was welcome to come there and continue his literary work as a private citizen.

The only other logical possibility was that of the pastoral office. Since his dismissal from Berlin, de Wette had been more and more drawn to the practical side of church life. Because of his academic career, he had, previously to this period, never preached more than half dozen sermons in his life. Now he began preaching in the small village churches near Weimar and he was so pleased with this work and happy with his success that he felt he would be content in his own pastorate.

In the spring of 1821, the pastorate of the large St. Katherine's Parish in Braunschweig had become

vacant. The procedure for filling the office consisted of inviting several pastors to preach trial sermons; the names of three were then submitted by the Church Council to the Stadt Direktor. He generally appointed the first named and submitted his appointment to the king for approval. Since de Wette's name was known throughout Germany, and upon the recommendation of a local bookseller who had read some of his sermons,[53] he was the first pastor invited to preach a trial sermon. The news of his coming in September had caused the members of the parish to reserve all the seats eight days in advance. De Wette delivered his sermon on the Thirteenth Sunday after Trinity[54] to a congregation of five thousand. His sermon was received with enthusiasm and the St. Katherine Church Board later made him their unanimous choice for the pastorate of the parish.

On October 30, the list of three pastors - de Wette, Damköhler, and Bernhard - was presented to the Stadt Direktor with the request that the first named be appointed. The Stadt Direktor added his recommendation for de Wette and presented the names to the government for confirmation. This was a trustee government under the authority of King George the IV of England and Hannover. On December 3, the government

confirmed the appointment of Pastor Damköhler, to the amazement of the parishioners. After a private letter of dissuasion had reached him, Pastor Damköhler refused the appointment. Thus the Church Council once again presented de Wette's name. This time the government replied, "since the necessary confirmation has been refused on carefully weighed grounds, this request can in no way be granted."[55] The note continued by saying that de Wette's name would not be accepted again and should the parish show further evidence of obstinacy, their rights would be suspended and a pastor would be appointed directly. Furthermore the city authorities had the right to forbid the entrance and stay of Professor de Wette in the city of Braunschweig.

In spite of this, the Church Council again submitted de Wette's name and they were told that by the king's decree this name was not acceptable. They then refused to make use of their right to present candidates. Feeling ran so high that members of the City Council received threatening letters but nothing could be done. The government then set about appointing the pastor directly. After several pastors had refused, H. M. Sachtleben finally agreed, and the hopes for de Wette were at an end.

In the late summer of the same year, de Wette was asked unofficially if he would consider a call to the theological faculty at Basel. Basel was at that time a small and somewhat retarded Hochschule, firmly in the grips of conservative pietism. The salary that they offered was pathetically inadequate. To a friend, de Wette wrote,

> It is only natural that I have very little desire to go to Basel since I will find there a rather limited area of effectiveness -- at least I will have to create this -- and a poor income. I would sooner have gone to Braunschweig. The separation from my friends will be the hardest of all.[56]

However, since Braunschweig became impossible and Basel had extended an official call, de Wette reluctantly accepted.

5 The Years in Basel

De Wette arrived with his family in Basel on May 3, 1822, and was met by a number of professors and townspeople. The next day a group of twenty-two students called at his home to bid him welcome.

Academically, the situation was difficult for de Wette. There were only two other professors in the theological faculty, Buxtorf and Falkeisen, and their methods and views were those of the previous century. For almost a century, the university had been isolated from all outside influences and was stagnant

in orthodoxy and fundamentalism. Many courses in theology were simply not being taught because of the lack of qualified men. De Wette himself lectured regularly in the fields of exegesis, dogmatics and ethics.[57] His suggestion to call a fourth professor was refused, since it would have meant adding another German to the faculty. De Wette's only course was to try to train young Swiss theologians for the task. In this he succeeded admirably.[58]

The conservative forces which had opposed his coming were still active. In order to find closer contact and to gain the confidence of the people, de Wette began preaching regularly in the churches of Basel. In addition he also gave a series of public lectures which were well attended and helped alleviate the financial strain.[59]

Other factors caused additional problems. In 1824 Prussia had accused a number of the students who were studying at Basel of plotting against the Prussian government. Among these was de Wette's step-son, Karl Beck. This of course again threw suspicion on de Wette and the whole university, and for a time the number of German students at Basel dropped sharply. Then too, the financial difficulties of the university had set a movement afoot to unite the faculties of Basel, Bern

and Zürich into one university for all of Switzerland. This movement reached its climax in 1830, and for a number of years uncertainty reigned.

In light of these facts, it is not surprising that de Wette was not impervious to calls elsewhere. In 1824 Braunschweig once again called him; but, fearing a repetition of his previous experience there, he declined. In the same year the University of Rostock offered him a professorship; and in 1826 Jena showed interest in calling him but de Wette felt that he could hardly leave Basel after such a short time. In 1831 Jena again considered calling him, but the problem was solved by cutting down the size of the faculty there. In 1832 de Wette was asked privately if he would consider coming to Marburg. He said he certainly would and prepared to accept the call, turning down a similar offer from Strasbourg. However, when the Ministerium in Marburg presented his name for the official call, the Hessen government refused, fearing repercussions from Prussia.

Several congregations in Germany had also shown interest in calling him as their pastor.... Jena in 1828, Frankfurt in 1829, Bremen in 1832, and St. Peter's parish in Hamburg in 1834. To the first three, he answered negatively, but he accepted the call to

Hamburg. However, upon more careful reflection, he felt a certain duty and debt of gratitude to Basel and the university, since it had offered him work and refuge in his own most trying days. Would it not be gross ingratitude to leave the university now in its most difficult time? De Wette reversed his previous decision and remained in Basel.

Another factor influencing his decision was his engagement and marriage on April 15, 1833 to Sophie Streckeisen von Mai, a pastor's widow.[60] De Wette's second wife, who had accompanied him to Basel in 1822 but left him again a few months later, had taken suddenly ill and died in 1825. He had met his third wife while she was visiting friends in Basel. In 1832 she moved to Basel permanently, and later in the same year de Wette asked for her hand in marriage. Although she was not wealthy, she did have sufficient money to ease de Wette's financial position considerably. In 1834, they bought a house and this remained their home until his death.

During his years in Basel de Wette's literary activity continued unabated. In addition to his novel, Theodor and the five volume collection of Luther's letters, which had been written earlier but were first published while he was in Basel, he wrote Vorlesungen über die Sittenlehre, 1823-1824; five volumes of sermons covering

the period from 1825-1839; Lehrbuch der Einleitung in das Neue Testament, 1826; Ueber die Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsform und ihrem Einfluss auf das Leben, 1827; a second novel, Heinrich Melchthal, oder Bildung und Gemeingeist, 1829; Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre, 1833; Ueber die erbauliche Erklärung der Psalmen, 1836; Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, 1846; and his chief exegetical work, Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, in three volumes and eleven parts in the years 1836-1848.

During the last fifteen years of his life, de Wette's health began to fail. He was bothered by a weak respiratory system, chronic fatigue and partial loss of acute vision. In spite of a number of "cures" and visits to health resorts, his weakness increased.[61]

The year 1847 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of his professorship in Basel, and he was royally feted by the city. A banquet was given in his honor, and the gratitude of the citizens, professors and students was evident in the laudatory speeches. That evening the students held a torch light parade in his honor.

Two years later, on June 7, 1849, after having presided over a long committee meeting in his fourth

term as rector, he complained of sharp rheumatic pains. He was confined to his bed, and on June 13, the symptoms of typhus clearly manifested themselves. Three days later, on June 16, at 5:00 P.M., he died.

The entire community mourned his loss. The Dean of the Theological Faculty, K. R. Hagenbach, preached the funeral sermon in the Elisabethkirche on June 19, using as his text Luke 2:29-32. To the music of Beethoven's Funeral March, he was borne to his last resting place by students and that evening the students held a torch light memorial service at his grave.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF DE WETTE'S THOUGHT

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A Influences on de Wette's Thought

The people and factors influencing the formation of de Wette's thought are as varied as the areas in which he worked.[1] One historian makes this statement:

> Through Griesbach and Paulus he became an astute critic; Herder made him a Christian humanist, while through Fries he became a religious-aesthetic idealist. His association with Schleiermacher increased and deepened his theological reflection, but it is to his (de Wette's) credit that he united these heterogeneous influences into a comprehensive religious viewpoint.[2]

Such a statement is, of course, an oversimplification but it does contain a good deal of truth.

1 Jakob Friedrich Fries

Jakob Friedrich Fries was the greatest single influence in shaping de Wette's thought. De Wette openly confesses his complete reliance and dependence upon him philosophically.[3] "Regarding the philosophical system of Fries, everyone knows that I am attached to it with complete conviction."[4] "In my opinion he is

one of the greatest geniuses in the history of philosophy."[5] De Wette, however, maintains that even before he knew Fries and his philosophy, he had, as the result of his own studies and speculation, adopted essentially the same standpoint as Fries. De Wette says he himself had neither the patience nor the gift to build a complete system but found in Fries' philosophy the scientific clarification of his own views.[6] This sounds a bit too optimistic in view of some of the letters he earlier wrote to Fries and the account he gives in his novel.[7] However, the systems of the two men are so nearly identical, apart from the theological ramifications, that when one speaks of Fries, de Wette is also included.

2 Influences Common to Fries and de Wette

This also complicates the problem of tracing the influences on de Wette, since one cannot clearly ascertain whether those factors which he has in common with Fries have been channeled through Fries, or if he was influenced independently. The logical assumption is that both happened. Those men who commonly influenced both Fries and de Wette were Kant, Jacobi, Schiller, and Schleiermacher.

Kant. - Immanuel Kant was the master from whom both took their starting point. Yet they felt that

Kant had not completed his system and this Fries took as his task. This will be seen more clearly in the development of Fries' philosophy later in this chapter.

Jacobi. - It has often been assumed that Jacobi played a major role in the formation of Fries' philosophy. Fries himself denies this,

> Through his novels, Jacobi had a pleasant influence on me in my youth. In philosophy however, I was never his pupil. My views had their sole origination in Kant and I have tried to develop them into a philosophy of religion. My views of Wissen, Glaube and Ahndung as well as my doctrine of feeling were developed in complete independence of Jacobi. In fact, Jacobi, in his later works concerning divine matters, in part followed me.[8]

Otto acknowledges their similar views but states that "this affinity does not involve dependence,"[9] although Jacobi, long before Fries, fought against the "rationalist prejudice" and the "assumed omnipotence and despotism of proof."[10] Jacobi

> placed scientific knowledge (Wissen) and rational faith (Glaube) side by side. He demanded no other proof than the proof of immediate certainty which God manifests in us through the self-revelation of His own nature.[11]

What Jacobi had felt instinctively was given a sound philosophical basis by Fries.

Not in the philosophical system itself but in the general direction and content of his thought, it

is more than probable that Fries was strongly, and perhaps unconsciously, influenced by Jacobi. When Fries was young, Jacobi's novels were his favorite fare.[12] "He was undoubtedly influenced by him to reflect concerning the nature of feeling and to take a stand for it."[13] If this unconscious influence is correct it quite likely appears in Fries' doctrine of Ahndung. This unusual term has a specific and unique meaning for Fries and his followers. It has an epistemological connotation and generally denotes the immediate non-conceptual knowledge in feeling that senses the eternal in the temporal. Since the term Ahndung cannot be rendered accurately in English, it has been left untranslated throughout the text.

Weiss is definite in his belief

> that Fries concept of the intuitive apprehension of the eternal in the temporal was taken primarily from Jacobi. Jacobi was also an important source for his combination of religion and aesthetics in his doctrine of Ahndung as well as in his reorganization of the theoretical and practical aspects of Kant's philosophy.[14]

Although de Wette had also undoubtedly read a good deal of Jacobi's works, the influence was here perhaps more indirect, i.e., via Fries.

Schiller. - The influence of Schiller on both Fries and de Wette is more certain.[15] From Schiller,

Fries took "the aesthetic judgment of the ethical life which Kant had vaguely suggested. In other respects as well, Fries was influenced by Schiller's spirit (Geist)."[16] Both had as their master Kant and took as their starting point his Kritik der Urteilskraft. De Wette was influenced by Schiller during his time at Weimar and always regarded him with the highest respect.[17]

Schleiermacher. - The problem of the relationship of de Wette and Fries to Schleiermacher is again more difficult. Fries had in common with Schleiermacher a Moravian Brethren upbringing and thus a knowledge of religion from the side of feeling.[18] Fries' doctrine of Ahndung is very close to Schleiermacher's "contemplation and sense of the universe," although they were arrived at independently. The doctrine of Ahndung has a solid philosophical basis, while with Schleiermacher, "the arbitrary decree of genius replaces the solid reasoning from philosophy and history."[19]

The doctrine of feeling is also the common point between de Wette and Schleiermacher, although the differences are essentially the same as in the case of Fries. In Theodor, de Wette shows the young student as being greatly impressed by Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion, but at a fairly late stage in his develop-

ment.[20] Hagenbach says the chief difference between the two men was a methodological one.

> Schleiermacher's method was strictly analytical, derived from one basic principle. De Wette's method, on the other hand, utilized varied starting points and was more synthetic and combinative.[21]

Schleiermacher's most lasting influence was probably in the practical field. Lücke records that de Wette became more interested in the practical and preaching ministry after having drawn closer to Schleiermacher.[22] This experience, together with his dismissal from Berlin, served to channel his thought and action into the practical sphere.[23]

3 Influences on de Wette Alone

The influence of a second group of men who affected de Wette independently of Fries can also be traced. These men were Herder, Schelling, Paulus, and Griesbach.

Herder. - De Wette had first met Herder when he was at a very impressionable age. Herder, although a poet, wrote a number of works on the Old Testament,[24] of which Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie in 1782 was the most important.

> In popular poetry, and, in fact, in the whole of poetry, Herder saw a creation that surges upwards from the secret and mysterious depths of

> the soul, a creation of the unconscious, the unwilled, and the uninvented; an inspiation that springs from the profound regions of the spirit, under divine influence, a complete analogy in its own sphere to that which in the realm of religion is "Grace" and "the Spirit that bloweth where it listeth, and thou canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth."[25]

De Wette himself says, "to Herder goes the credit for reawakening our understanding of this way of viewing."[26] De Wette under Herder's influence sought to approach the Old Testament with this same reverence and receptivity. "With this attitude," Hagenbach remarks, "the author (de Wette) sought to understand Hebrew poetry. He did so with more spiritual comprehension and sensitivity than anyone since Herder."[27]

Schelling. - It is not surprising that after the cold sternness of Kantianism de Wette should be attracted by the warmth of the Romantics and particularly by Schelling. He describes this meeting with Schelling's philosophy and the Friesian criticism of it in Theodor. However,

> in spite of this pungent criticism de Wette owes a great deal to Schelling's influence. He makes Theodore admit that under Schelling, as opposed to Kantian moralism, there was first aroused in him the dim and obscure knowledge of something higher "than his comprehension had ever reached," and of a significance in religion transcending the ethical aspect to which he had so far been restricted. Later on he attains greater clarity in this knowledge by means of the Friesian philosophy.[28]

Paulus and Griesbach. - The influence of Paulus and Griesbach, his teachers and doctoral advisors at Jena, has been described in the preceding chapter.[29]

B The Philosophy of Fries

As has been indicated, the key to and the basis of de Wette's thought lies in the philosophical system of Jakob Friedrich Fries. Fries considered himself a loyal disciple of Kant and accepted without change the major portion of Kant's investigation. Fries felt, however, that at some points Kant had erred and that he had failed to draw the necessary conclusions implicit in his premises.

Fries' concept of Wissen or experiential and empirical knowledge closely parallels Kant's view of the same. But, in his concept of Glaube, i.e., rational faith or ideal knowledge, Fries rejects Kant's limitation of the categories to the subjective phenomenal world and thus corrects what he felt was a basic error in the Kantian system. Fries sought to show that these categories were objectively valid.

If Fries were to have stopped at this point, he would only have sharpened the epistemological dualism inherent in the Kantian philosophy. Fries, however, went on to introduce his concept of Ahndung, in which

the eternal is apprehended in the temporal through feeling alone. In Ahndung the Kantian dualism is transcended by means of a higher unity.

We now proceed to a more detailed examination of Fries' thought, bearing in mind his relationship to Kant.

1 The Chief Areas of Concern

General aims. - Fries undertook to develop the Kantian critical philosophy along more definitely idealistic lines. Both Kant and Fries agreed that a searching critique of human reason was the initial and primary task of philosophy. Fries stated: "The history of philosophy forces us to ask: How is the immediate knowledge of reason supplied? On which of our means of philosophical conviction (Ueberzeugung) is this knowledge based? What is its relationship to reflection?"[30] "The demand then is for knowledge of ourselves, analysis of reason (Vernunft), knowledge of the inner nature of our spirit, in other words, anthropology!"[31] Only thus can the contribution of the mind itself be determined and the basis laid for a valid distinction between the true and the false, the eternal and temporal. This study Fries termed anthropology.

> The province of philosophical anthropology is inner experience, its object is man, as we know ourselves inwardly.[32]

> Physiological anthropology is singularly concerned with the human spirit as the object of inner experience. Our starting point is an inner experimental physics, the observations and attempts that each person can only make within himself, and we seek through it to find a doctrine of our inner nature as a theory of reason.[33]

The problem of knowledge. - Kant and Fries were fundamentally concerned about the problem of knowledge, or as Fries preferred to call it, the nature of truth. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason provided the proper foundation for a sound epistemology. Kant's critical philosophy differed from the rationalistic, empirical and skeptical attempts in that he did not begin with a hypothesis and then by the process of speculation evolve a system, but rather by taking given cognitions and carefully analysing and separating them according to their sources of knowledge, he discovered the fundamental kinds of real knowledge the reason possesses.

Experience and proof had reigned supreme in natural philosophy and the budding natural sciences. Mathematics was the undisputed "queen" before whom even the skeptic Hume had bowed. When Kant discovered that even mathematics was based on synthetic judgments, a new age dawned for the natural sciences as well as for all knowledge. By this careful critical process,

Kant showed that there were twelve a priori categories of reason. These are absolutely independent of experience and from them pure reason comprehends what is the fundamental condition of all being.

The question of the validity of these categories was first answered by Fries when he demonstrated that all nature-concepts are only the various forms of one fundamental idea of universal unity and necessity. Otto states,

> This "Deduction of the Categories" is Fries' most individual achievement in this branch. To the whole splendid theory it gives the stability it needs, and takes the place of Kant's futile and contradictory attempt to find a solid base for his theory in "transcendental proofs."[34]

Since the categories are pure a priori conceptions, Kant concluded that they had no validity for the objective world of Being-in-itself but rather were limited to the subjective world of our conceptions or the phenomena. From their a priori nature Kant concluded that these categories were ideal. It was at this point that Fries intended to carry forward Kant's investigation. Fries felt Kant renounced rightful confidence in human reason when he assumed that the a priori categories of reason did not provide valid knowledge of objective reality but were limited only to the phenomenal world of human experience. By

a clearer elucidation of the nature of truth and knowledge Fries felt that the Kantian epistemological dilemma could be resolved.

Truth and error. - Truth has generally been defined as the agreement of an idea with its object. This type of truth is expressed in rational judgments which appear capable of logical proof. Fries pointed out that, upon closer scrutiny, this type of "proof" is not as ultimate as it would first appear. In reality, all logical validation presupposes a previous knowledge on which the supposed proof rests. In fact, as Fries states, "the basic principles of any type of knowledge can never be proven."[35] In order to establish any valid truth at all we must posit an original knowledge as a possession of human reason itself. This knowledge is more ultimate than mediate knowledge and in some fashion self-authenticating -- it is incapable of further "proof." Furthermore reason must have confidence in itself that it participates in truth and is responsive to it.[36] The belief in the innate capacity of human reason "is the first presupposition for all rational knowledge."[37] Reason is man's capacity for "immediate non-perceptible knowledge."[38] This immediate knowledge is the source of all the truth of which the human being is capable and bears the mark of infallibility.

"All original knowledge of reason, which is independent of experience, is true and objectively valid."[39] Fries felt that this original knowledge found partial expression in Kant's a priori categories of rational understanding.

A new definition of truth is involved in this view. Truth expressed in rational concepts and validated by logical reflection is at variance with the traditional definition of truth as agreement of concept and objective reality in that we have no means of getting outside of our world of ideas to determine such agreement. To Fries, truth of this type consisted of agreement of the rational concept with that immediate and original knowledge of the human mind upon which all logical reasoning depends. "We cannot say, therefore, of truth as contrasted with error (as is customarily done) that truth is the agreement of idea with its object, but only that the truth of a judgment is the agreement of the same with the immediate knowledge of reason."[40]

In contrast to this "empirical truth," Fries distinguished a higher or "transcendental truth" which is found in the immediate a priori knowledge of human reason. This type of knowledge defies any proof of objective validity since it is itself the source from

which the validity of all logical proof is derived. This immediate knowledge has its own criterion of validity, that of a deep and inescapable "feeling of truth" (Wahrheitsgefühl), which the human reason accepts without question.

This interpretation of truth also gives a clearer understanding of the nature of error. Error applies only to the realm of logical reflection and mediate conceptual knowledge where a mistake or invalid conclusion is both possible and frequent. In the more profound original and immediate knowledge, the mind cannot accept the possibility of error since the truth of that knowledge is the very presupposition upon which all recognition of both error and validity in the realm of mediate knowledge finally rests.

2 The Friesian System Developed

Neue Kritik der Vernunft. - In his Neue Kritik der Vernunft, Fries sets out to discover the original knowledge possessed by pure reason and to demonstrate its validity. It is based upon the immediately- and inescapably-felt self-confidence of the reason in the ultimate validity of its deepest insights. Fries sought to provide an escape from the epistemological dualism of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by means of

a more constructive development of its own profounder insights.

In introducing his own position, Fries points out the refutation of the Kantian epistemological dualism involved in the very effort to state it. Kant denies the applicability of the a priori categories of reason beyond the phenomenal realm but he derives not merely the fact but also what he seems to know of the character of the real world only by assuming the objective validity of these categories. Actually the ultimate validity of its a priori knowledge is the sine qua non of the human reason.

If this conclusion implies a thoroughgoing assent to the naturalistic world-view of the sciences, it could be less favorable to the cause of religion than Kant's agnosticism. That interpretation is rejected by Fries. Kant had tried to save religious knowledge by denying the objective validity of scientific knowledge and he based his denial largely on the "antinomy of reason." The antinomy is well known and need not be repeated here. Kant pointed to the apparent irresolvable contradiction that occurred when the a priori categories of the understanding were taken to be objectively valid. Kant was aware of, and Fries reiterated more clearly, the error in stating the

antinomy. The subject in the theses of the antinomy differed from the meaning of the subject in the antitheses. In one instance "world" refers to the phenomenal world of sense experience in its spatio-temporal perception. In the theses, "world" speaks of world and being, or the real world of pure intelligibility. The Kantian antinomy has revealed the necessity for a careful distinction between these two concepts but has not necessarily invalidated the a priori knowledge of pure reason. Fries argues that this antinomy really indicates the essential limitation and restriction placed upon the knowledge of the scientific world-view.

It is in the process of interpretation that the pure a priori categories of the mind lose their absolute validity and are limited and restricted. This empirical schematism of the categories brings imperfection into the scientific world-view (Naturerkenntnis) and this becomes more apparent when science is contrasted with the completely rational interpretation of reality (ideal Erkenntnis) found in the a priori knowledge of the pure reason itself.

The ideas. - The "logical ideas" or the "ideas of the reason" arise as a protest by the reason against the limitation placed upon its original knowledge in the empirical schematism of the a priori categories.

The categories themselves are far more general and comprehensive than in their restricted, limited and schematized forms.

The ideas are conceptions of something that transcend all experience and cannot be applied to experience. Their origin and validity is found in the immediate knowledge of reason itself. In them we cognize the essence of things as contrasted to the cognition of phenomena in time and space. Our empirical knowledge is limited to the appearance of things and is not valid for their essence. This does not mean that appearance can be equated with illusion but indicates that our scientific or empirical knowledge is subject to restrictions and limitations.

In the ideas, pure reason provides a completely rational knowledge of reality from its own inner principles. Since the ideas express a final rejection by reason of the incompleteness and imperfection that characterizes our scientific knowledge, they are essentially negative in character and provide no positive knowledge of the real world.

Fries was the first to indicate clearly the operation of the principle of unity and necessity as applied to reason. Unity in this sense is not to be confused with monism, but implies that being and reality

is not a fragmentary and disconnected collection of phenomena. It implies that there is "an association of thorough and coherent interdependence."[41] The third division of categories, those of relation, express this unity. These ontological and metaphysical categories furnish the dimensions in which reason conceives the complete synthetic unity of being itself. "Unity and association among the perceptions are presented in Substance and Inherence."[42] "Causality and Dependence are the relations of the unity and association of things with each other. Community through reciprocal action is the association of each and everything in general to the unity of a World-All."[43]

Necessity expresses the same thing from a different viewpoint. The mind realizes that chance, as opposed to necessity, indicates the lack of full perception on our part. Reality can only be conceived as that which is, and it must be so by necessity. This is reason's intuitive grasp of necessary synthetic unity in reality itself.

On the basis of the law of necessary unity, the transcendental apperception or the immediate knowledge of reason demands totality or perfection. This principle of perfection or completion can never be satisfied by empirical experience because it stands

under the relativity of the time-space relationship and the limitations of the categories. Through the process of "double-negation," i.e., by lifting the barriers of limitation, and by the application of the principle of completion and perfection, we come to the realm of the ideas.[44]

By negation of the limitations of the categories of quantity, we arrive at the highest idea, that of completed being or the absolute itself. The quality categories become the idea of pure and simple reality. Modality negated and completed results in the idea of eternity. Again it is the third series of categories, those of relation, that yield the most important ideas.

The category of substance and inherence or accidentia, when subjected to the principle of completion and relieved of the empirical limitations, becomes the idea of soul. In this process of "ideal schematism," the quantitative world of objects disappears and the qualitative attributes lose only their phenomenal form. Substance, in its reality and complete intelligibility, is revealed as spiritual being in a complex of qualitative attributes without the limits of space and time.

The category of causality and dependence, when subjected to this ideal schematism, yields the idea

of freedom. Community through reciprocal action gives us the idea of deity or God.

By means of this ideal schematism, Fries felt that he had demonstrated that these ideas come from pure reason itself and that they must be in ultimate harmony with an a priori knowledge contained in the rational categories of understanding when that knowledge is freed from empirical limitation. This is the only possible theoretical validation of our knowledge of reality itself.

The ideas and their interpretation of the intelligible world or of reality itself are just as valid a rational type of conviction as is our interpretation of the natural universe in science and by experience. Fries felt, however, that the rational faith (Glaube) of the ideal view is a higher form of knowledge than the scientific interpretation of nature (Wissen), but both are valid forms of knowledge.

The serious epistemological limitation of the ideas and of this rational faith lies in their essentially negative character. The negation by pure reason of the restrictions imposed by the empirical schematism of the categories permits no basis for positive content. The ideas are purely formal expressions of our rational conviction and are empty, cold and abstract. We can

be certain that such ideas as God, soul and freedom are a part of the real world but we cannot define in a positive sense what they are in themselves. For example, the normal attributes of God such as eternal, omniscient, etc., would at first seem to be positive statements. Upon closer examination, however, they are merely denials of temporal limitation.

Practical reason. - The ideas founded in the immediate knowledge of reason are little more than cold and formal metaphysics. For their positive content and vitalization we must turn to active or practical reason. This is also where the connection between religion and ethics, or between faith and morality is to be found.[45]

In the philosophy of practical reason, Fries remains a disciple of Kant. There are several points, however, at which Fries varies and Otto summarizes them as follows:

> Fries abandons Kant's impossible attempt to evolve from the Categorical Imperative itself a detailed system of moral commandments. He shows that the Kantian "categorical imperative" is itself conditioned by another law, the law of Absolute Value. In place of the Kantian moral table of categories, with their "blind windows" and their fallacious assumption of the idea of Freedom as the highest object of classification, he obtains the real table of the basic concepts of ethics by proving that the object of classification is the idea of "value"... He sets aside Kant's mistaken confusion of the Decision of pure reason and that of the understanding; and in so doing averts the confusion

> of metaphysical and purely psychological Freedom. And he bases the whole doctrine on a fully worked-out theory of practical reason.[46]

The highest idea of practical philosophy is the law of purpose. This is, in addition to the law of necessary unity, also one of the fundamental laws of human reason. The law of purpose "is expressed at the highest level as the idea of absolute value. Thus the nature of things or the world is subsumed under the law of absolute value."[47]

The practical determination of the ideas falls into two parts. The first has to do with subjective teleology, i.e., ethics, or with man in his temporal relationships. The second is the realm of objective teleology, i.e., the eternal purpose or the realm of religion.[48]

Subjective teleology. - Over and above the cognitive process of reason, there are two other faculties through which reason manifests her vitality and defines her real nature. These Fries called heart and energy. Although they are independent, the energy of reason comes into action when the heart by means of instinct or impulse (Trieb) assigns value to things.[49] By means of inner self-observation we find that we value things on the first level according to whether

they are pleasant or unpleasant, i.e., through the senses we like or dislike. This judgment according to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is a posteriori and corresponds to the animal or sensual impulse. This is chiefly concerned with happiness.

The second impulse is the human one and gives value to the specifically human existence. It is concerned with education and culture and judges from the standpoint of "the beauty of the soul." This judgment in the realm of the personal is a priori and is incapable of being conceptualized. "We are dealing with a cognition through feeling alone, without a concept."[50]

The third is the pure or ethical impulse and has to do with duty and with the good. This is the impulse of the reason itself and is also a priori.

> This necessity of action out of a sense of ought, we call duty, and the devotion to duty plainly indicates good will -- this is essential good in its highest form.[51]

From the basic principle of the dignity of the human personality comes the highest moral idea, that of the realm of purpose. By subjecting the categories to the idea of purpose and value, all the basic ethical concepts can be derived. Thus the categories of relation become person and situation, person and fact, and right and obligation. Those of quality are:

value, non-value and collision of values. The categories of quantity give purpose, means and goal, while modality becomes permissibility, capacity and duty.[52]

Objective teleology. - Subjective teleology or the ethical view of nature is subordinate to an objective teleology or ethical ideal view "which relates the law of purpose objectively to the true nature of things. This entails the ethical determination of the ideas and thus we arrive at the true and full content of religious conviction."[53] "To be aware of this eternal purpose, and to live in relation to it, is religion."[54]

In the practical schematization of the ideas and the fuller development of religion, there are certain limitations. "For our finite reason, which is bound to phenomena, no positive and certain knowledge of the eternal is possible."[55] The element of mystery in the relationship of the eternal to the temporal defies logical conceptualization. Feeling and intuition are the only possible approaches. "These mysteries can only be thought of as inexpressible concepts and as the original ideas of the faculty of judgment."[56]

By means of the practical schematization, the idea of soul yields the idea of the destiny of man, i.e., the eternal absolute value and worth of personal reason. This includes also the belief in an eternal

purpose in nature itself. This is an

> inexpressible concept involving the relation of finite being to the eternal, which we can only conceive by means of the ideas of an intelligible world of nature. When we try to express this in nature as a realm of purpose, we are confronted with a very uncertain manner of presentation.[57]

The second idea, freedom, is richer in content. This brings the problem of good and evil and the mysterious fact of the sinfulness of all men. The belief in the freedom of the will and absolute demand of conscience are contradicted by the law of finitude in nature, which makes clear that our temporal will does not have the absolute power required. However, since the conscience in no way eases its demand we must consider this weakness "as an original and independent inclination toward evil."[58] On this point, Otto interprets Fries in the following manner:

> This is the Sin which lies as a burden upon us, as original desertion, as a radical failure through individual choice. Existence itself is not Sin, as affirmed in mythological fantasies. But <u>our</u> existence of duties unfulfilled is sin. And Sin, not in the mystic sense of the "sin of the World" or the like; personal sin, in the sense of a free and individual failure; and certainly as such an awe-inspiring and unfathomable mystery.[59]

God, the highest idea of all, becomes in this scheme the idea of divine providence and divine world government. In this area, our knowledge is completely dependent upon feeling.

> The idea of God is an inexpressible concept which develops out of the relationship of the ideal of the highest good to nature. This idea of divine providence and world governance can be approached solely through the feeling of devotion and pure love. Any other attempt at clarification will only involve us in inexpressible difficulties.[60]

This then is the content of religion but still in the negative and empty form of the understanding. This is the philosophical doctrine of religion or the Wahrheitslehre.[61] The positive side cannot be found in any speculative form.

> In our declarations that the application and development of religious ideas was not in the province of technical reason (Verstand), we have often referred to the role that feeling must play. It must now be stated clearly that religion can only become vital and alive in feeling.[62]

The doctrine of feeling. - The area of feeling plays such an important part in Fries' philosophy that it must be examined more closely. Fries starts with an observation from daily life,

> We often find something immediately true or false without understanding it, without proof and without being able to give an exact account of why we find it so. This we ascribe to feeling.[63]

The scope of feeling however, is far greater than occasional daily experience.

> Feeling is the source of the original consciousness of all a priori knowledge: pure self-consciousness, the categories, the ideas

> of the true, the good, and the beautiful. It thus encompasses the entire area of immediate knowledge.[64]

The judgments of logical conception and conclusion are different in nature from the aesthetic judgment of feeling. Normally every concluding judgment is dependent upon given propositions and thus is a mediate judgment. In contrast to this, feeling passes its judgments immediately in that it "feels" the truth. Feeling is "the immediate expression of the power of thought"[65] or "the immediate activity of the faculty of judgment."[66]

Fries makes three distinctions among the types of feelings in the faculty of judgment.[67] The first is that in which we are partially conscious of the grounds for our judgment. This is in the area of the resolvable feeling of truth (auflösliches Wahrheitsgefühl), i.e., where this feeling can be resolved by analysis into specific conceptions. The other two types of judgments are those of the subsuming and reflective faculties of judgment. The feeling expressed in both of these are irresolvable. The latter, the reflective faculty of judgment, is the most important and is completely independent of all logical conceptions and technical reason (Verstand).[68]

The most profound judgments of which the reflective faculty of judgment is capable are in the area

of taste. "This is the secret of the source of beauty in our reason."[69] This feeling is not only irresolvable but also inexpressible, incapable of any conceptualization. It is in this area that the positive and living side of religion is to be found.

Fries contends that in these aesthetic judgments of the higher order, we feel or intuitively apprehend (Ahndung) that the world of nature is itself ordered in accord with the inner principles of our reason. These aesthetic judgments of feeling are objectively valid and are a means of knowledge. Since the immediate knowledge of reason is infallible, so is feeling, in that it is only a conscious expression of this immediate knowledge. This infallibility however, is valid only for the irresolvable feeling of truth and does not apply to that which is resolvable.[70]

Ahndung. - The means of conviction for the aesthetic or transcendental faculty of judgment is called Ahndung.[71] This is one of the most unique and important facets of Fries' thought. Ahndung takes its place with Wissen and Glaube as a third type or means of knowledge. Ahndung signifies the apprehension of eternal reality in our temporal world through feeling alone.

> There are definite laws governing our knowing process: the world, subject to the laws of nature, is mere appearance; underlying this world is being-in-itself which is realized by means of the idea of eternity; both eternal and finite being partake of the same reality -- somehow the eternal must appear to us in nature.[72]
>
> We know empirically about the finite in nature, we must have rational faith in the eternal.[73]

However, because of our temporal limitations, the unity of reality in the finite world of nature and in the eternal can never be established empirically.

> This means that neither technical reason with its logical conceptualization, nor reason with its ideas, can ever grasp the eternal in the finite. Only the free independent reflective faculty of judgment with its pure feeling has this capacity.[74]

It is in the aesthetic ideas of the beautiful and the sublime that we become intuitively aware of an eternal purposiveness in the realm of nature. In these ideas, we assign values to external realities, although this act of predication is entirely a matter of feeling. Both beauty and sublimity defy exact definition.[75]

Beauty is unity of form, or the arrangement or formation of the various "parts" which gives this unity. No rules can be laid down -- this is entirely dependent upon feeling -- even as the individual tones in a symphony, meaningless in themselves, unite to form a moving

experience of unspeakable beauty. In the ethical field this is expressed in the beauty of the soul. In this way, all of nature becomes God's temple and garden.

The feeling of the sublime or the noble is equally inexpressible. In the ethical sphere it is seen in the nobility of character. When we are overwhelmed by the spatial magnitude of a range of mountains or a beautiful cathedral, we sense the "mathematical" sublimity. The "dynamically" sublime is most easily recognized in the awesome and overpowering forces of nature. In the sublime or the noble we feel a perfection which makes us aware of our finitude.

In this concept of Ahndung, Fries finds the keystone or unifying principle for his entire system.[76] Through Ahndung, the phenomenal world is apprehended as being in some way, a valid appearance of eternal reality. Thus the epistemological dualism of Kant is finally transcended. Without Ahndung, the scientific knowledge of nature (Wissen) would remain in irreconcilable opposition to the realm of rationally necessary faith (Glaube).

> But in Ahndung there is for Fries empirical validation of the faith of the human spirit in the intelligible world as objectively real. The apparent conflict between the ideal world of rational

> faith and the phenomenal world of natural science is resolved, and the essential principles of the former are apprehended as the ultimate nature of the latter.[77]

Of equal importance for our purpose is the fact that Ahndung is also the source of the religious life. Here religion finds its positive content and moral dynamic. The three fundamental ideas of soul, freedom and God, when subjected to the practical schematization, became the eternal destiny of man, good and evil, and divine providence. Corresponding to these ideas are the three uniquely religious moods or feelings of exaltation, self-surrender and devotion. In them we find the positive side of our religious life. This will be dealt with more fully in the section on the religious world-view.

Wissen, Glaube and Ahndung. - These three words serve as a brief outline of the whole system of Fries. They represent the three-fold division of human knowledge that Fries proposed. They are the types or means of conviction of human reason and are all equally valid avenues of objective knowledge.[78]

Wissen has to do with the empirical knowledge of nature under the limitation of space and time. Its knowledge has to do with the phenomena or the realm of appearances and not with eternal reality

itself. Our reason is activated by the senses and the resultant a posteriori knowledge is brought to our mediate consciousness by means of reflection or technical reason. The function of technical reason is essentially negative and can yield no positive content.

Glaube is rationally necessary faith concerned with the ideas which lie beyond experiential certification in the realm of eternity. Through the process of "double negation" we arrive at the ideas which give us knowledge without positive content of reality itself. This is a higher form of knowledge than that of Wissen. Since Wissen has to do with temporal knowledge and Glaube is concerned with the eternal verities, the two stand as implacably divided as the finite does from the infinite.

It is the Ahndung, which through feeling alone operates in the realm of immediate non-conceptual knowledge, that finally bridges the gap between the eternal and temporal. This insight is immediate in contrast to the mediate, conceptual knowledge of Wissen, and is positive as compared to the purely negative knowledge of Glaube. The immediate and positive expression of Ahndung is in the realm of feeling and this cannot be resolved into either rational concept or

logical idea.

3 Religion and the Religious World-view

The religious world-view. -

> In the aesthetic world-view of religion, all the contradictions of speculation are reconciled into harmony. The basic melody of the music of the spheres resounds omnipotently in time; all dissonances are resolved in accord with the world and show their strength in harmony, since ... the three religious moods of feeling ... harmonize in life in accordance with the eternal and holy law.[79]

What Fries here terms the aesthetic world-view, de Wette more properly calls the religious world-view.[80] The positive expression of the religious life is found in feeling or in Ahndung. Fries further explains his choice of this term.

> I prefer to use the word Ahndung for this mood of feeling in the life of faith, which is the source of religion. Rational faith (Glaube), as a means of cognition, is more closely related to scientific knowledge (Wissen) than to feeling (Gefühl). Here all is dependent upon feeling through which faith lives. Without feeling, only a dead faith is possible and this does not make man religious.[81]

In his own doctrine of religion, de Wette somewhat modified Fries' idea of Ahndung from a purely aesthetic intuition into one of a more specific religious nature.[82]

As we saw previously, the religious life is expressed chiefly in the three moods of religious feeling which correspond to the practical and speculative

ideas. The idea of the eternal destiny of man finds expression in the feeling or mood of exaltation. In this quality of exaltation we are dimly aware of the eternal nature and worth of the human spirit. Through it, it is possible for us to instinctively sense the Kingdom of God on earth.

The irresolvable conflict innate in the idea of good and evil finds its solution in the feeling of self-surrender and submission. In the feeling of forgiveness we can rise above our own weakness and sinfulness and have a confident faith and trust in a higher Kingdom. In spite of the cruelty and destructiveness of nature, we know of a higher sphere where beauty reigns supreme.

In the feeling of devotion or worship, we rise to the highest of all feelings and sense the ruling hand of God in nature and are aware of God's voice within us.[83]

This, in brief, is the religious world-view. "Through this religious feeling," de Wette states, "the world and our inner selves become a temple of God."[84] He then proceeds to summarize the form of religion in the following manner:

> (1) Although there is a correlation between religion and speculation, religion differs from speculation in that the negative

> concepts, with which technical reason comprehends the truth of reason, are used only as a protective mechanism against error and superstition. Religion must seek for its own positive means of conviction. (2) To ethics, which rests on the same ideal basis as religion, is given the task of introducing the idea of purpose into the natural view of human life. Religion supports it with its ideal view of things. Conversely, religion is bolstered by ethical organization in life. (3) The life of religion itself is in the realm of feeling and the forms in which it is most purely expressed are aesthetic.[85]

Communication and the religious community. - In this analysis of religion, one rather difficult problem still remains. If the realm of religion is that of the conceptually inexpressible feeling, how can this feeling be transmitted to others? The difficulties of communication and of the religious community immediately become obvious. It is not surprising that at this point the theologian de Wette again further developed the system of the philosopher Fries. In fairness however, it must be said, that much of this was already latent in the Friesian system.[86]

Since no direct communication of the religious feeling is possible, it must be communicated indirectly through art and the field of aesthetics. This means of communication is termed religious symbolism[87] and expresses itself in two forms:

> (1) The mediate aesthetic presentation through signs, the symbolism of the cultus, and holy rites. This religious symbolism

> is the public language of religion and develops its own peculiarities in accordance with preceding mythology. (2) Religious poetry or the religious imagery of mythology.[88]

De Wette points out that in history every religious community has been based upon and has built up its own religious tradition. The first religious feelings probably had to do with family and personal relationships and with nature. Sacred sagas and legends arose and became the property of the whole community. Technical reason, however, too often stepped in and confused feeling. "Thus concepts and images, dogmas and symbols, are all mixed together and what is the product of feeling is dealt with as if it were a matter for technical reason."[89] The source of this evil is the necessary subjectivity of this type of communication. The safest manner is in the more objective means of rhetoric and poetry, but even this demands the cooperation of technical reason.

Language is not the only means of communication of feeling. The appeal to the senses and activity is often a better means. In the life of the cultus, holy rites and customs are among the earliest symbols. "These are not moral actions which are valid but rather they serve to denote religious feelings in a pictorial manner."[90] However,

> in its highest development, this symbolism will present the ethical religious ideals of beauty, sublimity and holiness. The highest task of presenting the idea perceptibility will be solved and will coincide with beautiful art just as sacred doctrines and legends find their completion in poetry and eloquence.[91]

The religious feelings in art and poetry express themselves in three different forms according to the three moods of religious feeling. The mood of exaltation appears in poetry in the epic-idyllic or romantic ideals. Much of Greek art falls into this category. The mood of self-surrender expresses itself in the tragic, elegiac and comic ideals. Oedipus and Hercules are examples of the tragic in that they faced their fate in humble resignation. In the elegiac the suffering of the present is overcome by the hopes of a better future. The comic is characterized by a conflict of purposes; yet in this very conflict we sense the reality of a higher purposeful hand.

The mood of devotion or worship becomes the highest ideal, that of the lyrical. In the lyrical we rise above the earthly and come to the very throne of God. Music is one of the most complete expressions of this feeling. "Sacred poetry and music are therefore the most certain and powerful means of awakening and supporting the more complete religious life."[92]

This somewhat lengthy presentation of Fries' philosophy and doctrine of religion is justified by the fact that it coincides so closely with de Wette's "Anthropologische Vorbereitung" in his Dogmatik and with the first three chapters in his Ueber Religion und Theologie.[93] De Wette maintains that understanding this critical philosophical system is "of decisive importance for theology."[94]

In the next chapter, we shall deal with de Wette's further development of the Friesian system and the consequent results of its application to the field of dogmatic theology.

CHAPTER IV

DE WETTE AS THEOLOGIAN

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A General Purpose

In 1813 de Wette published the first part of his Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik containing the section on Biblical Dogmatics. This was followed three years later by the second part or the kirchliche Dogmatik.[1] Ueber Religion und Theologie,[2] a small volume published in 1815, was designed to be a companion and supplement to the introductory material of his Lehrbuch. These two volumes comprise de Wette's chief contribution in the area of systematic theology. He later published two other works in this general area,[3] but they were more popular in form and did not add essentially to what he had already said. However, it must be added that these later works represent a considerable change in emphasis, and this will be dealt with further on in this chapter.

At the time of de Wette's christlichen Dogmatik the two dominant schools of thought were Rationalism and Supranaturalism. Rationalism tended to transform theology into a cold lifeless abstraction[4] while Supranaturalism's rigid orthodoxy proved unpalatable to

anyone touched by the free spirit of critical inquiry. It was de Wette's intention to combine the valid aspects of both systems into a higher unity. "I wish to preserve for theology the results of technical reason's investigation and yet validate the rights of rational faith."[5] Theology cannot be only the use of technical reason (Verstand) without rational faith (Glaube), or only rational faith without the use of technical reason; it must be the proper combination of both. Technical reason must know what it has a right to question and what not. It dares not, motivated by a contradictory spirit, use its weapons against that which it must recognize as being above it. Rational faith on the other hand, conscious of its high origins must disdain from descending into the lower sphere of technical reason and dare not try to enslave this free-born son of human reason in chains.

> Faith alone should govern in man as the heavenly genius sent to enlighten and beautify his dark existence. This true master gives free rule to all subordinate powers in their own realm and achieves its desired goal in the full harmony of the whole.[6]

De Wette saw in the philosophy of Fries the solution to this problem.

According to de Wette, the purpose of theology in general "is to guide mankind to religion and train

them in it." The task of dogmatics is to present Christianity "from the view point of technical reason and in relation to our own age."[8] Every work in dogmatics is divided into at least two parts, i.e., a general section dealing with the ideas of God and man, and a special section dealing with the relation of these ideas to the practical world. In Protestantism a third section must be added, the critical. This is concerned with the sources of religious truth and must precede the other two areas. Protestantism differentiates itself from other religions in that it reflects upon these sources and by means of historical and philosophical criticism endeavours to grasp the truth more clearly.[9]

B Critical Section

1 Critical Anthropology

De Wette begins his Dogmatik with an "Anthropological preparation," which is little more than a presentation of Fries' philosophy of religion. As we saw in the previous chapter, de Wette is almost totally dependent upon Fries at this point. De Wette points out that in order to understand religion we must know what it is, its essential nature, the faculties from which it proceeds, the foundations on which our peculiar convictions are based, and the standards for judgment in

religious matters. Thus the definition and form of religion is the result of philosophy combined with anthropology, but the content must come from the area of human experience.

2 Concept of History

It was in this area that de Wette went beyond his teacher, Fries. The historiography of the Aufklärung had been of the pragmatic type. The past was treated with more scorn than sympathy, and the conception of human nature was rather static and shallow. The influence of the Romantics helped de Wette to a deeper and more significant conception of the historical processes.[10]

Here again it was Herder[11] who helped de Wette to see the literature and the documents of the past as an involuntary expression of the innate creativity of the soul of humanity. "Deeply impressed by the influence of cosmic factors, he (Herder) emphasized the existence of similar laws in history and nature."[12] A teleological view of history was closely aligned with revelation. Thus Lessing could write "What education is to the individual, revelation is to all mankind."[13] History was the medium of revelation, and this revelation was identical with the ever unfolding process of the

human spirit. The religious documents of the past were not the result of a supranatural miracle but were human products and were to be treated as such. For Herder,

> Scripture is not itself revelation but rather a witness and account of divine revelation. Under the concept of revelation, Herder no longer understood a single supranatural occurrence but rather a progressively more profound disclosure of God, the history of which is identical with man's own spiritual history.[14]

Another contributing factor to his concept of history was the newer and more precise methods of investigating original authorities. De Wette himself had been a pioneer in the fields of textual and historical criticism and its application to the Old Testament.

It was de Wette's intention that his theology should penetrate to the mysterious central core of religion. Both history and our own feelings (Gefühl) confirm that this religious center is in the area of inexpressible feeling.[15] History further shows that people of all ages have attempted to give expression to this feeling. Since the innate religious capacity (Ahndung) is always constant, what accounts for the tremendous variation in this expression? De Wette answered that part of these differences could be attributed to outward circumstances such as climate, geography, traditions, etc., but this does not account for the variances

within a specific geographical area.[16] This difference is dependent upon the degree of development of an historical consciousness. This consciousness of history enables people to see their own reflection in the past and thus develop a more sensitive receptivity to the present. A European has a broader historical basis and can therefore develop his reflective capacities to a higher degree than the more uncivilized peoples.[17] History is the process of man's spiritual development. This spiritual development is partially man's own responsibility, but there is a higher power which guides his ultimate destiny. This intuitive awareness of a higher guiding hand is essentially religious and is the most general form of the doctrine of revelation. Through this revelation there is no external impingement upon man, but it serves rather as a stimulus to bring to consciousness the ideas already latent within us. God reveals truth to us in history and in our reason. History stimulates and calls forth to clarity the innate ideas present in our reason.[18]

Christ is the center of religious life for the Christian. Yet the recognition of this appearance of religious truth in divine revelation does not mean that something foreign was brought into humanity. The history of the church indicates that the religion of Jesus has

always been interpreted in the thought forms of each succeeding generation. The religious spirit is always united with the spirit of the age. In reality, the religion of Jesus was nothing more than the transfiguration and thorough development of the Jewish national culture into a pure spiritual religiosity. It can never be more than this, i.e., the transfiguration of humanity into the realm of spiritual truth. Through Christianity and the spirit of truth which it brought into the world we can now, independent of history, find the source of religious truth in men and can recognize the nature of their religious convictions.[19] We dare not identify this living religious spirit with any concrete historical appearance although we are bound to history, since it was through history that the free religious spirit was mediated to us.

3 Symbol and Myth

This reliance upon history, yet not being bound to any historical moment or form, is determinative for de Wette's theology. The distinction between the outward form and the inner content of dogma follows logically. This religious spirit must find its expression in concrete historical situations, but this concrete historical expression cannot be absolute.

Thus the role of the symbolic plays an important part in his thought. The symbolic is not the opposite of historical but much more the same, since history for de Wette is symbolic, i.e., the expression and image of the spirit in its temporal activity.[20] The history of religion is the expression of the divine spirit through human temporal forms. Symbolism is the visual representation of a suprasensual idea. Mythical symbolism is different from historical symbolism in that the supranatural idea is presented with poetic freedom and has no historical reality.

Symbols may be used either consciously or unconsciously and are often misunderstood. De Wette gave the following rules to aid in determining what use the author intended. Firstly, the surest sign that a symbol is being consciously used is the express statement of the author to this effect. This occurs particularly in the prophets. Secondly, when the imagery concerning the same subject changes, one can assume that the person who used the imagery differentiated between the subject and the image used. Matthew 20:28 and Matthew 26:28 are examples of this. Thirdly, a symbol is consciously used in poetry. This is true in historical fiction as well as in the prophetic and lyrical poetry, i.e., conscious symbolism occurs where arbitrariness is the rule. His-

torical myths, fictions, theophanies, and symbolic actions of the prophets belong in this category. Fourthly, accommodation can probably be assumed where the author tries to win his contemporaries to a new doctrine as in the Letter to the Hebrews. It is unconscious symbolism, however, when the teacher tries to harmonize a new teaching with an old doctrine. Lastly, symbolism used in the cult is consciously determined by its originator. Symbols are most likely to be misunderstood: (1) in historical myths, where the myth is mistaken for historical fact; (2) in the cultus, when the common people mistake the sign for the subject; and (3) in the relationship between teacher and pupils, where the first stands on a higher level than the latter as in the case of Jesus and the apostles.[21]

Truth and beauty are the components of religion. Dogmas arise when speculation is carried into this religious sphere or when technical reason attempts to conceptualize and express a religious feeling.[22] In distinguishing symbols and myths from dogmas, the inner difference must act as a guide. Myths and symbols are matters of feeling and meditation while dogmas are concerned with deeds and presentation. A dogma is an object of faith; myths have to do with free poesy.[23] It is wrong to bring the religious ideas into

the area of the senses and technical reason, yet without this dogmatic hull, the religious content of Christianity would be an unstable product. Historical dogmas are to be accepted as they stand but must be given an aesthetic symbolical interpretation. Dogmas are only pictures of the ideas that they contain and cannot be taken at face value but must be exegeted as to their ideal-aesthetic content.[24] By this means de Wette hopes to utilize the results of accurate historical-critical research and yet retain symbolically the publicly recognized doctrine without falling into arbitrariness or priestly fraud.

4 The History of Religion

The history of religion is to be interpreted from the standpoints of truth and beauty, and the most perfect religion finds the two equally balanced. The three aesthetic ideas of exaltation, self-surrender and devotion help in this analysis. The smaller the role of technical reason, the greater is the purity of religion. The most primitive form of religion is nature worship in which the free religous spirit is bound by sense and matter. The Greeks progressed beyond this by transforming the nature myths into the symbolism of ethical ideals, freeing religious enthusiasm from the

bonds of nature, and by means of spiritual intuition saw the divine in the beautiful. However, in their appreciation of beauty, their striving for truth was neglected.

Moses, the herald of truth, was the first to establish a religion based on the highest idea of reverence and strict ethical demands. He attempted to discard mythology and made men individually responsible, but political interests and the concept of a law-giving national God changed the ethical into a legalism. The superstitious overestimation of the cultus and religious customs dammed up the living spirit so that after the exile their religion became a matter of outward form and authority was centered in the Scriptures. Thus religion became the object of learned scholarship and reflective speculation until it was laid hard and fast in dogma.[25]

Christ then appeared and brought religion to a new level of worship in spirit and in truth. Moses freed from mythology, but Christ freed also from the temple and religious ritual so that man could stand in complete freedom before God. Here for the first time in world history, the human spirit was fully conscious of itself and its great worth. Man learned that he was a son of God and felt he was capable of being like his

heavenly father. Christ was the first-born Son of God who showed human worth in its true glory, and He provides an example worthy of our emulation. Here we find the initial union of all three of the basic religious attitudes of devotion, self-surrender and exaltation. Jesus also expressed clearly and powerfully the ideas of redemption and reconciliation.[26]

It seemed inevitable that in the succeeding generations the thin earthly hull that surrounded the pure spiritual teachings of Jesus would thicken and petrify and once again encapsule the free spirit. The true idea of divine revelation was changed to an empirical concept, and the divine in Jesus was identified with his earthly relationship until they deified his person. Even as Moses' teaching was later identified with the letter of the law, so the life and teachings of Jesus together with eternal truth were thought to be contained in the writings of the apostles. In the following centuries, the Roman Catholic Church did to the religion of Jesus that which Judaism had done to the religion of Moses. The Roman Church replaced the love of truth with dogmatic authority and incorporated the ideal of the Kingdom of God into the institutional church whereby the suprasensual relationship of man to God was brought into the empirical realm.[27]

The living religious spirit finally broke through again at the time of the Reformation. The true Christian love of truth and the independence of religious conviction once more came to life. The Reformation was the third great historical moment in the liberation of the religious spirit. As Christ fought the bonds of Pharisaism, so the reformers attacked the arbitrary good works and superstition of Roman Catholicism. Because the reformers were children of their own time, they did not use the weapon of reason but rather met the Roman Church on its own grounds. The authority of the Roman Church rested on its assumption of the conformity of the church and tradition, i.e., on an external historical basis. It was the task of the reformers to show the incorrectness of this assumption. The first appearance of protestantism was really historical criticism in the service of living faith. This meant an intensified study of the original historical sources of Christianity and accepting the Bible, or more specifically, the New Testament as the norm of truth. Yet it was this very reliance on a book that again became a fetter for Christianity. Jesus did not say that the writings of His apostles would lead us into all truth but rather that His Spirit would be our guide.[28]

5 Philosophy and Religion

This recognition of the living spirit as the only real source of truth was reserved for the age of reason or philosophical reflection. Historical criticism must be supplemented by philosophical criticism. The period of orthodoxy following the Reformation stifled freedom of research, and it was not until Wolff ushered in the age of reason that progress began again. It was the critical philosophy of Kant that showed the direction for the future and overcame the crassness of Wolff's thought. However, Kant's emphasis on the cold, outward, ethical form was not conducive to the warm piety necessary for Christianity. Kant's philosophy had to be completed and extended so that the freedom and independence of the living religious spirit might be generally recognized.[29]

All through history, philosophy and religion have been closely linked together. The application of philosophy to religion has had two results: (1) If the philosophy was dogmatically applied, i.e., claimed to interpret truth objectively but really did so with very subjective presuppositions as in Gnosticism or in the Philosophy of Identity, then foreign concepts were injected into religion. (2) If the philosophy was applied only in a formal sense as with Scholasticism, the

result was a lifeless and spiritless skeleton. A third possibility remains which escapes these two errors, and that is the application of critical philosophy. The latter does not transform Christianity or try to comprehend it objectively but, starting from the anthropological standpoint, shows the laws operative in the inner nature of man and therefore demonstrates what he can know (Wissen), believe (Glaube), and intuit (Ahndung).[30] This philosophy is not concerned with building a system of religious doctrine but rather points out the religious ideas that lie within us and makes it possible for the Christian historian to find these same ideas in history. Although it is not a new science of religion, it does help the theologian to clearer consciousness of what the essence of theology is.

The critical anthropological philosophy has the advantage of being clear and certain in its methodology as well as preserving the ideal viewpoint and warmth of enthusiasm, without which theology becomes either spiritless materialism and unbelief or fanaticism and vague mysticism.[31] Any theology that is not based on anthropology will never be able to interpret history properly. Whoever ignores or scorns the religious ideas will find only dreams and opinions in the history

of religion. Whoever accepts the historical religious tradition materially as a given fact of faith will never be able to comprehend the living spirit of religion.[32]

It is the task of protestant dogmatics to lead to a purity of conviction in the Christian faith through the use of historical and philosophical criticism. The historical nature of Christianity is beyond question, and the philosophical critique must separate the religious content from its hull. It is the task of the dogmatician, through scientific research and accurate analysis, to unfold the universal religious ideas with philosophical precision and thoroughness. Thus through the use of technical reason, religion is to be freed from the bonds of technical reason.[33]

6 Historical Sources of Religious Truth

Here the Bible is the primary source, and the Confessional writings are witnesses to the truth it contains. From one standpoint, the doctrines of revelation through Christ and the inspiration of the Bible are correct.

The general nature of revelation has already been discussed. To say that Christianity is a divine revelation is an expression of faith, i.e., an ideal judgment that cannot be proven by means of technical reason. The dogmatician must use philosophical reflec-

tion to compare the content of Christianity with that of reason itself. He will find that Christianity is nothing more than the most pure and complete presentation of the eternal ideas of reason. Thus the belief in revelation is justified.

From the historical standpoint, the dogmatician must examine Christianity to see whether or not it has encouraged the historical development of the religious spirit. He will find that Christianity has brought in a new stage in the history of religion and has given a new direction to the religious spirit in the world. Thus the belief in revelation has also been justified historically.[34]

The same arguments are valid for our belief in the inspiration of the Bible, i.e., that the authors of the Old and New Testaments were animated by this religious spirit. This does not mean that their insights were infallible or that we need assume the supranatural influence of the Holy Spirit. Both of these latter conceptions are matters of technical reason and thus are devoid of religious value.

The Canon of Scripture refers to those books generally accepted by the church as being the most accurate and genuine transmission of the teachings of Jesus and his apostles. The relativity of this accur-

acy implies also a relativity of canonicity. The writings of the apostles stand at the highest level while those of the later unknown writers are less authoritative. These documents are the earliest we have concerning Christianity, and no type of biblical criticism can destroy their historical value. Since the religious viewpoint of the Canon judges according to religious truth and is not dependent upon the historical view, a later not genuine book could just as well contain religious truth as those written by the apostles.[35]

C General Section

De Wette divides Part II of his Dogmatik into two sections and insists that they remain separate. The first section deals with the speculative religious ideas of reason, and second has to do with religious feeling and views which belong to the Ahndung.

This general or first section is concerned with the doctrines of God and man. These are to be critically examined by means of the speculative and practical philosophical ideas, and the only concern is that of truth.

1 Theology

The concepts of the divine attributes are the development of the idea of God according to the categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality.[36]

Jesus did nothing more than to retain and perfect the idea of God already current in Judaism, although he omitted the idea of God as a wrathful judge.[37] The ideas of creation, providence, and lordship must be viewed ideally and freed from technical reason. This will not affect the faith of the common people and such myths as that of the creation can be retained for their pictorial and aesthetic value. The mythological figures of angels and devils may be used in poetry and in art. The idea of personified evil is a product of phantasy in the service of abstracting technical reason.[38]

All else concerning the idea of God can be found in the doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine as it now stands presents a difficulty since the church has been led into a false type of speculation. In the biblical conception, the Son is the creator and mediator while the Spirit is the enlivening, warming, and enlightening principle in both material and spiritual nature. The Father, who sends the Son and pours out the Spirit, stands above both. The Son and the Spirit are only forms of His revelation and His activity in the world. Through Christ, with the help of the Spirit, the believer comes to God and is united with Him. The whole of the Christian viewpoint is concentrated in the doctrine of the Trinity.

Through speculation, confusion was brought into this doctrine by giving substance to the three views of God. The further step of senselessly differentiating between substance and person was even more confusing.[39] The idea of one substance and three persons makes it evident that the rejected idea of modality really forms the basis for this doctrine. It is the right and the duty of the dogmatician to examine this doctrine critically and accept only that which is philosophically tenable.

Philosophically, there is a three-fold view of God closely analogous to the biblical doctrine of the Trinity. This view is also in conformity with human reason. All human knowledge is bound to the three-fold relationship of the whole, the form, and the parts, i. e., the transcendental, formal, and material apperceptions. God, in His independence, is the highest object of reason or the Father. God is also the form through which the world was created and continues. This is the Son. Again, God is the source of light and life and the one who penetrates and fills nature. This is the Spirit. Since the last two views are somewhat incompatible with the idea of person, this explanation differs from the doctrine held by the church.

2 Anthropology

The mythical account of Genesis, Chapter 2 ff. has become constitutive for the doctrine of man. This explanation of the human inclination towards evil is incorrect although it is true that man is inclined toward evil, and that he is responsible and guilty because of it. The concept of the imago dei, which has arisen by pushing the conceptualized form of the idea of the destiny of man back into the past, furnishes a good contrast to our present sinful condition. Although man is temporal and weak, he does have moral power and strength; and to declare that he is totally depraved and incapable of any good is an exaggeration.

The contrast between human impotence and the Holy Spirit, who imparts the power to do good, is a beautiful religious view but anthropologically untrue. According to anthropology, the Holy Spirit's work in man is nothing more than the spirit of his reason. The first view is in the area of faith, and the latter is a matter of philosophical reflection. This should not change the popular faith since it is still true to say that we are sinners before God and dependent upon His grace.[40] Jesus taught that the human heart was the source of evil, but it must also be added that His

teaching concerning the Kingdom of God was based on His belief in the independence, freedom, and perfectability of man.[41]

The doctrines of the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the dead must come under sharp philosophical criticism. The immortality of the soul cannot be deduced from reason but relies entirely upon Scripture.[42] The closest approximation to reason would be the thought of eternal spiritual being. Jesus accepted the idea of the resurrection from the dead but only in a spiritual sense.[43] The thought of the resurrection of a physical body involves a physical process and contradicts the idea of eternity, but it may be retained for popular belief as a symbol of the fact that spirit and matter are one in the deepest sense.[44]

B Special Section

This third section deals with the world-view of the Ahndung and applies the ideas of rational faith to our present time. By means of Ahndung we know that the disturbing contradictions of a holy God and an evil world, of man destined for good yet ethically corrupt, are resolved in a salvation and reconciliation which comes through Christ and divine grace.

1 Redemption

The theory of redemption is based on the great Christian idea that God is interested in the welfare of man and the world. This is also an integral part of rational faith. Through Ahndung we are aware of the appearance of the Divine in history. The specific Christian viewpoint that God would redeem and save the world thus belongs in the realm of Ahndung. The will of God to save each individual is a further implication of this idea, but the oft accompanying belief that God will condemn all unbelievers is an irreligious judgment. The latter statement is a product of technical reason and is religiously invalid. Rather than condemn those who believe, we should admit the existence of a mystery, pray for them and leave them to God's mercy. It is true to say that as far as we can see in this life unbelievers have not experienced salvation, but beyond this we cannot judge.[45]

2 Christology

The doctrine of the divinity of Christ is a contradictory concept since it implies that divinity and humanity are united in one individual. Thus the divine would become finite and limited; this is philosophically untenable. However, this doctrine should not be a concept but an aesthetic idea. The dogmaticians with their

teaching of the two natures of Christ have ruined everything.[46] The pious Christian, convinced of the divine truth of the teachings of Jesus and held by the purity and nobility of His character, believes and sees in Him the Incarnate Divinity; but he does not come with logical questions motivated by technical reason. Technical reason is subordinate to the ideal view and only becomes dominant when religious enthusiasm has lost its warmth.

> Away then with all the dogmatic determinations which are foreign to the Bible and to the faith of the people. Let Christ remain as the Divine Ambassador, as the God-man and as the image of God ... but do not forget that you are then speaking of religious beauty and not of Verstandeswahrheit.[47]

Here we see the value of differentiating between the understanding (verständigen), ideal, and aesthetic viewpoints. He who accepts only the first as valid must discard this doctrine, but from the aesthetic viewpoint this teaching retains its importance.

Some of the Gospel narratives in regard to the life of Jesus must also be aesthetically interpreted. The myth of the Virgin Birth signifies the divine origin of this religion and emphasizes the dignity of Jesus. The idea of the Virgin Birth probably developed in the post-apostolic period and it confuses aesthetic values with the machinations of technical reason.[48] It is far

more meaningful when it is ideally interpreted as indicating the divine origin of Christianity.

The miracles of Jesus are based on a world-view no longer acceptable to us and thus have lost much of their meaning for the present day. The philosophical theologian must simply presuppose that there are no miracles, i.e., happenings contrary to nature, but he need not attempt to explain all these happenings by natural means.[49] The deeper meaning of the miracles is the idea of the independent power of the human spirit and the noble teaching of spiritual self-confidence.[50]

Christ's death on the cross is the symbol of humanity purified through sacrifice. It teaches us that we should be crucified with Him and be raised again to a new life.[51]

The greatest miracle is the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. No happening in history has been so determinative for the world as the Easter experience. The total history of the educated peoples has been decisively influenced by Christianity and Christianity without the resurrection would be unthinkable. In the resurrection we see not only the visible activity of God's governing hand but also the symbol of truth's ultimate victory. The question of whether or not the resurrection was contrary to the laws of nature is not

a religious one. The miracle remains religiously even if we accept a natural resuscitation. The matter of Jesus's actual death only becomes important when we take His resurrection as a precursor of our own resurrection after death. De Wette records that the belief in the supranatural was so difficult in his time that this doctrine could only be plagued by doubt. The idea of a physical or bodily resurrection would be impossible to believe.[52]

The ascension of Jesus into heaven is a symbol of eternal glory; however, the objectionable world-view in which it is clothed has made it impossible for even the most primitive man to accept it.[53]

3 Atonement and Justification

The doctrine of the atonement is still one of the more important teachings of Christianity although it needs to be re-interpreted. The Jewish concept of sacrifice and the medieval satisfaction theory must be omitted from this doctrine. Following the Apostle Paul's guidance, we must retain the atonement as a beautiful aesthetic symbol capable of influencing the pious mind. The religious side of this doctrine states that Christ, through His death, freed us from the penalty of our sins and reconciled the wrath of God. When

this teaching is freed from technical reason, it means simply that Christ gives inner peace to the sin-troubled mind so that it can confidently rise up to God, the Holy Judge. Aesthetically viewed, the consciousness of sin is the religious feeling of self-surrender, and it is through the forgiveness of this sin that we receive peace of mind.[54]

Every martyr's death is an image of this self-surrender by which the human spirit is elevated above the contradictions of this corrupted world. This is even more true when the martyr dies for the highest religious truth and through his death brings a new truth into the world which is capable of freeing men from their sins. In Jesus's death we see first of all our own corruption, but yet we sense the love of God in that this death is to free us from corruption and insure the ultimate victory of truth. We see the total message of Christianity in Christ upon the cross.

The doctrine of justification is based on the atonement. The basic foundation of the Christian faith is in the religious feeling and idea of self-surrender which teaches us that we are unworthy and undeserving before God and must rely solely on His grace. The doctrine of justification coincides fully with this. In no teaching in Christian Dogmatics does the ideal view-

point stand in such full agreement with technical reason as in this doctrine.[55]

4 The Means of Grace

Just as the Scriptures are the source of knowledge for religion, so the Word of God and the Sacraments are the means of God's grace to us. The Word consists of Law and Gospel, and the union of both satisfies our every religious need.[56]

The Sacraments are divinely instituted symbols through which we receive grace. The Lutheran teaching stands between the halbverständigen Zwingli-Calvinist doctrine and the superstitious beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church. The Lutheran belief has in its subjective reverent conviction its own particular worth.[57]

The Sacrament of Baptism imparts the forgiveness of sins and regenerates to a new life in the Spirit. In infant baptism, this mystical view of regeneration has the difficulty of maintaining a child's capability of faith and avoiding the appearance of being ex opere operato.[58]

The true symbolical meaning of the Sacrament of the Eucharist has been confused by a mystical and unhistorical adaptation into the church's teaching. This is due to a misinterpretation of the Words of Institution.

These words speak of the atoning death of Christ, a long completed historical fact, which is valid for us only in the power of faith and through the grace of God. The thought of present power through the continuing body of Christ is a remnant of the false doctrine of the Roman mass.[59]

5 The Church

It was not the intention of Jesus to found a Church here on earth but rather to establish the Kingdom of God. The church is a work of man and became a sociological necessity in the apostolic and post-apostolic periods. The Kingdom of God is not only the idea of an eternal creator God in heaven which is symbolized for us by the return of Christ and eternal salvation, but it is also an ethical and political ideal to be realized in public life.[60] According to the apostles, Christ founded the congregation as an institution for the sanctification and perfection of those who confessed Him.[61]

In systematic theology a distinction is made between the outward or visible church, which is signified by the common use of the means of grace, and the invisible church, which is one church unified by a true, inward religious fellowship. The church in its visible form is inwardly bound to the state. The laity, the clergy, and the rulers are the three estates which com-

pose the church. The clergy differ from the other church members only in respect to their office and their duty to rightly preach the Word of God and administer the Sacraments. They also bear a special responsibility in church discipline and government. The Christian rulers have as their right and duty the responsibility of seeing that the true religion is propagated and that worship services are properly conducted. Furthermore they must protect the church, be the administrators of the church properties, see to the financial support of its institutions and servants, and take an active part in church discipline and government.[62]

6 Eschatology

The doctrines in this section are more correctly interpreted if we ascribe to them a mythical meaning. Since we are in the realm of the eternal ideas of reason, many of the thoughts expressed in the section on God and man will recur here. Some of the soteriological ideas such as the victory of Christianity over evil and the return of the world to its original ideal condition are also treated.

The doctrines of the resurrection of the dead and the destruction and renewal of the world are based on the thought of the eternal spiritual being of things.

In order to make these doctrines more plausible, they needed some sort of bodily substratum and thus came the concepts of a new transformed body and a new world. Technical reason has taken myth for reality instead of leaving the pictures for the phantasy and the Ahndung.[63]

The doctrines of the last judgment and of eternal salvation and condemnation symbolize the idea of the victorious Kingdom of God in eternity; however, in eternity the concepts of judgment and reward are meaningless. Good and evil carry their own reward and are not dependent upon eternity for their fulfillment. Here too we must recognize a symbolical mythology since the concept of eternal damnation contradicts our ideal faith. God cannot permit a large part of His creation to be eternally condemned if He is really eternal love and almighty. In the Kingdom of God there can be no contradictions such as that pictured in the two spheres of the saved and the damned. This is a poetical picture taken from our temporal relationships but is not valid in eternity. In the Kingdom of God there can be no evil, but how the conflict between good and evil will be solved or how sinful man will be restored to his sinless condition is an eternal mystery that no man can disclose.[64]

7 Church and State

Where the church is recognized by the state, the visible church is inwardly bound to it. The true religious life should show itself in the public life of the state, leaving the church with only symbolical importance.[65] Since the church is an institution of the state, some attempt should be made to bring patriotic and religious ideals into a closer inner connection.

De Wette suggests that perhaps the Christian festivals of the church year could be given a patriotic meaning. Christmas is the occasion of the appearance of divine salvation among men and of the transfiguration and glorification of human nature through its connection with the divine. The idea of the destiny of man and the feeling of exaltation are predominant. This could be made into a public festival for children with the emphasis on the fact that they are the future hope of their country.

Easter brings to our remembrance the victorious sacrifice of Christ and the general idea of heroic virtue and sacrificial death. This could be a public festival at which the emphasis was placed on the martyrs and heroes of church and nation who gave their lives in the fight for truth and right.

Pentecost is a time of religious exaltation and concord. This should be the time of confirmation and the religious patriotic dedication of the youth to their country. Even as the knights of old were consecrated, so the old German custom of Wehrhaftmachung could be united with confirmation. Every free citizen of the fatherland would be made a knight in the Christian fight for right and truth. He would receive the holy sword to defend the honor of his country and his church.[66]

E Later Theological Development

Although de Wette's basic theological and philosophical standpoint remained basically the same, his emphasis shifted to meet the corresponding spirit of his time. The Kantians, who had been dominant during the first years of de Wette's life, were slowly giving way to the Hegelians. When Hegel was called to Berlin, de Wette had protested in the name of the Christian faith.[67] When de Wette later read the theological works of a Hegelian like Strauss, he felt that his worst fears had been realized and that his opposition to Hegel was justified. The intense nationalism, optimistic liberalism, and patriotic enthusiasm that had resulted from Napoleon's invasion and subsequent defeat gave way to the

forces of conservative reaction as typified by a man like Prince Metternich. As we have seen this reaction had severe consequences for de Wette's own personal life.

De Wette's optimistic view of the church-state relationship was modified because of this experience. In the later editions of his earlier works and in the later works themselves a more cautious attitude is taken in regard to the state. This was accompanied by an increased emphasis on the believer's dependence upon the Christian community and the historical revelation of God in Christ.[68]

It is quite evident that after de Wette's dismissal from Berlin his interest in practical theology increased considerably. It was at this time that de Wette began to preach with regularity and to consider taking his own parish. In his years at Basel, de Wette continued to preach quite regularly and through his interest in the practical affairs of the church had a far more satisfying relationship to the community in which he lived. The titles of his later works in this field show this practical interest. The first: Ueber Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsformen und ihren Einfluss auf das Leben published in 1827; was originally a series of public lectures given in Basel. The second,

Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkt des Glaubens dargestellt, published in 1846, was also popular in nature. It is interesting to note the increased warmth of de Wette's faith and the increased emphasis of sin in this last mentioned work. At the beginning of this work, de Wette says that the life of the church has suffered because the dogmaticians in their concern with scientific exactness had too often forgotten that they were still members of the Christian Church.[69] At another point he states,

> Many of the early Christians probably knew only one tenth as much about the history of Jesus as our catechumens learn and yet they were truly more inspired and more faithful than we are. How does it happen that we, who stand so far off from the mysterious origins of Christianity, pretend to make such great claims to historical knowledge that not even the first Christians had? It is the great erudition that makes us rave so. Our Christianity is too much "ivory tower" wisdom and not enough faith and living. In place of the fabulous poetical tendency of the Roman Catholic Church we have substituted criticism and technical reason, we have exchanged the ecclesiastical tradition with its legendary enlargement for the arbitrary combinations of the harmonists and the tasteless miracle explanations of the rationalists and as a necessary antidote, the criticisms of Strauss.[70]

De Wette found little agreement among his contemporaries in regard to his work in systematic theology. They looked upon his system as a "wunderliche Prozedur." Some saw in his work the attempt, under the ideal-

aesthetic guise, to restore all that the hammer of critical research had demolished. Still others criticized his unnatural dualism (pre-established disharmony), and feared that he would dissolve church history and dogma into aesthetic ideas.[71]

CHAPTER V

DE WETTE AND THE OLD TESTAMENT

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It was in the area of Old Testament research that de Wette began his theological labors and gained his most lasting fame. Before proceeding to a closer examination of his work, we should glance briefly at the critical achievements prior to de Wette.

A Old Testament Criticism Before De Wette[1]

The Reformation and the Renaissance prepared the way for a critical study of the Old Testament. The Renaissance, with its interest in antiquity and the classical languages, provided the tools for this research while the Reformation, with its intense interest in the Scriptures, changed the focal point of authority away from tradition and back to the Bible. The early church had not been concerned with the critical problems of the Old Testament but confined itself largely to the practical exegesis of the text.

It was not until the Aufklärung and the age of Rationalism that a systematic and scientific critical method was developed to deal with the Old Testament.

The initial approach was made by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan (1651). Hobbes questioned the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, tried to determine the purpose of writing and maintained that the date of authorship of the Old Testament books must be established independent of tradition.[2]

The philosopher Spinoza carried the process a step further in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). Spinoza not only questioned the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch but felt that the whole section from Genesis through Kings was intended to be a single historical work of which Ezra was the author.[3]

In 1678 the Frenchman, Richard Simon, published his Histoire critique du Vieux Testament. This work has been characterized as a "very erudite and thorough literary-critical examination of the Old Testament."[4]

For more than a half-century no work of major import appeared on the scene. Then in 1753, the French physician, Jean Astruc published his Conjectures sur les Memoires, etc.[5] He was the first to establish definitely that Genesis is composed of two main documents, the "J" or Jehovah source and the "E" or Elohim material. Since all of Genesis could not be reduced to these two documents, he assumed that there were probably ten other fragmentary sources used.[6]

Semler and Herder, both of whom have been mentioned previously, made significant contributions in this field.[7] Semler in his Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Kanons (1771-1775) and his Apparatus ad liberalem Veteris Testamenti interpretationem (1773) used the same critical principles in dealing with Scripture that were applied to other literary works. Semler's criticism tried to separate the divine or moral elements from the temporal or human ones. Herder's was a more aesthetic approach; he attempted to understand the mind of the Orient. With his classical background and love for antiquity, Herder was extremely sensitive to the human elements and situations of the Old Testament. His fine intuitive sense and "hebraistic humanism"[8] played a major role in the developing Old Testament critical discipline.

J. G. Eichhorn has been called "the founder of modern Old Testament criticism."[9] Not only was he the first consistently to use the term "Introduction" (Einleitung in das Alte Testament, 1780-1783, published in five volumes) but his definition of the area covered by this discipline has, in the main, prevailed to this day. Eichhorn was concerned with three main problems: the formation and development of the Canon, the history of the text, and the origin of the individual books.[10]

1 De Wette's Contributions

In the Old Testament field, de Wette's critical work overshadowed his exegetical efforts. The great scholar Wellhausen saw de Wette as the epoch-making founder of historical criticism with regard to the Pentateuch.[11] In fact, de Wette anticipated many of Wellhausen's conclusions.[12] In his doctoral dissertation (1805)[13] de Wette showed with great perception that the Book of Deuteronomy was to be identified with the reform of Josiah in 621 B.C. and that its date of writing must coincide with this period. This hypothesis has been of inestimable value in the whole field of Old Testament research.

De Wette was a pioneer in the use of "religionsgeschichtliche" criticism. His two volume work, Beiträge zur Einleitung ins Alte Testament (1806-1807),[14] was a brilliant example of this method.[15] Historically, it introduced the second stadium of higher criticism by calling attention to the genesis of the documents.[16]

De Wette's Lehrbuch des historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen and apokryphischen Bücher des Alten Testaments (Berlin, 1817) was the first independent and important work in this field since Eichhorn.[17]

His Commentar über die Psalmen (Heidelberg, 1811) was de Wette's only strictly exegetical work in the Old

Testament. In this commentary, "'He was the first,' as Delitzsch observes, 'to clear away the rubbish under which exposition had been buried, and to introduce into it taste, after the example of Herder, and grammatical accuracy, under the influence of Gesenius.'"[18] This volume will be dealt with more fully in a later section of this chapter.

B Critical and Exegetical Principles

1 General Aims

Commenting upon the quality of exegesis in his time de Wette says quite bluntly,

> The shallowness, aridness and godlessness of the so called grammatical-historical exegesis which has been practiced previously will no longer suffice. It is neither grammatical, since it abuses the language and does not know its living laws, nor is it historical, for it does not investigate, does not live in and with history and has no historical viewpoint. In short, it does not deserve the name of exegesis for it is not a "holy interpreter" -- this is something it neither knows nor understands. Through the comparison of antequated Jewish concepts and rabbinical passages, one will never penetrate the divine spirit of Christianity. No one has ever understood life out of death. Where one does not know how to enrich his own spirit and learn to raise his sights to a living viewpoint, he will always remain standing in the outer court of the sanctuary and will never be initiated.[19]

De Wette contended that a thoroughgoing critical inquiry must precede any sound exegetical work. It is,

however, almost with a sense of sadness that he pursued this critical work. Yet, since the Bible is the source of religious truth and since biblical criticism was the mother of Protestantism, we must continue to examine critically the origins of our faith.[20] De Wette states,

> I did not start the process of criticism, but now that this dangerous game has begun it must be carried through, since only the completed product in any field can be of value.[21]

De Wette felt that he had found

> a subjective reconciliation of reason and faith, and by his philosophy of religion and his symbolic view of Biblical narratives he sought to provide a similar reconciliation for others. This, however, was a thing hitherto unknown among theological paradoxes. Devout philosophy was rare; but devout criticism like De Wette's was unique.[22]

2 Literary-critical Principles

"The purpose of all exegesis is to grasp the real and original sense of a writing or passage so as to make it understandable for others."[23] This however, involves several problems for the exegete. First of all a thorough analysis of the language and words must be undertaken before the content of a passage can be understood. This necessitates a three-fold task: (1) A lexical-grammatical explanation of the words must be made in order to understand as accurately as

possible the idioms used. (2) The rhetorical form of the passage must be known. This means that the peculiar word usages of the narrative, poetic and prophetic texts is to be observed. (3) Against the background of this careful lexical-grammatic and rhetorical inquiry, the next step is to grasp individually and stylistically the passage involved and to understand the peculiar word usage and manner of presentation of the particular author involved.

A second hermeneutical problem concerns the accuracy of the text itself. False readings have come into being either through error or intention. The errors of the scribes were unavoidably numerous and the transmission of an infallible text would have been a continuous miracle. These errors can be classified in four main groups: (1) visual errors, whereby the scribes interchanged or omitted letters, words or sentences; (2) errors caused by having heard wrongly; (3) errors of memory, whereby words were omitted or similar sounding phrases were inserted; and (4) errors of understanding, in regard to the division of words, in matters of abbreviation and in copying marginal interpretations into the text itself.[24]

The intentional changing of the text is difficult to prove and would only have been logical after

the beginnings of Christianity. Our knowledge of the history of the text tends to disprove the hypothesis of intentional change. Scribes may have simplified and replaced objectionable readings with those of their own construction but they did this out of an uncritical and innocent concern rather than malicious intent. In like manner, where gaps existed, they may have improvised transitional passages, and where contradictions were obvious, changes may have been made for the sake of consistency.[25]

The correct reading of a text cannot be determined by tabulating the conflicting testimonies of witnesses according to their number and age. Here we are solely dependent upon careful critical research. Since it is the task of the critic and exegete to discover the original reading of the text, he must judge the variant readings from the standpoint of originality and try to determine and discard the later modifications and additions. Here two general rules will aid the critic. The first, that of the exegetical-critical grounds of originality, stipulates that the questioned variant which most fittingly corresponds with the assumedly accurate text is the proper one. The second, affecting the historical-critical grounds of originality, states that through the comparison of the various readings,

that reading is to be preferred which most likely gave occasion for the origin of the others.[26]

The exegetical-critical principle of originality assumes that the writer followed the general laws of human reason and so could not logically write nonsense. Every reading, therefore, that is senseless or contradictory is to be rejected in favor of some other reading with a meaning that harmonizes with the context. One must however, be cautious and take into consideration the eccentricities of each writer. In regard to the language, one can assume that the reading which is grammatically correct is the proper one, but the irregularity of the Hebrew language makes this difficult. The critic is helped by the fact that most of the writers followed fairly definite rhetorical forms and developed their own style, but here again the Hebrews showed such a wide variance that a great deal of caution is necessary. These general rules become more definite when the distinct peculiarity of each individual writer with regard to his way of thinking, language and style, as well as the specific context of the discourse, is taken into consideration.[27]

The historical-critical principle of originality states that, in addition to determining the reading which explains the origin of the others, one must, as a general

rule, prefer the more difficult reading to the simpler since intentional alteration would have tended to simplify.[28]

If, after careful and considered examination, the text still gives a senseless and contradictory reading and no witnesses afford assistance in solving the problem, the exegete must resort to critical conjecture. Here he must be governed by sound exegetical-critical and historical-critical considerations and especially by the peculiarity of the writer and the passage. A negative judgment or conclusion is always more trustworthy than a positive one.[29]

3 Historical-critical Principles

The thoughts, views, desires and hopes of every author have their roots in the particular period and country in which he lived and in his own personal relationships. The literary product can never be disassociated from the historical conditions under which it came into being. These historical conditions must receive just as careful scrutiny on the part of the exegete as do the language and philosophical difficulties.[30] Here too, de Wette sees a three-fold process: (1) One must seek a general understanding of the peculiar nature, customs and total life as well as the history of the

Orient. (2) Against this general background, a more specific national-historical understanding must be gained. (3) Finally, one must attempt to develop a picture of the personal relationships, views and spiritual individuality of the author himself.

De Wette felt that "Truth is the primary law of history, and love of truth the first duty of the historian."[31] The sources of historical knowledge are the relationships and circumstances within history, but every historian is limited to his own experience and therefore is dependent upon the accounts and interpretations of others. It is the duty of the historical critic to examine the accounts of events as to their purpose, freedom from prejudice, and accuracy. The result of this criticism is always negative in that it can only reject the false but cannot rediscover the true. The historian must try, out of the separate incidents, to construct an organic whole that is consonant with and dependent upon the individual happenings.[32]

In order to interpret a historical account correctly, the historian must understand the author and his way of thinking. If he is to be able to reproduce with some exactness, both as to content and purpose, the original intention of that author, the critic must have adaptability, sympathetic understanding and complete objectivity.

The critical duty of the historian requires that he determine the credibility of the conditions and relations in the narrative: Are they contradictory to the general laws of nature or to the analogy of experience? Are the conceptions of the reporter right or has he been deceived? Is he writing with a distinct purpose that might influence his account? Every narrative is one-sided in that it is not written in the context of the whole of history. It is the duty of the historian to evaluate the importance of each narrative and determine its proper setting.

In some circumstances it may be necessary for the historian to use conjecture in an attempt to reconstruct that which criticism has destroyed. This requires extraordinary caution. All conjecture must be grounded in historical circumstances and totally consonant with the given facts. Conjecture that is based only upon conjecture is not permissible.

If an account is to be historically credible, it must have been the purpose of the author to relate history as history. Not all that appears to be history is historical since legends, myths, and fairy tales may contain the same basic elements as historical fact but obviously have a different purpose. If the purpose of the narrator was to make clear a philosophical or re-

ligious truth, or if he had any other intent than to transmit historical knowledge, this account has no historical value. Should there be no other narrative dealing with the same happening, it becomes impossible for the historian to differentiate between truth and falsehood since the account itself contains no criterion for truth. In this sense we are completely dependent upon the credibility of the narrator himself.33

In the strictest sense, only the report of an eye-witness could accurately reflect the actual historical incident. If one were to be radically consistent, this would mean giving up practically all historical knowledge. As a general rule it may be stated that the greater the time span between the narrator and the event, the less credible is his account. Even though the author believes he is relating historical facts, his writing must be judged by its coincidence with experience and the laws of nature as to its trustworthiness.

Tradition is not a reliable source of history since it is generally uncritical and biased. The motivation is poetic and patriotic rather than historical. Tradition tends to accept that which flatters its patriotic interests and is inclined to overemphasize the beautiful, the miraculous and the noble. Any historical gaps that may have existed in a tradition are soon

filled with works of phantasy. It is almost impossible to determine what is true and false in tradition. Both the miraculous unbelievable and the simple unpretentious report that stands disconnected and apparently purposeless are to be mistrusted.[34]

4 Exegetical Principles

The completion of the textual, literary and historical processes still do not comprise sound exegesis. De Wette felt that spiritual sensitivity was the most important qualification for an exegete. "There must be on the part of the exegete a certain congeniality of the spirit, a sensitivity for the specific viewpoint of the author....the capacity to submerge oneself completely in the milieu of the Old Testament writer."[35]

In this process of identification with the writer and the attempt to think his thoughts after him, the exegete must try to leave behind any theological prejudices that might hinder his understanding of the passage. The attempt must be made to let the author speak for himself.

In de Wette's exegesis, he attempts to combine the critical heritage of Simon and Semler with the romantic intuitive principle of Herder.[36]

C Critical Results

1 The Pentateuch

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, much study and research was focused on a critical inquiry regarding the origins of the Pentateuch. This was the era of the various hypotheses. As early as 1753, the French physician, Jean Astruc had pointed to two distinct documents that seemed to form the basis for the Pentateuch. The one centered around the use of the name Elohim and the other used the divine name Jehovah or Yahweh. This theme was taken up in Germany by Witter but more influentially by J. G. Eichhorn. This idea was given the name of the "older documentary hypothesis."

In the last part of the eighteenth century, a Roman Catholic theologian from England, Alexander Geddes, took the next step in pentateuchal criticism. He felt that the Pentateuch was made up not of two main documents but of a series of related and unrelated fragments. Someone had compiled them in accordance with their usage of Elohim or Jehovah. This fragmentary hypothesis was introduced in Germany by J. S. Vater. De Wette in his Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament seems to lend support to Vater's theory, but we shall see later that he progressed far beyond it.

The next step was called the supplementary hypothesis. De Wette and Ewald were unconsciously responsible for its development, although it was really brought to prominence by Bleek and Tuch at a later date. According to this theory, one document formed the fundament for the Pentateuch, but a later redactor, usually "J", supplemented and edited the work. The redactors sources were both oral and written. As early as 1807, de Wette had made a statement that contains the seed for this hypothesis[37] but he did not proceed to draw the methodological consequences of his own remark.

In his Old Testament Introduction, de Wette at first presents the three hypotheses and then goes on to point out that all of them contain some truth but none can be the final word.[38] It is characteristic of de Wette's work that he is always seeking for an answer that will be consonant with the critical results and yet achieve a unity at a higher level. De Wette's final conclusion was that the oldest sources were the "J" and "P" documents but that these were compiled and added to by the redactor "E". Lastly, one must add the document "D" which de Wette discovered in his dissertation on Deuteronomy.

The first four books of the Pentateuch are a collection of originally independent narratives which

were gathered together and given an artificial unity at a much later date.[39] We have no possible basis for determining who the author or authors might have been. The recensions and editions which these books have undergone only add to the difficulty of the problem.

It is equally difficult to determine when these four books were written. De Wette points out that the first references to a written Mosaic law do not occur until the time of Josiah and that definite references to these books in their present form are first found in the post-Exilic period.[40] Thus the present books did not exist until approximately one thousand years after the time of Moses. One cannot date with certainty the individual narratives in these four books but the terminus a quo must be about the time of David. Not before that time was the Hebrew culture developed to the extent that is presupposed by the writers of these books. The similarity of the language of these four books to the Psalms and other literary products of that age serve to strengthen this conclusion.[41]

If approximately five hundred years separated the events in these books from their transmission to writing, what sources did the authors at the time of David use? No definite answer can be given to this question but it is probable that they relied on oral

tradition. This fact alone makes their historical accuracy and trustworthiness extremely doubtful.[42]

A closer examination of these narratives reveals that they are composed of myths elevated into the miraculous and supranatural sphere by poets and by tradition. This together with their uncertain and oft contradictory sagas makes it impossible to determine what historical basis may have existed for the narratives related. These books then are of little or no value to the historian in the matter of ascertaining historical facts.[43]

This conclusion in no way lessens the religious value of the Pentateuch, on the contrary, being freed of its incredible historical statements, it gains in importance. These books are the product of the national religious poetry of the Israelites and reflect the spirit, mode of thinking, patriotism, philosophy and religion of an entire nation. They are of prime importance as a source in the history of culture and religion.[44] The Pentateuch should be read not with the purpose of gaining historical information but with the desire to understand the spirit and the religion of the Hebrew people. Thus Abraham, stripped of the historical trappings, becomes a poetic figure called and chosen by God. In absolute obedience, he receives the

promise of the future nation and becomes the symbol and prototype of Hebrew religiosity for all future generations. Moses appears as the deliverer sent from God who, through his unique training and use of miracles, sets his people free and continues in fellowship with God. He gave his people the divine laws of God and remains for all time the founder and author of the Hebrew theocracy. His name stands for all that is holy, right and ethical. In this manner, de Wette sees the Pentateuch as the national epic of Hebrew theocracy.[45] As epic poetry,[46] in one sense comparable to the Greek epics, the Pentateuch must be appreciated for its religious and aesthetic beauty and not for historical factuality.[47]

Although some four hundred years separate the events in Genesis and Exodus, they both seem to have been based on the Elohim documents and were written at approximately the same date.[48] Exodus does seem to be less planned and is composed of independent collections of laws.

The first two books seem to form an organic whole but the Book of Leviticus appears to have been composed at a later date and included laws that had either been left out of Genesis and Exodus or they had appeared since that time.[49] At least parts of Leviticus

bear unmistakable signs of having been written in the period of the Exile or the late prophets.

Leviticus contained the laws of the cultus while Numbers is a collection of civil laws of a later date.[50] Here again this collection of independent narratives was apparently designed to fulfill a supplementary function. Some of the narratives are a repetition of the events described in the Book of Exodus but the more decorative language and the more miraculous character give evidence that Numbers was written at a considerably later date.[51] Parts of the book may have been written shortly after the time of David while other narratives can be dated as late as the Assyrian period.[52]

As has been mentioned, de Wette's doctoral dissertation sought to prove that the Book of Deuteronomy was not written by Moses but at a considerably later date, probably at the time of the reform of Josiah about 621 B.C.[53] This hypothesis was not new but de Wette's method of approach and proof were different. His reasons for separating Deuteronomy from the rest of the Pentateuch in regard to its authorship and time of writing were, briefly, the following: the Book of Numbers has its own logical conclusion which serves at the same time as the conclusion of the first four books of the Pentateuch; the style of writing in Deuteronomy

differs from that in the other books and the language is richer and more ornamental; the conditions which Deuteronomy presupposes are not those of the desert but require a more developed system of institutions: and lastly, the historical contradictions existing between Deuteronomy and the first four books make Mosaic authorship an impossibility.[54]

The tone and the spirit of the Book of Deuteronomy point to a later period than the previous books of the Pentateuch. The author of Deuteronomy was strongly influenced by the rabbinic, allegorizing, mystical philosophy of a later date and has a strong levitical tendency. The simple forms of law and mythology seen in the first four books have now become the object of reflection and are presented with juridical aridness. The mythology has been replaced by a cold and somewhat insipid theology.[55] The unity of the cultus, the development of the hierarchical and priestly institutions and the inner development of the spirit of Judaism together with certain historical references make it impossible to date the book before the reign of Josiah. The Book of Deuteronomy is a later collection of laws fictionally attributed to Moses and quite certainly to be identified with the Book of Law found in the temple during the reign of Josiah.[56]

2 Historical Writings

The Book of Joshua, although not strictly a historical writing, still serves the theocratic purpose and shows how the prophecies regarding the Promised Land were fulfilled.[57] Joshua could not have been its author and its writing must be placed at a considerably later date, perhaps after the time of Solomon.[58] This book is mythological in character and contains a number of historical errors and contradictions.[59]

The Book of Judges, in spite of its miraculous and mythological traces, seems to be a genuine folk legend based on a fairly accurate historical tradition.[60] Chapters 17-21 are a later addition, but the main body of the work may come from the time of David and thus is one of the oldest historical writings that we have.[61]

The lack of mythology in I and II Samuel make them some of the more historically accurate books in the Old Testament. They may not have been based on written sources, but the oral tradition was still comparatively alive as the vividness of description and the character portraits indicate. With minor exceptions, the unity of style and content gives these books an organic wholeness. I and II Samuel were probably written later than Judges but quite certainly before the levitical-deuteronomical spirit became a ruling factor.[62]

In comparison with the preceding books, I and II Kings are a mark of regress rather than progress in the art of historical writing. The increased mythological and miraculous character places these books in a later period. The references to the Mosaic Law, the prophetic pragmatism and the dim view of history point to the period of the Exile.[63] Despite the similarities between the Books of Samuel and Kings in their freedom from the priestly and levitical spirit, the latter differ from the former in their traces of the Babylonian period, their reference to the Pentateuch, their dissatisfaction with the freedom of the cultus, their quotation of written sources, the different spirit of writing and the more accurate chronology.[64]

Volume I of De Wette's Beiträge zur Einleitung ins Alte Testament was devoted largely to the Books of the Chronicles and marked a great advance in their critical evaluation. The Books of the Chronicles, because of their supplementary nature and their unedifying character, have never been a favorite area of inquiry and the literature devoted to them has been relatively scarce. Eichhorn was the first to formulate a consistent theory and explanation. He felt that the genealogies were undoubtedly drawn from earlier canonical writings but felt that the Chronicler must also have had access to other

sources and registers probably preserved in the temple and used also by the authors of Kings and Samuel. Many of these records were abbreviated and had passed through several changes in transmission but Eichhorn felt that I and II Chronicles were basically reliable and he praised the authors careful use of historical sources.

De Wette disputed this view rather sharply. By careful analysis and comparison, he showed that Eichhorn's supposition that the Chronicler had used the same underlying sources as the Books of Kings and Samuel was untenable. It was de Wette's conclusion that the Chronicler, instead of using the same sources, had simply copied from the foregoing canonical books. The author of Chronicles attempted to deliver a compilation of the nation's history to the time of the Exile. He intended that the work should serve as a correction and supplementation of the older historical works.[65] Although the Chronicles cover much of the same period as the foregoing Samuel and Kings, de Wette's examination of the variations in the writings convinced him that the Chronicler had written at a considerably later date and was much less reliable historically. The marks of this later period are evident in the Chronicler's

> slovenly or careless writing, confusions and alterations of meaning and that his additions were marked by a preference for the concerns

> of the Levites, a love of marvels, apologies and preference for Judah and hatred of Israel, and embellishments of the history of Judah.[66]

The date of writing must be comparatively late because the period covered in the work extends to the end of the Exile. Since the genealogy of Zerubbabel is given to the time of Alexander, it is likely that this may be the time in which it was written.[67]

Although de Wette's conclusions were not accorded universal acceptance, they were later reinforced by the substantial agreement of such Old Testament scholars as K. H. Graf and Julius Wellhausen.[68]

The Book of Ruth was probably written in honor of the royal family and was to show the genealogy of David. Although legendary in character, it may have a historical basis. The date of writing may have been rather early, before marriage with a foreigner was permitted, but quite certainly later than the time of David and I and II Samuel.[69]

The Books of Ezra and Nehemiah are both compilations. Ezra could well be the author of Chapters 7:27-9:15. The editor of the remainder of the book may have been one of his admirers who gathered the other material as an introduction to the part written by Ezra himself.[70] Similarly Nehemiah may have written part of the Book of Nehemiah,[71] but the last chapters stem from a considerably

later period. The book in its present form probably dates from the Seleucidan period.[72]

De Wette is merciless in his judgment of the Book of Esther. To him, it is a fabulous fairy tale that marks the complete decline of Hebraic historical writing.[73] The entire book breathes the arrogance, vindictiveness and fanaticism of late Judaism and is devoid of any real religious spirit. The date of writing may be as late as the end of the monarchy in Persia.

3 Prophetic Writings

While the books we have dealt with describe the founding and development of the theocracy, the prophetic books are concerned with the present condition of Israel and the future. De Wette admits that the prophets had an unusual intuitive capacity but rejects the idea that they were able to foresee and prophesy the future in detail. The prophecies were conditioned by the Jewish idea of vengeance and had an ethical-religious significance. They were derived from and limited by the specific historical situations in which they appeared. A prophecy expressed the wishes and hopes of the prophet as well as his warnings and concerns generally in an indefinite and conditional form. The prophetic books are to be historically exegeted and the occasion and

motive rather than the fulfillment of a prophecy is to be emphasized.[74]

The Book of Isaiah is the work of two or more authors. Chapters 40-66 are the writings of a man who lived at a considerably later date than the prophet Isaiah. This section, composed largely of narratives of comfort and admonition, is different in its more flowing style and its more clear yet less vivid nature. The outward circumstances and inner condition of the nation, which the writer presupposes, indicate clearly that this section must have been written at the time of the Exile.[75] Chapters 1; 2:5-6:13; 12:1-11; 14:24-32; 17:12-18:17; 20; 22:15-25; and 28-33 are quite certainly the work of Isaiah himself. Chapters 36-39 seem to be a reworking of II Kings 18:13-20:19. The genuine portions in Isaiah are among the best in all of prophetic literature.[76]

Both Jeremiah and his younger contemporary Ezekiel were chiefly concerned with the coming destruction of Jerusalem and the resultant Babylonian captivity. Jeremiah's writing reflects the depressed and melancholic morale of his people. His style is less brilliant than Isaiah's and he speaks largely in symbolical terms and actions. The book itself was probably written by Baruch and later re-edited.[77] On the other hand,

Ezekiel is quite certainly the author of the book bearing his name. His style and form are not colorful and there is a degenerative tendency in his use of language.[78]

The twelve Minor Prophets had quite probably been collected as a separate volume. The date of the beginning of the collection is uncertain but it could not have been completed until after the Exile.[79] The Book of Hosea is quite likely the work of the prophet himself. Although his style is original it is somewhat difficult. His own declarations are given in an almost poetic form while his description of symbolic actions is in prose.

Both Joel and Amos are notable for their clarity and originality in style and thought. Amos is perhaps the most consistent of all the prophets. Little is known of Obadiah but his book must have been written after the fall of Jerusalem.

The Book of Jonah is more narrative than prophetic in style. It is not historical but legendary in nature and was written rather late but still before the Exile. Micah fought against the immorality and idolatry of both Judah and Israel at the time of Ahaz and Hezekiah. Nahum writes with a brilliant, rich and original style while Habakkuk, in the Chaldean period, has attained a level in Chapter 3 which stands as the

acme of Hebrew poetry. Zephaniah, writing at the time of Josiah, does not maintain the same high standard as the other prophets. Haggai is characterized by the recurrent idea of vengeance and a blind patriotism. Zechariah, a contemporary of Haggai, was clearly influenced by the Chaldeans. Chapters 9-14 stem from another hand. Malachi, probably a contemporary of Nehemiah and at least later than Haggai and Zechariah, added messianic promises to his warnings.

The Book of Daniel represents a late imitation of a prophetic work and was strongly influenced by Jewish apocalyptic thought. The fairy tales, the crass miracles and historical errors together with the exact and detailed description of the future reveal a spirit different from that of the earlier prophets. The religious and political views in regard to angelology, ethics, asceticism, etc.; the degenerated Hebrew and the mixture of Chaldean and Greek words; and the similarity to other apocryphal books of the Maccabean period -- all of this points to a very late date and precludes the possibility of Daniel's authorship. The suggestion that an unknown Jew at the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, wanting to strengthen his doubting and despairing brethren, wrote the book and assigned it to Daniel is more probable.[80]

4 Poetical Writings

The lyrical nature of the poetical books corresponds with the dominant Hebrew aesthetic idea of devotion or reverence. The prophetic books also contain lyrical and didactic elements. Lyric poetry was designed primarily to be sung but it is quite probable that a goodly number of the Psalms were written purely for didactic purposes. Didactic poetry generally appears in the form of aphorisms and maxims of a proverbial nature. The purest lyrical productions are to be found in the Psalms but Lamentations also includes lyric-elegiac elements. The Song of Solomon is the only example we possess of Hebrew erotic poetry. The didactic-gnomological type of poetry is found chiefly in Job and Proverbs. Job emphasizes the Jewish idea of reward and punishment while Proverbs brings out the ethical standpoint. Ecclesiastes contains both elements but is the product of uninspired reflection.[81]

Lamentations has the same Sitz-im-Leben as some of the Psalms, i.e., the lament concerning Israel, her unfaithfulness and her exile. Tradition states that Jeremiah is the author. The content, spirit, tone and language of Lamentations seem to justify this supposition.[82]

The Song of Solomon, idyllic in nature, deals with the subject of love with the passionate warmth of the Orient but always with Hebrew ethical strictness. The language used tends to indicate a later date but the picturesque vividness points to the time of Solomon. It is possible that these "songs" were handed down by oral tradition and thus the language was modernized but the imagery remained the same.[83]

The Book of Proverbs is a collection of individual sayings and proverbs and of larger unified sections of aphorisms. Wisdom literature was based chiefly on the experiences of life and the ideas of reward and vengeance. Chapters 1-24 form the first section while Chapters 25-29 were apparently collected at a later date. Both sections must have been collected shortly before or at the time of Hezekiah. The last two chapters were attached still later but before the Exile. It is difficult to ascertain which of these proverbs can be attributed to Solomon since Solomon was quite likely a collective name like Moses, Joshua and David.[84] It does seem probable that a good number of those in the first collection can be traced back to Solomon himself.

The Book of Ecclesiastes seems to have been written in a time of scepticism when doubts prevailed and faith and enthusiasm had grown cold. The gnomological-

didactic tendency points to the time of Solomon but the spirit and language of the book indicate a later period. The time of writing may have been at the end of the Persian period or at the beginning of the Macedonian era.[85]

De Wette saw the Book of Job as a work comparable to the Greek tragedies except for its distinctive Hebrew form. The Hebrew tended to express himself in words and concepts rather than in actions. The book deals with the problem of evil and with human destiny. The only solution offered is that of greater humility and a deeper consecration in one's faith. The dialogue of Elihu is a later insertion as can be seen by its dullness, inexactness and lack of clarity. Elihu not only seems to misunderstand Job but he also lessens the contrast between the ideas presented by Eliphaz and Job. It is significant that Job does not answer Elihu nor is his name mentioned in the prologue or epilogue. This book is probably a product of the period of the Exile.[86]

D Exegetical Work

1 The Psalms

De Wette's Old Testament exegetical work concentrated almost exclusively on the Psalms. The joint effort of Augusti and de Wette in translating the Old

Testament had made de Wette especially interested in the poetic structure of this "Hebrew lyric anthology."[87] His Commentar über die Psalmen, first published in 1811, went through five editions.[88] In 1836, de Wette published a small companion volume entitled Ueber die erbauliche Erklärung der Psalmen.

The Book of Psalms is the only major collection that we possess of what must have been a much larger body of Hebrew poetry. Most of the Psalms are religious songs designed for use in worship. We have evidence that there was also a large section of poetry not specifically dedicated to religious usage.[89] The liturgical and religious use of the Psalms was a decisive factor in their preservation.

The Psalms can be generally classified in the following six categories: (1) the hymns of praise to Jehovah as the God of nature and the Saviour of His people (Psalms 8, 104, 145, 19, 29, 33, 65, 93, 135, 136, 147, 47, 66, 67, 75, 46, 48, 76, 18, 30, 138, etc.). In this group we find the noblest thoughts concerning God and nature as well as the source of many theological ideas. (2) The national Psalms, containing references to Israel's history and the relation of the people to Jehovah (Psalms 78, 105, 106 and 114). (3) The songs of the temple and of Zion (Psalms 15, 24, 68, 81, 87,

132, 134 and 135). (4) Those referring to the king (Psalms 2, 20, 21, 45, 72, and 110). (5) Those lamenting Israel's misfortune and calling for judgment on their enemies and for help from Jehovah (Psalms 7, 22, 55, 56, 109, 44, 74, 79, 80, 137, 69, 77, 102, 10, 12, 14, 36, 37, 49, 73, 34, 40, etc.). This is the largest group and contains more than a third of the entire Psalter. (6) Songs of morality and religious hymns in the narrower sense (Psalms 90, 139, 23, 91, 121, 127, 128, 42, 43, 101, 131, 133, 32, 50 and 119).[90] The few remaining Psalms are either in a separate classification or are a mixture of these categories.

Religiously, the Psalms are the most valuable writings in the Old Testament. Religion is still expressed in its most comprehensible form, i.e., feeling. The Psalms are the expression of the heart and soul of the Hebrew religion before it had undergone the calcifying process of dogmatization and mythology.

Little can be established regarding the history of Hebrew poetry but its high points seem to have been at the time of David and during the Exile. We can only speculate as to how the art of poetry was developed in the Jewish nation. The immediate cause for much of the poetry seems to have been the joy and enthusiasm, or the sorrow and despair, which followed some major event in

their history. Some have speculated that the schools of prophets founded by Samuel may have cultivated the art of poetry. According to I Chronicles 15:16, David established definite groups who were responsible for music and poetry. All of these factors may have contributed but we have no definite knowledge as to how this art was developed.[91]

All but thirty-four of the Psalms bear a title designating the author, the tune, the purpose or the historical situation. It was the prevalent custom in the Orient for the author to place his name at the head of his poem and no doubt many of these titles are very old, yet some of the titles are so obviously false that little or no reliance can be placed on them.[92]

These titles ascribe Psalm 90 to Moses; 78 Psalms to David; 12 to Asaph; 11 to the sons of Korah; one each to Heman the Ezrahite and Ethan the Ezrahite; while Solomon is credited with two. It is doubtful that Moses could be the author of Psalm 90.[93] Many of the Psalms bearing David's name are not written by him since they contain references to the destruction of Jerusalem, the Babylonian captivity and the Chaldean period. This casts doubt on all of the Davidic Psalms and necessitates great care in dealing with them. Asaph could have written Psalms 50 and 73, but the other ten

can hardly be ascribed to him. Similarly, many of those attributed to the sons of Korah appear to have been written in the period of the Exile. It is also doubtful that the two Psalms supposedly written by Solomon actually stem from his hand.[94]

Differentiating between the original Psalms and later imitations demands a great deal of exegetical-critical and aesthetic understanding. Most of the imitations are found among the Psalms of lamentation. This explains their almost monotonous uniformity and their constant repetition. The worst imitations are those that are composed of direct quotations from other Psalms. Thus Psalm 108 is made up of Psalm 57:8-12 and Psalm 60:7-14, while Psalm 70 is an excerpt of Psalm 40. The earlier Psalms tend to be more difficult and awkward in their style but richer and bolder in their thought. The later Psalms are lighter in style, more flowing and pleasant in their language, and more orderly and clear in their content.[95]

The Psalms are divided into five books. De Wette holds this division to be an arbitrary one derived from the history of their collection rather than an attempt to build a parallel to the Pentateuch. Each book represents a separate collection and when it was completed, it was added on to the previous ones. The

first book contains the majority of the genuine Davidic Psalms and is undoubtedly the oldest. The second book is somewhat later and is composed chiefly of Psalms attributed to David and the sons of Korah. These two sections quite likely existed in their present form at the end of the Exile. The Psalms ascribed to Asaph and to the sons of Korah make up the major portion of the third book. The Psalms in the last two books are more liturgical in character. The whole collection was probably completed in the Maccabean period.[96]

In his exegesis, de Wette sought first to determine the historical situation in which the Psalm was written and then the author's motives and causes for writing. De Wette attempted to place himself in the author's position and thus gain the proper standpoint for interpreting the Psalm. The situation of writing was to be determined on a sound historical-critical basis. If no definite determination could be made, it was much better to accept a negative conclusion than to postulate an uncertain positive one.

In dealing with each Psalm, de Wette determines and gives the characteristic content, the peculiar ideas and the concepts and feelings expressed. He attempts to infer from the content what specific historical setting or particular situation might be indicated. The

result of this attempt is compared with the material in the superscription and if the two agree, this historical situation may be accepted as probable. In cases of such agreement, it is also permissible to supplement from known historical probabilities. If, however, the title disagrees with the content, no specific historical situation may be accepted and the relationship must be left in generalities. Thus de Wette hopes to escape the maze of hypotheses that were common to most commentaries on the Psalms. Any exegesis must be sound historically or it is indefensible. If a messianic interpretation of any Psalm did injustice to history, this exegesis must be rejected.[97]

2 Later Development

In the various editions of his Commentar über die Psalmen, one can notice a marked change in de Wette's exegetical emphasis. In the first edition (1811), he radically denied any messianic meaning to the Psalms and dated much of the poetry as late as the Maccabean period. At that time he tended to be a rather cold critic definitely under the influence of Rationalism. By the time of the second edition in 1823, many of his judgments were less severe. He still relied heavily on the bold criticism of men like Paulus[98] but he had

added much material of an "edifying" nature and was less drastic in his opinions. At this point he was ready to accept an allegorical, but not a historical, interpretation of the "Messianic" Psalms.[99] De Wette relied heavily on Gesenius in supplementing the grammatical explanations.[100]

In preparing a later edition of his commentary, de Wette had decided to follow the advice of his friends and include a section of material that would meet the more specific religious needs of its readers. After some consideration, de Wette felt that this would tend to destroy the peculiarity of his commentary so he published a companion volume bearing the title Ueber die erbauliche Erklärung der Psalmen (Heidelberg, 1836). This was a book of practical exegesis designed to serve as a guide to the use of the Old Testament in Christian circles. The purpose was to edify and strengthen the faith of the believer.

One of the difficulties in the Christian's use of the Old Testament is the temptation to read back into the Old Testament ideas and concepts that were historically not present at that time. There is, of course, a relationship between the Old and New Testaments in regard to prophecies and symbols but these were general, indefinite and indecisive. Many of the prophets and

writers of the Old Testament were unconscious bearers of germinal ideas that can only be understood in the light of Christ. This is particularly true of the messianic concepts. There was unquestionably a general expectation of a deliverer or a messiah in the Old Testament but it is extremely doubtful that their expectations took the form of the historical Jesus. Many of the passages in the Old Testament unconsciously carried a deeper meaning than the more obvious sense. One dare not, however, interpret this deeper meaning as having specific conscious reference to the later historical facts of Christianity. The Psalms are particularly well suited for this practical or edifying exegesis.[101]

De Wette gave the following rules for the edifying use of the Old Testament: (1) the grammatical-historical exegesis must be the basis for the edifying explanation. (2) The grammatical-historical sense is the real and only sense of the passage. The edifying explanation can do no more than see the immediate and unconscious implications of the literal meaning. (3) There is no double meaning and every ambiguous explanation is to be rejected. (4) No "deeper meaning" is acceptable that goes contrary to the psychological laws of the historical meaning or destroys the unity of the

obvious sense of the passage. (5) The "deeper meaning" is always general and ideal. Any interpretation of the historical sense to make it coincide with later accidental fact or situations is to be rejected. (6) If the "deeper meaning" of an Old Testament passage is to be brought into connection with the history and teaching of the New Testament or our modern age, it must be done through the use of common general concepts which comprehend both the earlier and later times. (7) Since every concept is fluid, a concept may be broadened to include that which is not evident in a historical sense. Here caution must be used and intuition must be our guide. (8) After having accurately determined the historical sense, it is permissible to change or omit certain conceptions and relationships in order to gain a new viewpoint providing this does not do injustice to the truth. (9) When the historical situation is indefinite and uncertain, it is permissible for the interpreter to use probable hypothesis and interpolate so that certain edifying truths may be emphasized. (10) The general meaning, which is subordinate to the historical meaning, can be changed slightly if a desirable and fruitful edifying application can be made.[102]

Once again we see in de Wette the strange combination which caused Hagenbach to say that "he (de

Wette) was a rationalist with his mind but a mystic or a pietist in his feelings and heart."[103] The same process which occurred in his theological development is reflected in his Old Testament work and, as we shall see in the next chapter, holds true for his New Testament efforts as well.

E The Historical Importance of de Wette's Work

Now, more than a century after de Wette's death, many of the conclusions and results of his Old Testament work have quite understandably been superseded. It is a tribute to his insight and sensitivity however, that in at least four areas, his work has been of abiding importance.

De Wette's first lasting contribution was in the area of Pentateuchal criticism. His conclusions regarding the Book of Deuteronomy have been accorded almost universal acceptance. Otto Eissfeldt writes,

> De Wette's thesis provided the Archimedean point for the criticism of the Pentateuch. Through it the synogogical and ecclesiastical tradition could be displaced and a new approach to the Pentateuch and its parts became possible.[104]

Secondly, in the field of Old Testament Introduction, de Wette's volume published in 1817 marked a new era. "A new moment in the Einleitungswissenschaft came with the introduction of religionsgeschichtliche

criticism. Here we must recognize W. M. L. de Wette as the pioneer."[105] This volume has also been referred to as the first example of consistent historical-critical research.[106]

In a third area, de Wette's contribution has often been overlooked. In his study of the Psalms, de Wette was the first to attempt an analysis of literary categories (Gattungsanalyse). Hermann Gunkel is often credited as being the "creator" of this particular approach but this is quite untrue. Eichhorn was the first to use the term Gattung but de Wette was the first to analyse the Psalms on this basis. As we saw in the preceding section, de Wette utilized six categories. Almost the entire program of the later Gattungsforschung is embryonically present in de Wette's work.[107]

Lastly, de Wette's religionsgeschichtliche method coupled with his literary sensitivity and his devotion to truth pointed the way toward the future. He not only outlined the tasks of biblical research for the following century but also gave an indication of the methods that would be used. "Both the Literargeschichte of Wellhausen and the Literaturgeschichte of Gunkel have their starting point in de Wette."[108]

CHAPTER VI

DE WETTE AND THE NEW TESTAMENT

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In spite of his literary productivity, it was not until the last half of de Wette's life that he began to write specifically in the New Testament field.[1] De Wette had given New Testament lectures at both Berlin and Heidelberg, but his first publication appeared at Basel in 1826. It bore the title Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen Bücher des Neuen Testaments. This small volume went through five editions during his years at Basel.[2]

His major New Testament work, however, was his Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament in three volumes and published in eleven parts covering the years from 1836-1848.[3] The last part, that on the Book of Revelation, appeared less than a year before his death.[4]

A New Testament Criticism and Exegesis Before 1850

The surge of interest in the critical problems of the Old Testament evident in the first quarter of this century was followed by a similar intensification of New Testament research. Little progress had been

made since the discussions occasioned by Lessing's publication of the Wolfenbüttel Fragments.[5] A storm of controversy was aroused and Lessing himself was involved in a violent quarrel with Goetze, the Chief Pastor of Hamburg. Johann Salomo Semler wrote a lengthy and detailed refutation.[6] The real author of the Wolfenbüttel Fragments was Reimarus, a professor of Oriental Languages at the University of Hamburg. He discredited progressive theology and maintained that Christianity from its beginnings was derived from an imposture.[7] Yet Schweitzer says of one of the fragments, "this essay is not only one of the greatest events in the history of criticism, it is also a masterpiece of general literature."[8]

The general trend in the field of the New Testament was towards a thoroughgoing rationalism as typified in a man like Paulus.[9] In the field of textual criticism, able and thorough work had been carried out by Bengel, Wetstein, and particularly by Griesbach.[10]

The year 1835 marks a turning point in the history of New Testament criticism. This was the year that David Friedrich Strauss published Das Leben Jesu.[11] De Wette was one of those who helped prepare the way for Strauss in that he had been one of the pioneers in applying the concept of myth to the literature of the Old Testament.[12] Strauss reasoned that this same process

must also be valid in regard to the New Testament. As a result of studying Hegel, Strauss maintained that he was inwardly free of thought and feeling in regard to certain religious and dogmatic presuppositions. The question of how much of the historical life of Jesus would remain if the mythological concept were consistently applied held no terrors for him.

> Hegel's philosophy had set him free, giving him a clear conception of the relationship of idea and reality, leading him to a higher plane of Christological speculation, and opening his eyes to the mystic interpenetration of finitude and infinity, God and man.[13]

In his brilliantly written work, Strauss brings up three main problems: First, questions arising from the opposition of miracle and myth; secondly, the relationship of the Jesus of history to the Christ of faith; and thirdly the problem concerning the relation of the Synoptics to the Gospel of John.

Needless to say this controversy was marked by a flood of literature refuting Strauss' position.[14] By this brilliant dialectic, Strauss had shown the complete absurdity of explaining the miracles as the rationalists had done. The lack of clarity at this point and the general confusion of his opponents is clearly seen in the literature of this period. When all else failed, the weapons of irony and sarcasm were

brought to the fore.

The mediating theologians and biblical critics, having failed to harmonize the Synoptic Gospels, tended to look to the Gospel of John as the remaining bastion of historical validity in regards to the life of Jesus. Strauss had quite definitely shown that John was written at a later date and was concerned more with presenting an apologetic interpretation of Christianity from a specific dogmatic standpoint than with portraying the life of Jesus with historical accuracy. Schleiermacher and Hase were chiefly responsible for bringing the mediating theologians into the indefensible position of relying only on the Fourth Gospel.[15]

In 1836, one year after the first volume of Strauss' Leben Jesu appeared, de Wette published the first part of his Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch. In the preface to Matthew, de Wette discussed his attitude and position in regard to the work of Strauss. He agreed with Strauss that any attempt to harmonize the Synoptic Gospels was either dishonest or doomed to failure. De Wette too, rejected the 'naturalist' explanation of the miracles and gave them an ideal-symbolic interpretation. However, at the point of myth and history, he felt that Strauss had gone too far. De Wette said,

> The results of Strauss' inquiry are mostly negative and lack clarity in that it does not become evident just how much and what historical content he recognizes as a foundation for the mythology of the New Testament; it is obvious however, that for him, the person of Jesus, as he is normally thought of by believers, has disappeared. At this point he has gone too far. I believe that those who have been freed of the uncriticalness, and arbitrariness of the so-called orthodox group, yet have maintained a genuine historical faith in Christ, can achieve other results.[16]

Despite their points of similarity, de Wette and Strauss were very different, not only in that Strauss negated where de Wette placed a non liquet, but specifically at the point of their evaluation of the person of Jesus. "While Strauss replaced the person of Jesus with an idea, that of the real appearance of the unity of the eternal and temporal spirit in humanity,"[17] de Wette firmly maintained the historicity of Jesus.

Still another important advance in the field of New Testament criticism was the establishment of the Marcan Hypothesis. Christian Hermann Weisse and Christian Gottlob Wilke both published works on this subject in 1838.[18] Independent of one another, they had both come to the conclusion that the Gospel of Mark was definitely the oldest of the three Synoptic Gospels. Weisse established the priority of Mark by means of historical argumentation, while Wilke treated the problem more from the literary side. For both of them,

Mark was the only one of the four Gospels which possessed the character of originality, authenticity and thus credibility.

Undoubtedly the most radical critic of this period was Bruno Bauer.[19] At first as a member of the Hegelian Right, he followed the line of reasoning established by Weisse and Wilke. However, as years passed, he swung over to the radical Hegelian left, becoming increasingly bitter and sceptical. His hatred and disgust for the apologetic theologians knew no bounds. For him,

> the gospel history is the free product of the human consciousness. But it is not the Christian community, as Strauss would have it, -- it was the evangelists who invented this history and imagined these myths.[20]

Yet one must agree with Schweitzer when he says, "In spite of this hatred of theologians, which is pathological in character, like his meaningless punctuation, his critical analyses are always exceedingly acute."[21]

In the light of this brief resume of the results of historical criticism during this period, it is easy to understand what de Wette meant when, towards the end of his life, he wrote:

> When I first entered this field, I was in the front ranks and was looked upon by many as a dangerous radical. Now I see myself pushed back to the middle ranks of the conservative critics -- those who

> naturally are still far from the apologists who want to retain everything. Yet my own views and position have, on the whole, remained the same.[22]

This consistency and open-mindedness are two of the characteristics that make de Wette such an interesting study. As Kattenbusch and Franck wrote:

> This loving dedication to the Holy Scriptures united with taste and philological ability and a love for truth that was impartial as to where it found its satisfaction whether with the pietist Tholuck or the radical Strauss, or even with those, such as Bleek, who had been his pupils, made him one of the most loved exegetes of his time. He even won praise from the side of the pietists.[23]

B Critical and Exegetical Principles

1 General Principles

De Wette's view of Scripture can best be summarized in the words of one of his pupils.

> It is not and cannot be the task of the Bible to dispense supranatural revelation in the areas of history, geography and natural history. It's task is to proclaim and preserve in man's memory the actual historical facts of God's revelation for the salvation of mankind as they were grasped, at different times and under various circumstances, by sensitive and divinely inspired men. The Bible is not itself revelation as is sometimes falsely maintained, but is the means through which God's actual revelation is made available to us in the form of a literary product. The exegete must separate the eternal and divine kernel of revelation from the finite and human literary husks and hulls. To complete this process conscientiously is the highest task of the critic and exegete.[24]

He who would do exegetical work must realize that

> the interpretation of each biblical book is to be found only in its own historical period and must always be viewed in that context. We will gladly admit that the religion of Jesus stands apart from and above all others, but it comes to us in the language and concepts of its own period and therefore must be viewed and understood historically.[25]

Yet in the process there is a deeper purpose,

> In the study of the Scriptures and in the penetration of their living sense we feel the life-giving breath of the creative spirit that first emanated from Christ. When, as it were, we almost see and hear the apostles and view in the mirror, which they hold up, the picture of the Saviour himself, we almost come into personal contact with them and receive the same impulse of energy from which the existence and the life of the Church has come.[26]

2 Textual Critical Principles

In general, de Wette is content to referee the results and the conclusions of others when it comes to the field of textual criticism.[27]

De Wette points out that much of the inaccuracy of many of the New Testament manuscripts is due to the inattentiveness and arbitrariness with which the early Christians handled these texts.[28] The majority of the errors probably came in the process of copying the manuscripts. Here a number of factors could have been responsible. Through the process of confusing the letters

or by the transposition or omission of words and sentences, the copyists unwittingly were responsible. In the case of dictation, they may have heard falsely. In the use of the oral tradition, the memory may have led the writers to omit words or use synonyms to replace them. There were also errors of understanding, i.e., words were divided in the wrong place, abbreviations may have been wrongly interpreted, and glosses and parallel readings may have been incorporated into the text.

Many times there may also have been an intentional changing of the text.[29] Cases of faulty grammar were corrected and additions were made for the sake of clarity and style. Again, through the elimination of inaccuracies or offending passages in regard to history, geography, archaeology and dogma, the text was altered. Many times the explanation of famous exegetes was carried over into the texts. Additions and omissions occasionally resulted from the liturgical use of New Testament texts.

In the judgment of the texts themselves, de Wette accepted the general rules and principles that had been established by Griesbach.[30]

3 Historical-Critical and Exegetical Principles

De Wette says,

> It is impossible to carry out scholarly research, particularly that of historical investigation, without presuppositions, but presuppositions should not be confused with prejudices.[31]

The first of these presuppositions was faith, "but this faith must be a real faith, i.e., faith in the historical truth of the Christian revelation,"[32] and such a faith would permit him to make a strict use of the grammatical and critical rules of exegesis and would in no way blind him to the truth.

> By this true historical faith, I understand something completely different from those who stand in the service of the traditional faith with their fantastic use of all possible analogies in their attempt to patch together a historical caricature of the moving of the Spirit. I understand a historical faith to be a sound essential ethical faith which is grounded in the historical Christian community. This faith holds fast to the fact that the Spirit, which has become the life principle of the new world, has its source in the person of Christ, and that He is the Creator of our religious life.[33]

A number of principles and presuppositions also govern the historical research and criticism pertaining to the gospel history.[34] Any criticism must be consonant with and dependent upon those historical facts which have been reliably established by other research or witnesses. In regard to the person of Christ, one must presuppose that the human individual Jesus was subject to the same temporal limitations in the areas

of knowledge and action as every other human being. Thus the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience cannot be applied to Jesus, yet on the other hand, one cannot equate or limit the potentiality and capacity of His humanity to that of ordinary sinful man. The interpretation of any individual problem or passage must be tested by its conformity to the scope and direction of the New Testament in general. Every great discovery, creation, or foundation in human life, even if it is based on the receptivity, nostalgia, or need of the masses, must be attributed to the activity of some superior individual. This is a valid principle for all of history. Jesus Christ was the founder of Christianity -- this is a basic principle for critical work in the area of gospel history. This does not mean that all that we know as Christianity, i.e., particulars of Christian doctrine, or details of institutional Christianity, must be attributed to Him. Rather, as Paul indicated, Jesus laid the foundation, and the apostles built upon it.

The establishment of the original text is a prerequisite for exegesis -- this is the task of the critic. Many textual readings must be rejected because they make little or no sense. Yet one dare not apply too strictly the rules of grammar and style to the New

Testament writings. In fact, not infrequently the more ungrammatical reading is to be preferred to the smoother more fluent one. These are the exegetical-critical grounds of originality.[35]

That reading which explains the origins of the other readings is probably the original one. The more difficult and less clear reading is to be preferred to the easier, clearer one; the harder, elliptical, Hebraistic, and ungrammatical reading to the more pleasant, grammatically correct one; the unusual to the more common reading; the reading lacking ascetic or monastic trends to that more favorable to them; the seemingly false meaning to the more fitting one; the shorter reading to the more expanded one; the less emphatic to the more emphatic; and lastly, the reading which stands in the middle and bears the seed of the others is probably the more original. These are the historical-critical grounds of originality.[36]

Since the New Testament text is less corrupted than that of the Old Testament, and since the resources for re-establishing the original are much greater, the need for critical conjecture is greatly lessened. No conjectural hypothesis may claim universal validity.[37]

4 Exegetical Method

If one were to characterize de Wette's exege-

tical method with one term, that term would of necessity be the "critical approach."[38] In fact, he was one of the pioneers in uniting criticism and exegesis in his commentaries. His evident concern is always that of the critical scholar rather than that of the systematic theologian or the practical homiletician.

His careful and thorough philological training is evident on every page of his commentaries. Much of his exegesis is devoted to textual criticism. There is a constant comparison and listing of the variant readings of the different manuscripts. Not only are the readings listed but the varied opinions of scholars and commentators past and present are given in regard to the text. De Wette's commentaries are also manuals on the history of textual criticism. In addition, his observations and criticism in the matter of style and grammatical usage are thorough and competent.

In like manner, de Wette often does little more than referee the opinion of others in regard to the meaning and the exegesis of the text itself. He seems to presuppose that his reader is thoroughly familiar with the commentaries and opinions of his contemporaries.

De Wette's historical approach and his understanding and interpretation of the time in which the

New Testament was written is much more original. This is seen clearly in his discussion of the Synoptic Gospels and his exegesis of the Prologue in John. In his commentary on the Book of Revelation he has not only a fine historical introduction, but he seeks to interpret the book in its historical setting. Yet one detects the strong influence of rationalism upon him, particularly in regard to his interpretation of the miracles.[39]

In his critical work, de Wette is always skeptical of those scholars who too readily come to positive results.[40] This attitude is also characteristic of his exegetical work. It is quite common for de Wette to present the arguments for and against a certain interpretation, and then to pass on without ever having taken a definite stand.

Seldom does de Wette seem to interpret Scripture from any specific theological viewpoint, nor does he enter into doctrinal implications. Any practical applications or homiletical hints are almost entirely absent from his work.

Even though his exegetical work did not always meet with unqualified acceptance, he was still widely read by succeeding generations.[41] One of his pupils describes his work in these words:

> A spiritual impartial exegesis, based on the principles of historical-grammatical interpretation and as free as possible from a one-sided factional interest, was his critical and exegetical ideal. If, in the course of his renowned theological career, he did not reach this goal, he at least worked toward it with untiring zeal and deep earnestness. He spared no pains or effort to fulfill his ideals.[42]

C Critical and Exegetical Results

1 The Synoptic Gospels

This area of the New Testament proved a fertile field for de Wette's critical mind. No generally accepted solution had been found as yet for the "Synoptic Problem." Although from our present day standpoint he failed to find the solution, his reasoning and research are not without interest.

The Synoptic problem. - De Wette approaches the problem by considering the various possibilities of its solution. The close relationship, both as to content and form of the three gospels makes it evident that they are in some way dependent upon one another.

The first possibility is that they merely copied from each other, i.e., Mark copied parts of Matthew, and Luke relied on both Matthew and Mark. Griesbach probed more deeply into the problem and by careful analysis and comparison showed that Mark copied both Matthew and Luke. However, he failed to clarify the relationship between

Matthew and Luke. De Wette felt that Griesbach was definitely pointing in the right direction.[43]

The second possibility is to assume that the evangelists were dependent upon the same written source or sources. Many supposed that this source might have been the lost Gospel of the Hebrews; others presupposed merely some form of an "Urevangelium." These conjectural hypotheses became more elaborate and complex, assuming translations, redactions, etc., almost to the point of absurdity.[44] De Wette felt that this solution was highly improbable since it found no support in the church fathers, and was very artificial. The assumption of a number of written sources fails to clarify the close similarities and, in some cases, the uniformity of the three Gospels.

The assumption of a common oral tradition or source is a third attempt at solving this problem. Undoubtedly there was a living and fairly accurate oral tradition for many years after the time of Christ. A comparison of Matthew 26:26 ff. and I Corinthians 11:23 ff. bears witness to this fact. The oral tradition not only preserved historical continuity, but at the same time was itself a transforming, adapting, and interpreting factor in regard to the life and teachings of Jesus. The early church and the evangelists themselves

did not hesitate in making the oral tradition applicable to their own situation. This is seen in the contextual differences and transitionary passages in the Gospels. As powerful as the oral sources may have been, they are still not sufficient explanation for the general similarity and at times, literal uniformity, of the Synoptic Gospels. Other sources must have been involved.

The fourth explanation posits the use of a common oral source plus the written influence of the evangelists on each other. Although some doubtful hypotheses have been established in this area, de Wette still felt that this explanation was the most satisfactory. He begins his own solution with an explanation of the relationship between Matthew and Luke.[45]

The written sources that Luke mentions (1:1-4) were probably created out of the oral tradition. It is also very probable that Matthew used the same or similar sources, and thus a great deal of their similarity would be explained. These must be classed as reliance upon the oral tradition. It is evident that both men used their materials with a good deal of freedom and individuality but Luke was the better stylist. Their individuality finds expression in the various ways that they connect the sayings of Jesus and in their painting of the background against which He

appears. It can be said that each writer wrote a bit of his own personal history into the Gospel narratives. In regard to their works as a whole, Matthew wrote from a Jewish-Christian viewpoint, limited the ministry of Jesus to Galilee and saw Jesus primarily as the fulfillment of Old Testament law and prophecy; while Luke extended the ministry of Jesus beyond the Galilean borders and wrote more from the standpoint of a Gentile and Paulinist.

Some have supposed that Matthew was dependent upon Luke, but the reverse is more probably true. Matthew is the far more original of the two. The more perfect form and effective simplicity of Matthew shows that his is not primarily the work of a redactor or editor who could have copied from Luke.

Quite definitely Luke was dependent upon Matthew for much of his material, yet he was no mere plagiarist. He reworked the material creatively and no doubt was dependent on other sources, both oral and written.

The relation of Mark to the other two Gospels is now fairly clear.[46] From its position between Matthew and Luke, and from the fact that he has woven his own text simply by using the materials furnished by them, we can safely conclude that Mark is dependent

upon both of them. According to tradition, Mark wrote at a later date than the other two evangelists. This is confirmed by the mediating tendency of his Gospel and by his selection of the material which tends to omit the discourses of Jesus. Furthermore, the false contexts and transpositions of the sayings of Jesus, the arbitrary changing of historical narratives, and the somewhat suspicious additions all indicate the lack of originality. His dependence upon Matthew and Luke is seen in the way Mark abbreviates their narratives and in other cases uses material which presupposes the longer narratives. We dare not judge Mark too severely for this, for the concepts of historical criticism and plagiarism were unknown in that day. In addition, the oral tradition was considered as common property of the Christian community and free to all. Since the oral tradition was still living and growing, it also proved an effective rule for measuring the accuracy of the material he adopted.

The Gospel of Matthew. - According to tradition, the Apostle Matthew was the author and originally wrote this gospel in Hebrew for the Christians in Palestine. However, it is quite certain that this gospel was first written in Greek as the quotations from the Old Testament according to the Septuagint would be highly impro-

bable if it had been written in Hebrew earlier. The tradition that this is the oldest gospel is correct. The date of writing is probably fairly late, yet it must have been before the destruction of Jerusalem.[47]

Many have doubted the apostolic authenticity of the Gospel of Matthew, but not always without passion or prejudice. Yet the following objective grounds for doubt must be stated:[48] (1) Nowhere does the gospel itself indicate that Matthew was the author; (2) An eye-witness and apostle would not have confined the ministry of Jesus to Galilee; (3) The chronology of the book seems quite arbitrary, e.g., the crucifixion on the first day of the Passover; (4) The historicity of entire passages as well as individual facts are questionable; (5) The whole presentation lacks vividness; and (6) The words of Jesus are not always in their true historical context, nor are they accurately transcribed.

In the exegesis of the book itself, de Wette feels that the genealogy in Chapter 1 has very little historical merit because of its contradictions with the Lucan version.[49]

In Chapter 1:18-25, the story of the Virgin Birth, the purpose of the narrative obviously is to indicate the divine origin of the Person of Jesus. There

are a number of difficulties involved.[50] The narratives of Matthew and Luke contradict each other as to the time of the appearance of the angel to Joseph. The mystery of Mary's conception is outside of the normal historical circles, i.e., John, who was closest to Mary, makes no mention of it, and Mary herself (Cf. 12:46; Mark 3:21, 31 ff.) seems to doubt her son. The contemporaries of Jesus hold him to be the son of Joseph,[51] and the evangelists make no protest. Even Paul says Jesus was born "according to the flesh."[52] Jesus's conception by the Holy Spirit was given the character of a supranatural happening because of the prevalent idea of the sinfulness of sexual relations. Similar miraculous births were not uncommon in antiquity.[53] However, one should not discard this narrative since that would have a negative effect on the piety of the common people, but it should be interpreted spiritually.

Other passages in Matthew which illustrate well the character of de Wette's exegesis are Matthew 4:1-11, the Temptation of Jesus;[54] Chapter 5 ff., the Sermon on the Mount;[55] 14:13-41, the Feeding of the Five Thousand;[56] 17:1-13, the Transfiguration;[57] and 17:24-27, the Temple Tax and the Fish.[58]

The Gospel of Mark. - According to tradition this Gospel was written by John Mark and is essentially

Petrine in character.[59] A negative conclusion in regard to Marcan authorship is the most likely. The date of writing is indefinite, but it must have been later than Matthew and Luke. The place of writing was probably Rome.

De Wette treats Mark throughout as a rather secondary source.[60] Thus he can say of the Temptation narrative, (1:12-13), "the ethical importance has been totally lost in this short presentation, and it has become instead an eccentric adventure."[61]

The Gospel of Luke and Book of Acts. - It is fairly certain that Luke and Acts are the work of the same author so they will be considered together. Traditionally Luke is accepted as the author of these books, but this cannot be certified. All that can be said is that the author was strongly influenced by Paul and was probably not a Jew.[62]

The place at which the Gospel was written is entirely unknown. The time of writing was after the fall of Jerusalem, and the fact of the persecution of the Christians and the waning eschatological expectations also point to a fairly late date.

Once again de Wette discusses the Virgin Birth, Chapter 1:26 ff., and says that our judgment as to the historicity of this narrative and fact depends upon the

critic's viewpoint, his education and on the question of whether or not it is essential to the Christian faith to accept such miracle stories literally.[63] The genealogies of Jesus are incompatible and must thus be discounted.

In the Lucan version of the Sermon on the Mount, (Feldrede), 6:17 ff., it is clear that the author writes at a later date and no longer shares the fresh messianic expectations but rather that of a more developed Christianity.[64]

In both the Ascension narratives, i.e., in Luke and in Acts, it is impossible to ascertain by means of the historical-critical method the factual happenings on which they are based.[65] This will probably always remain as one of the secrets of the gospel history.

The author of the Book of Acts writes as a Pauline apologist. He is concerned with a defense of the mission to the Gentiles over against the narrowness of the Judaizing Christians.[66]

Although the general authorship is the same as that of Luke, there are a number of passages which indicate other sources. Some of the passages seem to be those of an eye-witness[67] -- since this could not have been Luke, it seems very probable that Timothy may have

written memoirs which Luke incorporated. Much of Chapter 7 indicates that it may have been taken from a writing dedicated to the memory of Stephen. Similarly, Chapters 13 and 14 could well have been taken from some sort of missionary report, while Chapter 12 may be from a writing concerning Peter.[68]

The second half of the book, Chapter 12 ff., is more reliable historically than the first half.[69] The time of writing is difficult to determine, but at any rate it was after the destruction of Jerusalem and the death of Paul.[70]

De Wette questions the accuracy of the narrative concerning Ananias and Sapphira, 5:1-11.[71] In regard to their death by means of the Holy Spirit, he asks quite pointedly are such drastic methods really necessary for Christianity? Is it the nature of the Holy Spirit to cut off the life of a person while he is still in sin, or is this merely an exaggeration of an overzealous author relying upon an equally ardent churchly tradition?

Paul's address to the Athenians, de Wette holds to be a "model of apologetic teaching."[72]

2 Johannine Literature

De Wette, as did many of his contemporaries, had a decided preference for the Fourth Gospel and the

other writings of John. Not only does John add much new material, but he writes with more spiritual comprehension and a deeper understanding.[73]

The Gospel of John. - In comparison with the Synoptics, the author of this Gospel is an eyewitness with exact knowledge and presents his material more vividly.[74] Much of the teaching of Jesus is given in the form of dialectical dialogue. As regards the reliability of this Gospel, it must be admitted that the author uses his material with a great deal of freedom. The style and contents of this work are in many ways superior to the Synoptics.

This Gospel is not primarily polemical but rather a presentation of the messianic character and the eternally divine nature of Jesus. The Person of Christ is valued more highly than in Matthew.[75]

The portrayal of the hardness of the Jews and a more developed Christendom indicate that the Gospel was written at a later date. There is a gnostic and mystical tendency in this work. It must also be characterized as a hellenistic Gospel. Although this work is later than Matthew, it was still probably used by Mark and Luke.[76]

The authenticity of apostolic authorship was severely questioned by many of de Wette's contemporaries.[77]

De Wette himself felt that even if a later redaction had taken place, the major portion of the material must be attributed to the apostle John.[78] Tradition clearly speaks in favor of it and outward circumstances do not make it impossible. Internal evidence increases the probability of Johannine authorship. The first Epistle and the Gospel were by the same writer, and the former, the author speaks of himself as an eyewitness. Although de Wette admits that no certain judgment ever may be possible, he quite clearly prefers to accept its authenticity.

De Wette gives a fairly lengthy exegesis of the Prologue -- particularly on the meaning of the logos.[79] Chapter 12:44 ff., he holds to be a free composition of the author.[80] Chapter 21 is obviously a later addition.[81]

The Epistles of John. - The First Epistle is written by the same author as the Gospel.[82] This writing was probably a circular letter to the churches in Asia Minor. The time of writing is uncertain, but it was probably written after the Gospel. No reference is made to the destruction of Jerusalem.

The author of the Second and Third Epistles refers to himself as the "elder" (presbyteros). This and the somewhat indefinite tradition have caused many

to recognize some other John as the writer of these letters. However, no certainty can be attained.[83]

3 Pauline Epistles

The letters of Paul are probably the most important historical documents that we possess concerning the early Christian period.[84] We not only are given a deep insight into the character of Paul but into the early church and its problems as well. The church fathers accepted unanimously thirteen letters as Pauline. More recent criticism has cast doubts on the genuineness of Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles.

Early letters. - The First Epistle to the Thessalonians was written while Paul, Timothy and Silas were in Corinth the first time. The time of writing was 52 or 53 A.D.[85] The occasion for the epistle was Paul's concern for the newly founded congregation. The letter evidences a strong apocalyptic tendency.

The Second Letter to the Thessalonians was written shortly after the First, also from Corinth. The subject again is the Second Coming of Christ, but now Paul cautions against fanaticism.[86]

Paul's Epistle to the Galatians is a defense of the Christian faith against the heresies of the Judaizers. It was probably written after his second missionary journey -- approximately 55 or 56 A.D.[87]

In the First Letter to the Corinthians, the congregation had apparently been split into four factions and Paul's writing is a plea for unity.[88] This epistle was written at Ephesus in the year 57 or 58 A.D.

The Second Epistle to the Corinthians was written in Macedonia about a year later. Paul is happy with the results of his first letter and the re-awakened spirit of unity in the congregation. Yet one group, probably the "Christ" party, still seems to be offering opposition.[89]

In the letter to the Romans, Paul introduces himself and his teachings to the congregation at Rome, with whom he as yet has no direct contact. The letter was written in the year 58 or 59 A.D. while Paul was in Corinth.[90] The theme of the letter is found in 1:17, and 1:18-8:39 is an explanation of this basic statement.[91]

Letters from prison. - The letter to Philemon was probably written during Paul's imprisonment in Rome. This epistle has no doctrinal or historical significance but shows us rather the human warmth of Paul's personality.[92]

The Epistle to the Colossians was written from Rome to a congregation that he did not know intimately. The purpose of writing was to encourage them in their

faith and to warn them against false doctrine. Onesimus' return to Colossae may have been the immediate occasion for writing.[93]

The letter to the Ephesians must be carefully analyzed as to its authenticity. If Paul wrote the letter, its destination could hardly have been Ephesus, since the impersonal tone would be inexplicable. More probable is the supposition that the author was not Paul.[94] The similarity to and dependence upon Colossians plus its un-Pauline content and method strengthen this supposition. Finally, the style and language are not Pauline. Although the author was not Paul, it may have been one of his gifted pupils.

The letter to the Philippians was probably sent with Epaphroditus from Rome.[95] Two main questions concern the exegete:[96] (1) What was the state of affairs in the congregation at Philippi; (2) When and where was this letter written? Indications are that it was written rather late.

Pastoral Epistles. - The Epistles of First and Second Timothy and Titus are definitely not the work of Paul although traditionally ascribed to him. All bear a marked similarity to each other in their style, language, and concepts. A strong generalizing tendency is equally non-Pauline. They are dominated by a moralistic

view of life and a doctrinal rigidity indicating a much later period of writing. De Wette says that all three letters are historically and exegetically incomprehensible.[97]

4 The Letter to the Hebrews

This letter too has often been attributed to Paul, but in spite of certain similarities, he could not have been the author. This letter is more literary and theological than any other writing in the New Testament.[98]

The factors against Pauline authorship are: the different theological viewpoint; difference in style and vocabulary; consistent dependence upon the Septuagint; the author's identification of himself as a pupil of the apostles (2:3); the lack of epistolary form; and the missing salutation or conclusion.[99]

The letter was obviously written to Jewish Christians, probably in Palestine. The time of writing was between 62-67 A.D.

Speculations as to authorship have remained futile. He must have had these three characteristics:[100] a born Jew, thorough familiarity with the Alexandrian method and tradition, and literary ability and eloquence. Apollos would fit these qualifications, but no certainty is possible.

5 The Catholic Epistles

These are essentially non-Pauline in character and also lack the true nature and form of personal epistles.[101]

The author of the Book of James identifies himself as the brother of the Lord. De Wette feels that this probably was the brother or half-brother of Jesus, although the question of authorship is not too important.[102] The letter itself is without plan or order and reflects a comparatively late date of writing. This book had some difficulty in being accepted as canonical.

The First Epistle of Peter is addressed to Gentile Christians. The author claims to be Peter but a marked Pauline tendency and the difficulty with which he handles his material has caused doubt. On the basis of internal evidence, the letter appears to have been written during the Neronic persecutions.[103]

Although the author of the Second Epistle of Peter claims to be the Apostle, it is quite certain that he is neither the apostle Peter nor the same person as the author of the First Epistle. The letter is addressed to all Christians and must be late since the eagerness and expectancy in regard to the Second Coming of Christ has waned. This letter is dependent on Jude and often is merely a poor imitation.[104]

The identification of the author of Jude is dependent upon the authorship of James. De Wette is consistent in holding Jude to be the brother of James the brother of Jesus. This book must have been written fairly late since it uses the apocryphal Book of Enoch.[105]

6 The Apocalypse

The Book of Revelation belongs to the class of prophetic writings, the only example in the New Testament. Its purpose was to encourage Christians in time of persecution. The manner of symbolical presentation poses extremely difficult exegetical problems.

Chapter 11 presupposes that Jerusalem was still standing, so the book must have been written before 70 A.D. but after the death of Nero.[106]

Although the author identifies himself as John, it cannot be the same individual who wrote the Gospel and the Epistles and no result of New Testament criticism is more certain than this fact.[107] The author of Revelation differs from the other Johannine writings in language and style, in his method of presentation, and in his total viewpoint.

D Conclusion

In the preface to his commentary on the Book of Revelation, de Wette reviews in retrospect the

circumstances surrounding the production of his exegetical work. His words serve not only as a summary but as an eloquent confession of his faith.

> I began this work while the civil war in Switzerland was brewing, and carried it on undisturbed when the crown fell in France and the thrones in Germany swayed. I have completed it in a time when anarchy seems to be spreading and dark storm clouds are rising over nations and kingdoms. I thank God for the peace of mind that He has given me. However, the concern about the probable fate that awaits us and our church accompanied almost every stroke of my pen. In working with the Apocalypse I have not learned to prophesy. The prophetic vision of John did not extend to our times. I cannot know what the destiny of our beloved protestant church will be. But this I know, that in no other name is there salvation than in the name of Jesus Christ, the Crucified. Nothing higher is given to mankind than the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God -- an idea and task still not properly grasped and carried out in life, not even by those who are rightly considered the most zealous and devoted Christians... Christianity must become life and deed.[108]

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

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A Summary

1 The General Period

The first half of the nineteenth century, the period in which de Wette worked, was remarkable for its production of great thinkers whose germinal ideas have influenced and are still influencing our present age. Foremost among them was Friedrich Schleiermacher, the towering theological genius. He has been called the "church father of the nineteenth century." Not until more than a hundred years later did men such as Barth and Brunner move to a position beyond Schleiermacher. Even then, some have maintained that these men have not left Schleiermacher's sphere of thought but have merely reversed the emphasis on God and man within it.[1]

The influence of another great man of this age, G. W. F. Hegel, has had its most lasting effects through the work of his students. Schweitzer has pointed out the tremendous importance of the Hegelian, David Friedrich Strauss, in the New Testament field.[2] Still another

Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach, completely transformed theology into anthropology and paved the way for the work of Nietzsche. The man of this school whose thought has enjoyed the widest influence is the left-wing Hegelian, Karl Marx. His views have become a vital force and a political reality in our own age.

At this same time and almost unknown to his contemporaries, a quiet Dane, Soren Kierkegaard, was laying the foundation for the exceedingly influential school of existentialist thought. Seldom has anyone so penetratingly re-thought the basic concepts of the Christian faith or analyzed so ruthlessly the weaknesses of human thought. Although much of the modern existentialist movement has wandered far from the basic conceptions of its founder, existentialism has been a potent force in the molding of present theological thought. Many of the great contemporary theologians such as Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, Bultmann, etc., have been deeply influenced by Kierkegaard.

2 Influences of Historical Events on De Wette's Life

W. M. L. de Wette did not have the breadth of influence of such men as have been mentioned above, but his life and work reflect clearly both the historical happenings and the thought currents of northern Europe in that period. His life seems to have been inextricably

connected with the major historical events of those years. The Napoleonic invasions were of more than academic interest to de Wette since his own library and almost all his personal possessions were among the wreckage left behind by the advancing troops. In addition, just a few months previously, de Wette had suffered the personal tragedy of losing his wife when she died in stillbirth.

During the period of occupation, de Wette, together with many others, was seriously concerned about the future of his country. When the day of liberation came, would a new era of freedom and liberal government dawn, or would a reactionary tendency bring a new type of enslavement? De Wette was outspoken in his hopes for the first possibility. As we have seen in Chapter IV, de Wette's enthusiasm led him to advocate the re-interpretation of the Christian festivals in a patriotic sense. The church was to be almost absorbed by the state. The Congress of Vienna, however, confirmed the victory of the forces of reactionary conservatism. De Wette's political zeal was well known and thus it is not surprising that he should have been under the close surveillance of the authorities. The letter to Sand's mother furnished the necessary pretext for his dismissal. It was at this same time that de Wette was having difficulty with his second wife.

With the exception of short periods, the two lived separately from that point on.

De Wette did not realize that his dismissal by the Prussian Government would make it almost impossible for him to find employment in the churches or universities of any other German province. It was at this point that de Wette reluctantly left his native land and settled at the University of Basel, Switzerland for the rest of his life.

3 De Wette's Relation to the Thought of the Period

De Wette's work also clearly reflected the thought currents of his day. He began his efforts in the field of Old Testament criticism. De Wette had rebelled against the dogmatic attitude of the Supranaturalists with their literal interpretation of the Scriptures. The influence of Rationalism led him to accept the criterion of human reason, in its more popular sense, as the measure of truth. The cold aloofness of Rationalism, however, did not satisfy de Wette's desire for a warm, personal Christianity. He thus hoped that his work could combine the strengths of both approaches and omit their weaknesses.

During his Berlin period, de Wette worked chiefly in the area of theology and ethics. The intercourse with his old friend, Fries, at Heidelberg, had served

to clarify and crystallize his philosophical position. In addition, de Wette's concern with the future course of his fatherland resulted in his trying, by the formulation of his theological and ethical principles, to influence the thought of his day. In his theology, de Wette again tried to synthesize and harmonize the two prevailing views. He attempted to maintain the traditional doctrines of the church but gave them an aesthetic or ideal interpretation in order to avoid their conflict with, and make them acceptable to, the critical philosophies of his day.

Following his dismissal from Berlin, de Wette began his collection of Luther's letters. He also began to write philosophical novels and drama. This he did from a variety of motives. First, he wanted to analyze in a more popular form the thought and controlling forces of his day. Secondly, although this may have been done unconsciously, they formed an explanation and justification for his own development and attitudes. A third, more pragmatic consideration, was his need for additional funds. With his wife and children living separately, and with her rather exorbitant financial demands, de Wette was hard pressed to meet his bills. This not only encouraged and necessitated his writing but had another effect. It was at

this point that de Wette began to preach and consider the active parish ministry. Although his motivation was not only financial, his preaching led him to a practical interest in the church which remained with him the rest of his life. The church and congregation were no longer theological abstractions but concrete, living realities. Schleiermacher's influence and the bitter experience with the Prussian government dampened his enthusiasm for the close relationship of church and state. Prior to this time, de Wette seemed to indicate that the church was to be subordinate and almost completely subservient to the state. From this point on, de Wette became more interested in the church as such and showed a greater reliance on the Christian community.

This practical interest was greatly in evidence during de Wette's years in Basel. Not only did he enter into the life of the community, and preach in its churches but his chief theological interest was the exegesis of the New Testament. De Wette felt that his work in the New Testament was also necessary because of the radical approach of Hegelians such as Strauss and Bauer. He felt that his own approach, although more conservative, was more balanced.

Thus the man who began as a radical Old Testa-

ment critic was, at the end of his life, classed by some as a conservative pietist. De Wette realized this himself but maintained, and rightly so, that his basic position had remained the same while the times had changed.[3] No "school" of theological thought was established by de Wette, but he and Fries have had an influence on some of the men in our present century. This is shown in the revival of interest in Fries' philosophy in Germany shortly after the turn of this century and by the work of Rudolf Otto in particular. One cannot help but wonder what the result might have been had Fries actually received the call to the University of Berlin to occupy the position that Hegel was to hold. It is conceivable that the next half century might have been a Friesian rather than a Hegelian era.

B A Negative Critique

1 De Wette's Philosophy and Theology

The Friesian philosophy, on which de Wette relied, was anthropological and psychological in character. Through careful observation, introspection and analysis, not only the logical but also the religious capacities of man could be discovered. This basic approach made de Wette's theology anthropocentric rather than theocentric. This anthropocentricity had far reaching consequences in his theology.

If we define religion on the basis of man and his capacities, then the religious capacity of man becomes the criterion for judging religion. To put it rather crudely, can one accurately describe a container and draw any definite conclusions about its contents? Thus the description of the container to some extent limits the nature, form and properties of that which it is to contain. The results of this approach to theology are obvious -- only that can be accepted which fits into man's categories. We might ask further, if we describe religion in terms of man's capacities, what criteria do we have for distinguishing whether Christianity is superior to any other religion?

To approach the same difficulty from another point of view, it would seem that de Wette's method itself mitigated against a full and adequate understanding of the Christian faith. According to his method, philosophy by its critical analysis determines the capacity of reason and defines the boundaries of the religious inquiry. The questions and boundaries, determined by philosophy, are by definition formal, empty and abstract. Thus from the outset elements and presuppositions are introduced which are foreign to the New Testament and Christianity. The content and material for the answers to these questions is to be

derived from the New Testament, experience and history. It is quite obvious that the formulation of the question has much to say about the possible answer. Is there any assurance that the questions posed by this method either can or should be answered by the given material? It is conceivable that the questions asked may be irrelevant to the main emphasis of the given material. Furthermore, any answer given to these questions may involve only the peripheral elements rather than the basic concern of the material in question. This would imply that the central emphasis of the given material might be either totally or partially neglected. As we shall see, this actually happens in de Wette's theology.

De Wette's methodological and philosophical presuppositions prevented him from penetrating to the core of the New Testament message. His reliance on the infallibility of human reason and his faith in the perfectability of man lead to an essentially optimistic estimate of the nature of man. By the same token, these presuppositions precluded any radical doctrine of evil. Thus evil had no objective stature and sin is more a matter of ignorance than of perversity. This is not the situation to which the New Testament speaks. The New Testament views man as being held in bondage

by the powers of evil and as being lost and separated from God. Not only this, but man somehow consents to this bondage and is inextricably and actively involved in opposing God. The Gospel is the good news of victory over the powers of evil, of forgiveness for disobedience, and of reconciliation to God in Christ. If man is not in bondage to evil, if he is not actively disobedient and if he is not separated from God, then the Gospel message of liberation, forgiveness and reconciliation is irrelevant. If man is not enslaved by the Law, then the Gospel of freedom is unnecessary; if man is not lost in sin, then God's Grace is cheap and meaningless. In this light, it is not difficult to understand why the Cross and the Resurrection of Christ, which are the focal points of God's victorious invasion of history, are relegated by de Wette to a peripheral role.

De Wette's absolute dichotomy between Wissen and Glaube, or between the eternal and the temporal realms, necessitated that revelation be immanent rather than transcendent. Revelation is not a confrontation from without but an unfolding from within. The hidden ground of the soul is the source through which revelation comes. Thus reason becomes some sort of mystical "inner light" or "divine spark" whose proper stimulation reveals God to us.

The most serious implication of this dichotomy is the denial of the incarnation. For de Wette, the eternal can never enter the temporal, and no amount of "aesthetic feeling" can alter the fact that, for him, the incarnation is impossible and, to some extent, unnecessary. Thus Christ is not the God-man but some rather nebulous universal ideal of humanity. Any reconciliation of man to God is not on the objective basis of God's invasion of history in the person of Christ, but is a subjective, aesthetic feeling within man himself.

In his desire to accept the traditional doctrines of Christianity and combine them with some of the critical conclusions of Rationalism, de Wette resorted to an "ideal" or "aesthetic" interpretation. This attempt at a synthesis was not always satisfactory. When de Wette states that a doctrine, although philosophically untrue, should still be left for the good of the common people, his approach is something less than one of complete honesty. Despite the purity of his motives, de Wette's method tends toward a gnostic distinction between the initiated and the uninitiated. Can the conflicts resulting from two fundamentally different approaches be resolved by elevating the problem into the sphere of aesthetic feeling? Do these aesthetic symbols have any immediate relationship to or

are they a vital force in life? Are there any limitations or controls in regard to religious feeling? What criteria or standards are available or even possible to ascertain their correctness?

2 De Wette's Biblical Work

On the whole, de Wette was far more successful in the biblical than in the theological field. His work in the Old Testament had the most lasting significance.

During the early years of his critical work in the Old Testament, de Wette was overly influenced by Rationalism. His conclusions were generally negative and more radical than in his later years. De Wette had reacted sharply against the maze of speculative hypotheses and tended toward the other extreme.

Although his historical understanding was greater than that of many of his predecessors, the lack of precise data about the early periods of history and about other civilizations limited his grasp of history as a whole. De Wette still operated with many of the pragmatic hypotheses of the Aufklärung. In addition, his strict adherence to the ideas of a progressive history and revelation, as propounded by Lessing and Herder, limited him in certain areas. Thus he failed to grasp the real significance of prophecy which is "the

source and nature of the real religious content of the Old Testament religion."[4]

In the New Testament area, the criticisms are similar. De Wette shared with the Rationalists their predilection for the Fourth Gospel. Of the four gospels, John was accepted as the one which presented the most accurate historical picture. The picture of Christ was drawn in accordance with it and the historical presentation was awkward and clumsy.

De Wette also failed to present an adequate solution to the Synoptic Problem. His disparagement of Mark's Gospel was a barrier to seeing its originality.

In his New Testament exegetical work, de Wette tended to rely too heavily on the opinions of others and too often was tempted merely to review what they had said. His commentaries would have been more interesting had they contained more of his own thought. In his explanation of the miracles, the influence of Rationalism is still markedly noticeable.

C A Positive Evaluation

1 De Wette's Philosophy and Theology

In spite of the preceding rather negative critique, there is much that can be said positively for de Wette's work in these areas. It is to de Wette's

credit that he chose Fries' philosophy since it was probably the best available vehicle for his thought. Although the present writer has been critical of de Wette's "aesthetic" judgments and "aesthetic" feelings, these were honest, if not too fortunate, attempts to express something very fundamental. It seems that de Wette caught sight of the fact that there are certain basic areas and truths of the Christian faith that defy all conceptualization or articulation. Propositions and doctrines, in the last analysis, are a description of the truth and not the truth itself. De Wette's concept of Ahndung was an attempt to express this.

De Wette's choice of Fries' philosophy was also fortunate in that he was able to construct a comparatively adequate philosophy of religion with it. Almost a century later, Rudolf Otto based his own philosophy of religion on the same system. As Davidson points out, Otto

> is content to turn to the philosophy of Fries for suggestion, finding in the Friesian idealism the ultimate justification as well as the initial inspiration for his own position, and never attempting any systematic statement of philosophy other than that sketched in his early Kantisch-Friessche Religionsphilosophie (1909).[5]

It is true that Otto in his later development deviated

somewhat from this original position but he never repudiated his dependence upon Fries.

At one point Otto was also influenced by de Wette's further development of Fries' position. De Wette's modification of Ahndung "unquestionably paved the way for his (Otto's) own theory of 'divination', and the concept of religion outlined in De Wette's theological studies is remarkably similar to that later formulated by Otto."[6]

At another point, Otto attempted to establish an independent a priori religious category of interpretation similar to the other Kantian-Friesian categories.[7] In his identification of the Holy as an a priori category, he knowingly deviated from Fries' position. It is interesting to note that at approximately the same period, Anders Nygren, the leading proponent of the rather influential Swedish "Lundensian school" of theology, was also seeking to establish an independent religious a priori.[8] However, further pursuit of this suggestive interrelationship goes beyond the bounds of this present study.

De Wette's advance in the treatment of the history of religion was the first step toward a historical understanding of Christianity. Barth remarks that, "apart from Ferdinand Christian Baur, de Wette was the

greatest historical theologian of this generation."[9]

De Wette looked upon theology not as an objective and disinterested science but as a discipline that stood in the service of the church. His theology was conceived with the purpose of aiding the Christian community since it was de Wette's conviction that Christianity must become vital and active.[10] It is to our loss that de Wette's concern for serving the church is not more clearly visible in his theology.

De Wette's aesthetic interpretation of the traditional doctrines shows a great deal of psychological insight. Much of what was said is astonishingly modern.

Barth suggests that a renewed interest in de Wette today would be profitable since the relation of de Wette to Fries is comparable to Rudolf Bultmann's relation to Martin Heidegger.[11] Although the philosophical presuppositions of de Wette and Bultmann would be quite different, a methodological comparison of their use of these presuppositions in relationship to the Christian faith would be highly interesting and instructive. A further area of methodological similarity seems to be evident in the work of de Wette and Anders Nygren. In this case even the philosophical presuppositions appear to be much more closely related. The trenchant criticism levelled at Nygren by his successor, Gustaf

Wingren, would, for the most part, also apply to de Wette's method.[12]

2 De Wette's Biblical Work

Almost any type of evaluation of de Wette's Old Testament efforts would be positive in its conclusions. De Wette's identification, in his doctoral dissertation, of the Book of Deuteronomy with the reform of Josiah in the seventh century B.C. is still, for most scholars, the pole star around which the criticism of the Pentateuch revolves. De Wette's work was so exhaustive that his observations went almost unchallenged until very recent times.[13] But even now, some one hundred and fifty years after de Wette's discovery, the burden of proof lies with those who contend that he was wrong.

De Wette's critical study of the Books of Chronicles was a masterpiece of historical criticism. One historian describes this work of de Wette's in the following words:

> In this instance, the critical work was so incisive in its initial findings that succeeding generations found little left to do. De Wette's scientific method, which combined the criticism of content and of literary style, was an influential example.[14]

In his analysis of the literary categories of the Psalms, de Wette has left a lasting but often unrecognized mark. His was the first such attempt and

much of the later work of Hermann Gunkel in this area is but a further development of de Wette's work.

De Wette seems to have been a unusually gifted critic. His philological thoroughness, his historical perception and great sensitivity, combined to give him an almost uncanny intuitive sense in the matter of historical and literary criticism.

These same characteristics helped make de Wette's textbook on Old Testament Introduction exemplary in its field. Hirsch makes this comment about it:

> In its combination of research and doctrine, its explanation and presentation, its clarity of the whole and its accuracy in details, it was a masterpiece never achieved by any other Old Testament Introduction.[15]

In the New Testament field, de Wette is remembered chiefly for his commentaries and his textbook on New Testament Introduction. The fact that both of these went through a number of editions testifies to their popularity and usefulness. Here too, he showed the same type of impartial, calm and exact scholarship characteristic of his Old Testament work. His commentaries are examples of philological exactness and thoroughness. His exegesis as well as his theology was to be a servant of the church.

In his role as a theological professor, his personal concern for his students elicited not only

their respect but their love. His influence in shaping the lives and thought of at least two generations of theological students is a contribution that cannot be measured. When de Wette arrived at Basel, it was a small rather unimportant theological faculty with standards and resources at a much lower level than the first-rate German universities. Today Basel is one of the most influential theological centers in the protestant world. Apart from the obvious attraction of individual personalities which have made Basel's influence world-wide, there is the solid foundation of scholarly endeavour and academic tradition which has its roots in de Wette's time.

De Wette's life and work are an example of devotion to truth and Christian concern. He did not succeed in accomplishing the task he set for himself, but he was aware of this. Toward the close of his life he wrote:

> Ich fiel in eine wirre Zeit,
> Die Glaubenseintracht war vernichtet.
> Ich mischte mich mit in den Streit.
> Umsonst! Ich hab' ihn nicht geschlichtet![16]

De Wette was truly a Nathaniel of modern theology.[17]

Daniel Schenkel, a former pupil and close friend of de Wette, was the author of a sentence placed on de Wette's tombstone to the effect that the truth of the approach of science (Wissenschaft) and the truth of

the approach of faith were uniquely united in him. Another close friend and former pupil, Karl R. Hagenbach, reverently placed a question mark at the end of the sentence.[18]

NOTES

NOTES

CHAPTER I

[1]F. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1889), p. 34.

[2]Cf., Karl Heussi, Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte (10th ed.; Tübingen, 1949), pp. 390 ff.

[3]For works of a general nature concerning this period cf., Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932); K. R. Hagenbach, German Rationalism, in its rise, progress and decline, in relation to Theologians, Scholars, Poets, Philosophers and the people, ed. and trans. by W. L. Gage and J. H. W. Stuckenberg, (Edinburgh, 1864); and H. M. Wolff, Die Weltanschauung der deutschen Aufklärung in geschichtlicher Entwicklung, (Bern, 1949).

[4]Cf., Andrew L. Drummond, German Protestantism Since Luther (London: Epworth Press, 1951), pp. 173 ff.

[5]Cf., Heussi, op. cit., p. 394.

[6]Cf., Max Beloff, The Age of Absolutism, 1660-1815, (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1954). Also, Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert (Zürich, 1947), pp. 19 ff. In Chapter II, Barth gives a good and fairly complete analysis of "Der Mensch im 18. Jahrhundert."

[7]Cf., Barth, op. cit., p. 25 for a fuller discussion of this view.

[8]Cf., Ibid., p. 32.

[9]Cf., Ibid., p. 33.

[10]Richard Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, trans. A. C. Armstrong (London, 1895), p. 76.

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[11]Ibid., pp. 76-77.

[12]Cf., Johann E. Erdmann, History of Philosophy, trans. W. S. Hough (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1891), Vol. II, pp. 104 ff. for a fuller discussion of Locke's thought.

[13]Cf., Barth, op. cit., pp. 23 ff.

[14]Cf., Joseph Gostwick, German Culture and Christianity (London: F. Norgate, 1882), which has several chapters tracing the rise of German poetry.

[15]Cf., Barth, op. cit., p. 48.

[16]Cf., Gostwick, op. cit., Ch. XI on Klopstock and Wieland.

[17]Lichtenberger, op. cit., p. 242.

[18]Ibid., p. 248. Cf., Gostwick, op. cit., Ch. XIII.

[19]Lichtenberger, op. cit., p. 249.

[20]Gostwick, op. cit., p. 281.

[21]Ibid., p. 284.

[22]Cf., Ibid., Ch. XIV.

[23]Lichtenberger, op. cit., p. 286.

[24]Drummond, op. cit., p. 91.

[25]Ibid., p. 91.

[26]Cf., Barth, op. cit., pp. 36 ff.

[27]Ibid., p. 50.

[28]Ibid., p. 52.

[29]Hagenbach, op. cit., p. 99.

[30]Ibid., p. 102.

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[31]C. F. A. Kahnis, Internal History of German Protestantism since the Middle of the Last Century, trans. T. Meyer (Edinburgh, 1856), p. 216.

[32]Ibid., pp. 216-217.

[33]Cf., Barth, op. cit., p. 44.

[34]Ibid., p. 44.

[35]Cf., Kahnis, op. cit., pp. 56 ff.

[36]Barth, op. cit., p. 45.

[37]Erdmann, op. cit., p. 308.

[38]Falckenberg, op. cit., p. 89.

[39]Ibid., p. 91.

[40]John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 151 f.

[41]Cf., Erdmann, op. cit., pp. 60 ff.

[42]Cf., W. Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (Tübingen, 1903), pp. 345 ff.

[43]Cf., Falckenberg, op. cit., p. 296.

[44]Cf., Friedrich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, trans. G. Morris (London, 1876), Vol. II, pp. 117 ff.

[45]Kahnis, op. cit., p. 29.

[46]Ueberweg, op. cit., pp. 119 ff.

[47]Cf., Harald Höffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, trans. B. E. Meyer (London: Macmillan and Co., 1900), Vol. II, p. 9.

[48]Cf., B. A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), pp. 259 ff.

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[49]Cf., J. B. Burgess, Introduction to the History of Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 405.

[50]Cf., Burgess, op. cit., p. 420.

[51]Cf., Heussi, op. cit., p. 404.

[52]Cf., Drummond, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[53]Heussi, op. cit., p. 406. Cf., the section on Pietism in Walter von Löwenich, Die Geschichte der Kirche (Witten: Luther Verlag, 1948).

[54]Cf., Heussi, op. cit., pp. 405 ff.

[55]Cf., Ibid., p. 412.

[56]Cf., Barth, op. cit., pp. 120 ff.

[57]Cf., Ibid., pp. 122 ff.

[58]Cf., Ibid., pp. 130 ff.

[59]Cf., Kahnis, op. cit., pp. 139 ff.

[60]Cf., Barth, op. cit., pp. 139 ff.

[61]Cf., Ibid., p. 143.

[62]Cf., Heussi, op. cit., p. 413.

[63]Cf., Kahnis, op. cit., pp. 130-145.

[64]Hagenbach, op. cit., p. 78.

[65]Heussi, op. cit., p. 417.

[66]H. L. Stewart, Modernism, Past and Present (London: John Murray, 1932), p. 197.

[67]Cf., O. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology in Germany Since Kant, trans. J. F. Smith (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1890), pp. 85 ff.

[68]Cf., Lichtenberger, op. cit., pp. 19 ff.

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[69]Cf., Ibid., pp. 20-21. Also, Pfleiderer, op. cit., pp. 89 ff.

[70]Pfleiderer, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

[71]Cf., Lichtenberger, op. cit., pp. 25 ff.

[72]Cf., Ibid., pp. 27 ff.

[73]Ibid., p. 34.

[74]Cf., Barth, op. cit., the chapter on Schleiermacher. Also, W. B. Selbie, Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study (London, 1913).

CHAPTER II

[1]The two works referring directly to the genealogy of the de Wette family were unavailable, i.e., Robert de Wette, Die Familie de Wette (Arnstadt, 1869); and Hübschmann, Nachrichten über die Familie de Wette (Jena, 1848). However, I was able to use these works indirectly through the excellent biography of A. Wiegand, W. M. L. de Wette, Eine Säkularschrift (Erfurt, 1879). Other partly biographical works are: Daniel Schenkel, W. M. L. de Wette und die Bedeutung seiner Theologie für unsere Zeit (Schaffhausen, 1849); K. R. Hagenbach, Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, Eine Akademische Gedächtnissrede (Leipzig, 1850); F. Lücke, Zur freundschaftlichen Erinnerung, in Theologische Studien und Kritiken (Hamburg, 1850); Rudolf Stähelin, W. M. L. de Wette, nach seiner theologischen Wirksamkeit und Bedeutung (Basel, 1880); Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, trans. E. B. Dicker (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1931); G. Franck and F. Kattenbusch, "De Wette," Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche (Leipzig, 1908), Vol. XXI; and Holzman, "De Wette," Allgemeine deutsche Biographie (1877), Vol. V.

[2]Martin de Wette studied theology at Jena and was ordained in the parish of Grosscröbitz bei Kahla in 1640. He later moved to Maua and Leutra bei Jena and served there until 1692. Two of his

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sons were ministers; Johann Georg served as pastor in Sulzbach bei Apolda from 1679-1718, and Johann Heinrich served in Synderstedt from 1681 to 1702 and in Berka from 1702 to 1714. The son of the latter, Gottfried Albin de Wette, was pastor in Mellingen for twenty-two years and died in 1768. In turn, two of his sons were clergymen; Anton Johann Friedrich (1739-1804) served at Hottelstedt and Ulrichtshalben, and Johann Augustin, W. M. L. de Wette's father, became pastor at Ulla in 1776.

[3]Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., p. 3. In his student days at Jena, de Wette wrote in his diary concerning a Bible that he had received: "I bid Thee welcome Thou holy remembrance, Thou rich treasure of the Good and the Beautiful, Thou Book of Books! How I shall enjoy Thee and be enriched by Thy fullness." So too, at the end of his life, laying his hand on his Bible, he said to his friends, "It is a precious gift of God! I learn from it and am refreshed by it daily."

[4]Friedrich Carl Peucer later became Direktor of the Oberconsistorium at Weimar.

[5]These men influenced chiefly de Wette's aesthetic sensitivity. Schiller was for him the "Dichter des sittlichen begeisterten Strebens," and Herder's Geist der Hebräischen Poesie is one of the keys to de Wette's approach to the Old Testament. For a fuller treatment of those who influenced de Wette, see Chapter III.

[6]Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., p. 9.

[7]de Wette, Theodor oder des Zweiflers Weihe, Bildungsgeschichte eines evangelischen Geistlichen, (Berlin, 1822), Vol. I, p. 112.

[8]J. J. Griesbach (1745-1812) was the son of a pastor from Butzbach in Hessen Darmstadt and a grandson of the famous Giessen theologian, Rambach. Griesbach came to Jena in 1775 and taught there for seventy-four semesters. De Wette says of him in Theodor, op. cit., pp. 16-17, that he "eine Menge von Meinungen und Ansichten uber streitige Stellen vorlegt und die Gründe für und wieder angiebt,

ohne sich bestimmt für den einen oder andern zu entscheiden."

[9]J. P. Gabler (1753-1826) was born in Frankfurt a. M., studied at Jena under Griesbach and Eichhorn from 1772-1778, became Professor and Deacon at Altdorf in 1785, and went to the faculty at Jena in 1804 to remain there for twenty-two years.

[10]H. E. G. Paulus (1761-1851), born in the same house in Leonberg where Schelling was born fourteen years later, became a professor at Jena at the age of twenty-seven, went to Würzburg in 1803, and to Heidelberg in 1811 where he taught for forty years.

[11]de Wette, Theodor, op. cit., p. 20.

[12]Cf., Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[13]Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., pp. 13-14, who quotes from de Wette's Eine Idee über das Studium der Theologie, ed. posthumously by A. Stierer (Leipzig, 1850). De Wette says further: "Mein Studium ist das streben nach Religion, die Gottheit zu finden, mich mit ihr zu vereinigen. Nie wird der Theolog aus gesammelten, fremden Reflexionen und aus Systemen Weisheit predigen können. Das Herz, wo allein die Gottheit wirkt und lebt, wo sie allein geahnt und gefühlt werden kann, muss gerührt und bewegt werden, ja für den Glauben an Gott erwärmt. Es sind nicht todte Sätze und Lehrmeinungen, was der Mund verkündigen soll, es ist ungeheuchelte, aus dem Herzen strömende Wahrheit, bestätigt durch das Leben und Handeln des Sprechenden, es ist innige, warme Ueberzeugung, lebendiger Glaube, was ihn zu heiliger Begeisterung erheben und die Hörer mit voller mächtiger Rührung ergreifen soll! Ja, glauben muss der Prediger, was er verkündiget; thun, wozu er die Menschen ermahnt!"

[14]This lecture was never published and thus was unavailable to the writer. It was necessary to rely on Wiegand's account of it.

[15]Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., p. 18.

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[16]Cf., E. L. T. Henke, Jakob Friedrich Fries, Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse dargestellt (Leipzig,1867), pp. 126 ff. In the appendix Henke includes de Wette's article "Zum Andenken an J. F. Fries," and several of de Wette's letters, pp. 277 ff. and 344 ff.

[17]Daub (1765-1836), born in Kassel, was a man of simplicity, moral energy and great objectivity. He was a creative spirit with a wealth of knowledge and experience.

[18]Creuzer (1771-1858) was according to Umbreit's judgment an "offenbarungsgläubiger Theolog" and a pious man in church and home. De Wette often came together with him.

[19]Wiegand, op. cit., p. 21, says, "Leider war es de Wette nicht vergönnt mit Henriette Beck, der früheren Kaufmannsgattin, die kein Verständniss für ihres Mannes stilles Leben und wissenschaftliches Streben hatte, dazu höchst launenhaftig, rechthaberisch, eifersuchtig und verschwenderisch war, eine glückliche und zufriedene Ehe zu führen."

[20]Karl Beck (1798-1866) was with de Wette at the Sand home in Wunsiedel and later, in 1824, emigrated to the United States and through the recommendation of the Swiss Consulate was appointed Professor of the Latin Language at Harvard. He returned for a short visit to Basel at the time of de Wette's Twenty-fifth Anniversary as a professor there.

[21]The prevailing atmosphere in government and university circles is clearly evident from a letter written by Robinson in 1804. Cf., Henke, op. cit., p. 95. Fries was under consideration for a call to Heidelberg and he was to send samples of his work. Robinson counsels "nun über Religion je weniger je besser; wenn irgendwo in seinen Werken nur ein Wörtchen, das wie Ketzerei oder Unglaube aussieht, enthalten sei, so musse es nicht mitgeschickt werden, denn hierüber sei die Regierung ungemein zartfühlend."

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[22]Cf., Max Lenz, Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, (Halle, 1910), for a complete history of the founding and development of this institution.

[23]Wiegand, op. cit., p. 24.

[24]Cf., Ibid., p. 25.

[25]On these occasions, theological discussions must have been common since three of de Wette's sisters were married to pastors -- Pastor Thöllden of Willerstedt, Pastor Ludwig of Rossleben, and Pastor Hübschmann from Riethnordhausen.

[26]Henke, op. cit., p. 344. "Dieser (Schleiermacher) hat etwas Vornehmthuendes an sich, was nicht erlauben wird, mich eng an ihn zu schliessen, doch wird sich auf einen guten Fuss mit ihm leben lassen." Cf., Ernst Staehelin, Dewettiana: Forschungen und Texte zu Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wettes Leben und Werk, Vol. II, Studien zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Basel (Basel: Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 1956), p. 68 f., a letter to J. F. Fries, Oct. 16, 1810.

[27]Cf., Henke, op. cit., pp. 345 ff. In a letter to Fries, de Wette gives a detailed description of his arrival in Berlin and of the situation as he found it.

[28]Ibid., pp. 348 ff. Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 71 f., a letter to J. F. Fries, Nov. 11, 1811.

[29]Henke, op. cit., pp. 352 ff. Marheineke was a Hegelian, and the two had already been bitter opponents at Heidelberg. Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 73 f., a letter to Fries, Dec. 31, 1814.

[30]August Neander (1789-1850) was of Jewish descent. He was baptized in 1806 and changed his name from Mendel to Neander (neos ander). He studied at Halle and Heidelberg and was called to Berlin in 1812, where he taught for seventy-four semesters.

[31]Cf., Lücke, op. cit., pp. 21-23.

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[32]Cf., Henke, op. cit., pp. 346-347; 351-358. This tension is clearly expressed in the letters from de Wette to Fries. De Wette writes (p. 351): "Uebrigens gewinnt er (Schleiermacher) ein Uebergewicht über mich, da die Studenten seine Gnosis lieber wollen als meine Kritik." Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 72, a letter to Fries, Feb. 16, 1813. Again, Henke, op. cit., p. 352, "Ich kann mir jetzt gar nicht mehr verhehlen, dass Schleiermacher ein entschiedenes Uebergewicht über mich gewonnen, und dass ich durch herrschende Frömmelei und meine immer mehr offenbar gewordene Freidenkerei in Miscredit gekommen bin." Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 73, a letter to Fries, Dec. 31, 1814.

[33]Cf., Henke, op. cit., p. 360.

[34]Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 77 f., a letter from Lücke to von Bunsen, Nov. 3, 1816. Also p. 78, de Wette's letters to Fries, Nov. 10, 1816 and March 15, 1817.

[35]Anna, after her mother's death in 1825, kept house for her father. In 1835 she married Notarius Dr. Jur. August Heitz of Basel. The marriage was blessed with five children. Cf., Robert de Wette, op. cit., p. 63.

[36]Ludwig studied medicine in Basel, Heidelberg, Berlin and Vienna but practiced in Basel. In 1836-37 he visited his half-brother in America. He married in 1838 and was the father of three children.

[37]For brief sketches of the political situation at this time, cf., the Introduction in F. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1889); and Karl Heussi, Kompendium der Kirchengeschichte (10th ed.; Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1949), pp. 437 ff. For more detailed treatment, cf., C. Seignobos, Politische Geschichte des Modernen Europa 1814-1896 (1910), and K. Griewank, Der Wiener Kongress (1942).

[38]Cf., Henke, op. cit., pp. 173 ff., for an interesting description of this occasion.

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[39]Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., p. 33. Almost a year before, on May 5, 1818, Karl Sand wrote in his diary, "When I stop to consider it, I often think that someone should have enough courage to take a man like Kotzebue or any other traitor to our country and run a sword through his breast."

[40]The letter read as follows: "Die begangene That ist freilich nicht nur ungesetzlich und vor dem weltlichen Richter strafbar, sondern auch unsittlich und der sittlichen Gesetzgebung zuwiderlaufend. Durch Unrecht, durch List und Gewalt kann kein Recht gestiftet werden und der gute Zweck heiligt nicht das ungerechte Mittel. Als Sittenlehrer kann ich nie zu solchen Handlungen ermahnen und rathen, das Böse soll nicht durch das Böse, sondern allein durch das Gute überwunden werden. Aber -- ist von Beurtheilung irgend einer geschehenen Handlung die Rede, so darf man nie das allgemeine Gesetz als Massstabe gebrauchen, sondern die Ueberzeugung und Beweggründe des Handelnden... Ich bin allerdings der Meinung, dass der Entschluss Ihres Sohnes aus einem Irrthum hervorgegangen und nicht ganz frei von Leidenschaft gewesen ist....Der Irrthum wird entschuldigt durch die Festigkeit und Lauterkeit der Ueberzeugung und die Leidenschaft wird geheiligt durch die gute Quelle, aus der sie fliesst....Er war seiner Sache Gewiss, er hielt es für Recht das zu thun, was er gethan, und so hat er Recht gethan....So wie die That geschehen ist durch diesen reinen, frommen Jüngling, mit diesem Glauben, mit dieser Zuversicht ist sie ein schönes Zeichen der Zeit....Mögen Sie, verehrte Freudin, diese Bemerkungen wahr finden und diese Ansicht der Sache festhalten gegen alle Widerrede. Sie haben diesen ausserordentlichen Sohn geboren und erzogen, so werden Sie ihn auch verstehen und zu schätzen wissen und sein selbst gewähltes Schicksal mit Muth und Ergebung tragen. Dazu verleihe Ihnen Gott seinen Segen, der auch im Schwachen mächtig ist."

De Wette's intention of comforting Sand's mother was accomplished as her return letter testifies: "Ihr Brief war mir die theuerste Handschrift denn ich erhielt Ihre Alles besiegenden Tröstungen in den ersten Tagen des allgewaltigen Schmerzes. Doppelten Eingang müssten sie bei dem zermalmten Herzen finden, da Sie Alles umfassten, was die Vernunft erhellen und das Herz beruhigen könnte; auch

war die hohe Achtung und die innigste Verehrung, welche Ihnen mein theurer Karl so lebhaft zollte, meinem Herzen zu neu und zu tief eingegraben. Sie erschienen mir, hochverehrter Freund, als ein tröstender, leitender Engel in dem fürchterlichen Sturme, der mich umtobte." Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., p. 35. Also cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 85-87, the complete letter to Mrs. Sand March 31, 1819.

[41]Cf., Friedrich Nippold, Handbuch der Neuesten Kirchengeschichte (3rd ed.; Berlin, 1890), Vol. III, pp. 46 ff.

[42]Wiegand, op. cit., p. 36. Cf., de Wette, Actensammlung über die Entlassung des Prof. de Wette vom Theologische Lehramt zu Berlin, (Leipzig, 1820) for all the material and documents pertinent to this affair.

[43]The letter read: "Neun Jahre lang habe ich bei einem stillen, unbescholtenen Lebenswandel nach meinen geringen Kräften mit redlichem Willen das mir anvertraute Amt verwaltet. Den schweren Weg der strengsten wissenschaftlichen Forschung wandelnd, habe ich in meinem Wirkungskreise, wenn mich die dankbaren Zeugnisse solcher Schüler, welche schon im Amte stehen und mit Beifall und Segen arbeiten, nicht täuschen, Ueberzeugung und Einsicht und heilsame Anregung gegeben....Achtung glaube ich selbst meinem Gegnern abgewonnen zu haben und mein redliches Streben ist selten verkannt worden; aber jetzt -- meine Wirksamkeit als Lehrer habe ich vielleicht für immer verloren, meine Ehre ist gekränkt, das Glück meiner Familie zertrümmert und im 40. Lebensjahre sehe ich mich weit auf meiner Laufbahn zurückgeworfen. Bei geschwächter Gesundheit, ohne alles Vermögen, Gatte, Vater zweier Kinder, Versorger eines noch im seiner Ausbildung begriffenden Pflegesohnes nehme ich eine schwere Last von hinnen."

[44]Wiegand, op. cit., pp. 36 f.

[45]Ibid., p. 37.

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[46]De Wette's answer to the Senatus read: "Gross war der Gewinn, unersetzlich mir nun der Verlust. Eine unauslöschliche Sehnsucht wird mich hieher als in meine verlorene Heimath ziehen. Möge mein unbedeutendes Andenken in dem Kreise, den ich verlasse, nicht ganz erlöschen. Gott erhalte und segne zum Heil der Kirche und des Vaterlandes diese Anstalt, für welche mir fortan nichts als die stillen Wünsche meines Herzens darzubringen erlaubt ist, die aber nur mit meinem letzten Pulsschlag aufhören werden."

[47]To the king, he wrote: "In Geduld und Ergebung füge ich mich in das, was mir beschieden. Ein Vergehen haben mir Ew. Majestät selbst nicht zur Last gelegt, sondern Allerhöchst dieselben setzen nur in meine sittlichen Grundsätze Misstrauen; desto härter ist die Strafe, die mir aufgelegt. Ich trage die Last, aufrecht im Gefühl meiner Unschuld, aber ohne Trotz, im Schmerz über erlittene Kränkung, aber ohne Erbitterung scheide ich aus Ew. Majestät Staaten. Mein Herz schlägt noch immer warm für Preussens Wohl, in welchem ich die Hauptstütze der evangelischen Kirche und des deutschen Vaterlandes sehe. Gott segne Thron und Reich!"

[48]The students wrote: "Im Gefühle wahrhaft kindlicher Dankbarkeit Ihnen noch ein schmerzliches Lebewohl zu sagen. Ein liebendes Wort in der Stunde der Trennung ist ja das Letzte, was uns übrig bleibt als einziger Lohn für Ihren väterlichen Eifer im redlichen Lehren sowie für das Bestreben allseitigen, edlen Wirkens unter uns. Fügen wir als Andenken den Becher hinzu, so wünschen wir, dass Sie ebenso fröhlich dereinst aus ihm dem allgemeinen Wohl ein Hoch trinken mögen, als betrübt jetzt Ihre Augen auf dem Beschenke unserer Liebe verweilen werden. Reisen Sie glücklich und gedenken Sie auch in der Ferne freundschaftlich des Kreises von dankbaren Zuhörerern, der Sie, ach! nur zu gern festhalten möchte und traurig sich selbst gestehen muss, dass er es nicht vermag."

[49]It was necessary for him to meet his family in Mannheim since the government of Baden had forbidden his entrance into Heidelberg.

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[50]Cf., Wiegand, op. cit., p. 48. De Wette wrote to his friend Reimer: "Noch immer kann ich mich nicht an die Trennung meiner Kinder gewöhnen und dass ich Nichts für ihre Erziehung thun kann, ist für mich schrecklich. Dazu kommt mein schweres, häusliches Leiden und die fast aufreibende Sorge der doppelten Haushaltung. Trotzdem dass ich meiner Frau von Weihnachten 1819 bis Johanni 1820 gegen 900 Gulden gesendet, muss ich in jedem Briefe die Klage hören, dass das Geld bei dem theuern Leben in Heidelberg nicht ausreichend sei."

[51]Wiegand, op. cit., p. 49.

[52]Otto, op. cit., p. 155 ff. Otto treats de Wette's Theodor at some length.

[53]Three of his sermons were published in Berlin in 1821 with the title, Drei Predigten.

[54]He used Luke 10:23-27 as his text.

[55]Wiegand, op. cit., p. 60.

[56]Ibid., p. 63. Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 108-109, a letter to Georg Reimer, Oct. 12, 1821.

[57]During the fifty-four semesters that de Wette was at Basel, he gave lectures on Romans, Corinthians, John, and Isaiah nine times each; on Matthew, Mark, and Luke, seven times; Acts, three times; Revelation, once; Ethics, eleven times; Dogmatics, thirty-three times; Job, three times; Proverbs, twice; Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, six times each; and he held forty-three seminars in Homiletics. During his twenty-seven years as a professor at Basel, he served eight years as Dean and was four times elected Rector of Basel University -- in the years, 1823, 1829, 1834, and 1849.

[58]Daniel Schenkel and the church historian, Karl R. Hagenbach, are two examples. Hagenbach had just returned from studying with Schleiermacher and Neander in Berlin and was only twenty-two years old when de Wette persuaded him to become a Privatdozent in Church History.

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[59]His first series of lectures was published in 1823-24 with the title Vorlesungen über die Sittenlehre. The second series was entitled Ueber die Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsformen und ihren Einfluss auf das Leben, and appeared in print in 1827. Both volumes were published in Berlin.

[60]Sophie Streckeisen was born in Amsterdam on March 19, 1788, and died on December 27, 1867. She brought two daughters, Emma (1812-1834) and Clara (1825-1866), with her into the marriage. Cf., E. Staehelin, Dewettiana, op. cit., p. 158, a letter to Amalie von Voigt, Dec. 29, 1832.

[61]In 1833, 1836 and 1838, de Wette had gone to Montreux for a "Traubenkur." In 1835, 1840 and 1848, he was at Karlsbad and Wiesbaden for rest and mineral baths. In 1845, his doctors sent him to Italy to rest.

CHAPTER III

[1]De Wette wrote extensively in the fields of Dogmatics, Old and New Testament, and Ethics. He published one work on Archaeology and one in Church History (a collection of Luther's letters). In addition, he translated the Bible, wrote numerous articles, and even ventured into the field of the novel and drama.

[2]W. Gass, Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Theologie Überhaupt (Berlin, 1867), Vol. IV, p. 514.

[3]Cf., de Wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1818-21), Vorrede, p.iii. Also, de Wette, Ueber Religion und Theologie (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1821), Vorrede p. iv.

[4]E. L. T. Henke, Jakob Friedrich Fries, Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse dargestellt (Leipzig, 1867), p. 285.

[5]Ibid., p. 284.

[6]Cf., Ibid., p. 285.

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[7]Cf., de Wette, Theodor oder des Zweiflers Weihe, Bildungsgeschichte eines evangelischen Geistlichen (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1827), Vol. I, pp. 112 ff. Also de Wette's letters to Fries in the appendix of Henke, op. cit., pp. 344 ff. The statement referred to in Note 6 was written late in de Wette's life (1843), and at this time he had fully absorbed Fries' philosophy as his own and was no longer clear about the tremendous impact that it made on him. The picture de Wette presents in Theodor -- that of a confused young theological student who by means of this philosophy is given a new lease of life -- is probably more trustworthy.

[8]Henke, op. cit., pp. 106 f.

[9]Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, trans. E. B. Dicker (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1931), p. 21.

[10]Cf., Ibid., p. 20. Otto points out that, in the later editions of his works, Jacobi was influenced by Fries. Cf., Jacobi, Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung (1811; 2nd ed., 1828), p. 86, where he quotes from Fries' Neue Kritik der Vernunft (Heidelberg, 1807), I, Part I, p. 339. Otto also cites other examples.

[11]K. R. Hagenbach, Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, Eine akademische Gedächtnissrede (Leipzig, 1850), p. 24.

[12]Cf., Henke, op. cit., pp. 24 ff.

[13]Georg Weiss, Fries' Lehre von der Ahndung in Aesthetik, Religion und Ethik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1912), p. 34.

[14]Ibid., p. 117. Cf., pp. 4, 50, 64, 91, 115 ff., and 119.

[15]Cf., Otto, op. cit., pp. 22, 177. Also Weiss, op. cit., pp. 4, 14 ff., 50, 88, 105, and 114 ff.

[16]Weiss, op. cit., p. 117.

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[17]Cf., A. Wiegand, W. M. L. de Wette, Eine Säkularschrift (Erfurt, 1879), p. 6. Wiegand quotes a letter that de Wette wrote to a friend on August 7, 1835: "Schiller ist der Dichter des sittlichen begeisterten Strebens, Dolmetscher des sittlichen Geistes und der gemüthvollen Gemüthlichkeit unseres Zeitalters und übt eine um so grössere Gewalt auf die Gemüther aus, als er sich der Mittel der Rührung und gefühlvollen Betrachtung mit Vorliebe bedient. Er ist aber nicht etwa bloss Reflexionsdichter, und seine Gestalten sind nicht etwa blosse Hervorbringungen des Strebens nach Idealen, sondern er hat mit ursprünglicher Anschauung und Dichterkraft aus dem reinsten Wesen der Menschheit geschöpft und Bilder hingestellt, welche, reiner als das Sonnenlicht, so lange glänzen werden, als dieses die Erde und Menschen auf ihr bescheint." In the Schiller-album, de Wette wrote: "Wie viel ich der Schillerschen Muse für meine Geistesbildung verdanke, ist nicht zu ermessen. Ist Schwung und Richtung des Geistes die Hauptsache, so verdanke ich Schiller alles."

[18]Cf., Otto, op. cit., pp. 22 ff.

[19]Ibid., p. 23.

[20]Cf., de Wette, Theodor, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 229 ff.

[21]Hagenbach, op. cit., p. 68.

[22]Cf., F. Lücke, W. M. L. de Wette, Zur freundschaftlichen Erinnerung, in Theologischen Studien und Kritiken (Hamburg, 1850), pp. 21 ff.

[23]It was at this time that de Wette began to preach quite regularly. In this same period he re-worked his Dogmatik, op. cit., and included sections on the religiöse Gemeinschaft. His increasing emphasis on the practical can be traced from this time on.

[24]In addition Herder wrote: Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts (1774-76); Salomon's Lieder der Liebe (1778); and, Briefe das Studium der Theologie betreffend (1780).

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[25]Otto, op. cit., p. 184.

[26]De Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 67

[27]Hagenbach, op. cit., p. 14.

[28]Otto, op. cit., p. 161.

[29]Cf., Chapter II, the section on "University Years."

[30]Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., Vol. I, Vorrede, p. xxxviii.

[31]Ibid., Vorrede, p. xxxix.

[32]Ibid., Vorrede, p. xli.

[33]Ibid., Vorrede, p. xliii.

[34]Otto, op. cit., p. 49.

[35]Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., Vol. I, Vorrede, p. xxxi.

[36]Cf., Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 36 ff., 58; Vol. II, pp. 37 ff., 206 ff. Also Fries, Handbuch der praktischen Philosophie (1818-1832), Vol. II, pp. 31, 55, 63 and 71 ff. Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 16 ff.

[37]Weiss, op. cit., p. 17. Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 16.

[38]Weiss, op. cit., p. 12. Cf., Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 93. Also Fries, Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie (1820-1821), Vol. II, Vorrede, p. xxv, where he says: "Aus der reinen Vernunft entspringen dann alle Principien a priori."

[39]Weiss, op. cit., p. 17. Cf., Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, (1805, new ed. by L. Nelson, Göttingen, 1905), pp. 27 ff.

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[40]Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1805), p. 29. Cf., pp. 19-32.

[41]Otto, op. cit., p. 78.

[42]Ibid., p. 51.

[43]Ibid., p. 79

[44]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 8 ff.; and Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 7 ff. Also Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. II, pp. 33, 214-293.

[45]Cf., Fries, praktischen Philosophie, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 10.

[46]Otto, op. cit., pp. 105 f.

[47]Weiss, op. cit., p. 32.

[48]Cf., Otto, op. cit., Chapters VIII and IX.

[49]Cf., Fries, Anthropologie, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 36 ff.

[50]Otto, op. cit., p. 112.

[51]Weiss, op. cit., p. 65.

[52]Cf., Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. III, pp. 63-84, for a general treatment of "Trieb."

[53]de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 25.

[54]Otto, op. cit., p. 124.

[55]Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1905), p. 250.

[56]Ibid., p. 253.

[57]Ibid., p. 254.

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[58]de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 16. Cf., Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 50 ff.

[59]Otto, op. cit., p. 128.

[60]Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1905), p. 257.

[61]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 17.

[62]de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 63.

[63]Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. I, p. 405.

[64]Weiss, op. cit., p. 41.

[65]Fries, Anthropologie, op. cit., p. 178.

[66]Fries, Logik, op. cit., p. 377.

[67]Cf., Fries, Anthropologie, op. cit., pp. 178 ff. Also Logik, op. cit., pp. 377 ff.; Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. I, pp. 407 ff.

[68]Fries' and de Wette's concept of Verstand has been translated as "technical reason" in this and succeeding chapters. The writer is indebted to Paul Tillich for this term. In Tillich's Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1953), the distinction is made between "ontological reason" (Vernunft) and "technical reason" which corresponds to Verstand. Cf., pp. 60 ff., 80 ff., and 95.

[69]Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. I, pp. 409 f.

[70]Cf., Weiss, op. cit., pp. 42 ff.

[71]Eisler's Handwörterbuch der Philosophie defines the term Ahndung as follows: "Fries understands by Ahndung a conviction, originating in the

feelings, without any definite conception, of the reality of the suprasensual, which gives us a reflection of the real existence of things in their phenomena, and brings us their eternal meaning and purposeful connection, in nature's sublimity and beauty."

[72]Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1905), p. 61. Cf., Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 209.

[73]Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1905), p. 173.

[74]Ibid., p. 175.

[75]Cf., Otto, op. cit., pp. 139 ff.

[76]Cf., Weiss, op. cit., pp. 102 ff., the section entitled "Das Prinzip der Ahndung als Prinzip der Einigung und als Schlussstein des Systems."

[77]Robert F. Davidson, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 150.

[78]Cf., Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1905). In this volume Fries summarizes the results of his philosophy with special attention to these three concepts. Also, Fries, Von Deutscher Philosophie, Art und Kunst (1812), pp. 48 ff. Cf., de Wette's Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 8 ff., and Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 14.

[79]Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. III, pp. 364 f.

[80]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 18. Also, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 67 ff.

[81]Fries, Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., (1905), p. 236.

[82]Cf., Davidson, op. cit., p. 154.

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[83]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 18 ff. Also, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 63 ff.

[84]de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 67.

[85]de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 19 ff.

[86]On art and religion, cf., Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. III, pp. 342-361; and praktischen Philosophie, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 213-248.

[87]On religious symbolism and the religious community, cf., Fries, Neue Kritik, op. cit., (2nd ed.), Vol. III, pp. 366 ff.; praktischen Philosophie, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 251 ff.; Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, op. cit., pp. 254 ff., 273; and, Julius und Evagoras, oder die neue Republik (1814-1822; new ed. by W. Bousset, 1910), pp. 273 ff.

[88]Weiss, op. cit., p. 108.

[89]de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. 79.

[90]Ibid., p. 81.

[91]Ibid., p. 82.

[92]Ibid., p. 87.

[93]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 1-252. Note the additional chapter.

[94]Ibid., (1st ed.), Vorrede, p. iv.

CHAPTER IV

[1]W. M. L. de Wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik in ihrer historischen Entwickelung, Part I, Die biblische Dogmatik enthaltend (Berlin, 1813; Part II, Die kirchliche Dogmatik (Berlin, 1816). A second edition was published in 1818-21, and a third edition in 1831.

[2]W. M. L. de Wette, Ueber Religion und Theologie, Erläuterungen zum Lehrbuche der Dogmatik (Berlin, 1815). A second edition was published in 1821.

[3]These two books were: Ueber die Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsformen und ihren Einfluss auf das Leben (Berlin 1827), and Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkt des Glaubens dargestellt (Basel, 1846). Both cannot be classed as scientific works, but rather are popular in content.

[4]Cf., Rudolf Stähelin, W. M. L. de Wette, nach seiner theologischen Wirksamkeit und Bedeutung, (Basel, 1880). Stähelin says, "Die Dogmatik seiner Zeit stand, soweit sie in jener Periode der dogmatischen Unfruchtbarkeit überhaupt noch lebendige Bewegung besass, fast ganz unter der Herrschaft des Kantianismus, und auch de Wette war nicht gewillt die Richtigkeit der von ihm an der alten Metaphysik ausgeübten Kritik irgendwie in Frage zu stellen. Aber er schildert uns selbst, wie dieser Kriticismus nicht nur auf das religiöse Leben erkältend und zerstörend eingewirkt, sondern wie er auch das Sittliche selbst, indem er es von dem Grunde des Glaubens ablöste, um seinen concreten Inhalt und seine lebendige Entfaltung gebracht habe wie aus dem von ihm gepflanzten moralischen Selbstgefühl statt einer Erneuerung der Gesinnung nur ein verfeinerter Pharisäismus und eine beschränkte, unlautere Selbstgefälligkeit enstanden sei." pp. 25-26.

[5]de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., Vorrede, p. xii. Cf., G. Franck and F. Kattenbusch, "De Wette," Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, ed. A. Hauck (3rd ed.; Leipzig, 1908), Vol. XXI, p. 194.

[6]de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., Vorrede, pp. vii-viii.

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[7]Ibid, p. 132.

[8]W. Gass, Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Theologie überhaupt (Berlin, 1867), Vol. IV, p. 520.

[9]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 201 ff.

[10]Cf., R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 76 ff.; 86 ff.; for a treatment of the historiography of the Aufklärung and the Romanticists. Also the excellent treatment of these periods by J. W. Thompson, A History of Historical Writing (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), Vol. II, pp. 96 ff., 132 ff.

[11]Cf., Chapter III of this thesis for a more detailed account of Herder's influence on de Wette. Also R. Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, trans. E. B. Dicker (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd., 1931), pp. 183 ff.

[12]G. P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century (2nd ed. rev.; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), p. 9.

[13]G. E. Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (Hamburg; Hamburger Kulturverlag, 1948), p. 35. Cf., Gooch, op. cit., p. 9.

[14]Walter Nigg, Geschichte des Religiösen Liberalismus (Zurich, 1937), p. 130. Cf., p. 128 where Nigg says: "Herders grösstes Verdienst besteht in seinem neuen Geschichtsverständnis...Die Bibel ist nach Herder kein göttlicheres Buch als die anderen Bücher, und er empfand es als eine förmliche Lästerung, alle ihre Ausführungen als von Gott diktiert ausgeben zu wollen. Sie ist in keinem anderen Sinne inspiriert, als Homer und Shakespeare es auch sind. Wie diese Dichter ist sie göttliche Poesie, und alle Poesie ist auch Bibel. Unermüdlich betonte Herder dass die Bibel durch Menschen und für Menschen geschrieben sei. Sie ist ein menschliches Buch, menschlich enstanden und menschlich zu lesen."

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[15]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., Part I, Vorrede, p. vii. Also de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 125.

[16]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 125-126. Also Dogmatik, op. cit., Part II, Vorrede p. viii.

[17]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 127. De Wette follows Herder's idea at this point. For a discussion of the weaknesses and consequences of this view cf., Collingwood, op. cit., pp. 90 ff.

[18]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

[19]Cf., Ibid., pp. 130-131.

[20]Cf., Ibid., pp. 157 ff.

[21]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., Part I, pp. 25-26.

[22]Cf., Ibid., pp. 18-19. Also Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 76.

[23]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., p. 24.

[24]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 198 ff.

[25]Cf., Ibid., pp. 76-90.

[26]Cf., Ibid., pp. 90-96.

[27]Cf., Ibid., pp. 96-106.

[28]Cf., Ibid., pp. 106-110.

[29]Cf., Ibid., pp. 110-124.

[30]Cf., Ibid., pp. 139 ff.

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[31]Cf., Ibid., pp. 143 ff.

[32]Cf., Ibid., p. 144.

[33]Cf., Ibid., p. 201.

[34]Cf., Ibid., pp. 203 ff.

[35]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 201.

[36]Cf., de Wette. Dogmatik, op. cit., Part II, pp. 72 ff.

[37]Cf., Ibid., Part I, pp. 229 ff.

[38]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 207 ff.

[39]Cf., Ibid., p. 208.

[40]Cf., Ibid., pp. 211 ff.

[41]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., Part I, p. 238.

[42]Cf., Ibid., Part II, p. 127.

[43]Cf., Ibid., Part I, p. 237.

[44]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 225. Also p. 213.

[45]Cf., Ibid., pp. 214 ff.

[46]Cf., Ibid., pp. 215 f.

[47]Ibid., pp. 216-217.

[48]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., Part I, p. 270. Also Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 158.

[49]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 166.

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[50]Cf., Ibid., p. 159.

[51]Cf., Ibid., pp. 163-164.

[52]Cf., Ibid., pp. 160 ff.

[53]Cf., Ibid., p. 161.

[54]Cf., Ibid., p. 219.

[55]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., p. 222.

[56]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., Part II, p. 186.

[57]Cf., Ibid., Part II, pp. 189 ff.

[58]Cf., Ibid., Part II, pp. 196 ff.

[59]Cf., Ibid., Part II, pp. 202-213.

[60]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 229 ff.

[61]Cf., de Wette, Dogmatik, op. cit., Part I, p. 293.

[62]Cf., Ibid., Part II, pp. 214-229.

[63]Cf., de Wette, Religion und Theologie, op. cit., pp. 223 ff.

[64]Cf., Ibid., pp. 225 ff.

[65]Cf., Ibid., p. 242.

[66]Cf., Ibid., pp. 245 ff.

[67]Cf., Stahelin, op. cit., p. 43.

[68]Cf., Ibid., p. 35.

[69]Cf., de Wette, Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkt des Glaubens dargestellt (Basel, 1846), p. 1.

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[70]Daniel Schenkel, W. M. L. de Wette und die Bedeutung seiner Theologie für unsere Zeit (Schaffhausen: A. Beck und Sohn, 1849), p. 13.

[71]Cf., Franck and Kattenbusch, Realencyklopädie, op. cit., p. 197.

CHAPTER V

[1]For general works dealing with the history of Old Testament criticism, cf., Edward M. Gray, Old Testament Criticism, Its Rise and Progress (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1923) and T.K. Cheyne, Founders of Old Testament Criticism (London: Methuen and Co., 1893).

[2]Cf., Gray, op. cit., pp. 75 ff.

[3]Cf., Ibid., pp. 86 ff. Also Otto Eissfeldt, Einleitung in das Alte Testament (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934), pp. 174 f.

[4]Carl Heinrich Cornill, Einleitung in die kanonischen Bücher des Alten Testaments (7th ed.; Tübingen, 1913), p. 3. Cf., Gray, op. cit., pp. 101 ff.

[5]The full title read: Conjectures sur les Memoires Originaux dont il paroit que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de la Genese (Bruxelles, 1753).

[6]Cf., Gray, op. cit., pp. 129 ff. Also Eissfeldt, op. cit., pp. 175 ff. and James Orr, The Problem of the Old Testament (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917), pp. 196 ff.

[7]Cf., pp. 48 and 93 of this dissertation. Also Artur Weiser, Einleitung in das Alte Testament, (2nd ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1949), p. 10; K. F. Keil, Manual of Historico-Critical Introduction to the Canonical Scriptures of the Old Testament, trans. G. C. M. Douglas (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1869), Vol. I, p. 10; and Eissfeldt, op. cit., pp. 2 f.

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[8]Cf., Hans-Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart, (Neukirchen, Kreis Moers: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1956) pp. 103 ff.

[9]Cheyne, op. cit., p. 13.

[10]Cf., Eissfeldt, op. cit., p. 3. Also Cheyne, op. cit., pp. 13-26.

[11]Cf., J. Wellhausen, Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels (3rd ed.; Berlin, 1886), p. 4.

[12]Cf., Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert (Zürich, 1947), p. 435.

[13]The full title was: Dissertatio critica, qua Deuteronomium a prioribus Pentateuchi diversum, alius cuiusdam recentioris opus esse monstratur (Jena, 1805).

[14]W. M. L. de Wette, Beiträge zur Einleitung ins Alte Testament; Vol. I, "Kritischer Versuch über die Glaubwürdigkeit der Bücher der Chronik mit Hinsicht auf der Geschichte der mosäischen Bücher und Gesetzgebung; ein Nachtrag zu den Vater'schen Untersuchungen über den Pentateuch" (Halle, 1806); Vol.II, "Kritik der israelitischen Geschichte" (Halle, 1807).

[15]Cf., Cornill, op. cit., p. 4.

[16]The first stage being the conflict between the fragmentary hypothesis held by men such as Vater, and the documentary hypothesis as advanced by Eichhorn. Cf., Charles Augustus Briggs, General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), pp. 282 ff. Vol. I of the Beiträge will be dealt with again in reference to the Books of Chronicles in section C 2 of this chapter.

[17]Cf., Kraus, op. cit., p. 162.

[18]Cheyne, op. cit., p. 38.

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[19]W. M. L. de Wette, Ueber Religion und Theologie; Erläuterungen zum Lehrbuche der Dogmatik, (Berlin, 1815), p. 119.

[20]Cf., W. M. L. de Wette, op. cit., p. 152.

[21]de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 408.

[22]Cheyne, op. cit., pp. 41 f.

[23]Cf., W. M. L. de Wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen und apokryphischen Bücher des Alten Testaments (Berlin, 1817), paragraph #98.

[24]Cf., Ibid., p. 111.

[25]Cf., Ibid., p. 112.

[26]Cf., Ibid., p. 144.

[27]Cf., Ibid., pp. 146 ff.

[28]Cf., Ibid., pp. 148 ff.

[29]Cf., Ibid., p. 150.

[30]Cf., Ibid., p. 181. Also Kraus, op. cit., p. 169.

[31]de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II. p. 1.

[32]Cf., Ibid., pp. 2 ff.

[33]Cf., Ibid., pp. 11 ff.

[34]Cf., Ibid., pp. 16 ff.

[35]de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 182. Also Kraus, op. cit., p. 170.

[36]Kraus, op. cit., p. 171.

[37]de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 28.

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[38]de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., paragraphs 199-202.

[39]Cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 135 ff.; Vol. II, pp. 21 ff., 396 ff. Both volumes deal extensively with this problem. Also, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 162-189.

[40]Cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 136 ff.

[41]Cf., Ibid., Vol. II, p. 23.

[42]Cf., Ibid., Vol. II, p. 24.

[43]Cf., Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 396 ff.

[44]Cf., Ibid., Vol. II, p. 398.

[45]Cf., Ibid., Vol. II, p. 31. Also AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 165.

[46]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 169. De Wette says a narrative is epic when: (1) it is written without a basis of critical research; (2) it is patterned after aesthetic ideas but has a definite purpose; and (3) it has aesthetic vividness in a beautiful style and form.

[47]Cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 401.

[48]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 172 ff. and 183. Also Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 169 ff. The Elohim source is the oldest and probably existed before the time of David and Solomon.

[49]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 178 ff. Also Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 273 ff.

[50]Cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 309 ff.

[51]Cf., Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 314 ff.

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[52]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 183.

[53]Cf., the section "De Wette's Contributions" in this chapter, pp. 155 ff. Also note 13 for the full title of his dissertation. This document was not available to the present writer so he had to rely on de Wette's references to it in his other works and on the accounts given by other authors.

[54]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 180 ff. Also Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 265 ff.

[55]Cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I pp. 275 ff.

[56]Cf., Ibid., p. 299. Also Vol. II, pp. 385 ff.

[57]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 189 ff.

[58]Cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 136 ff. Also AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 193.

[59]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 190.

[60]Cf., Ibid., p. 197.

[61]Cf., Ibid., pp. 198 ff.

[62]Cf., Ibid., pp. 196-204.

[63]Cf., Ibid., pp. 205-208.

[64]Cf., Ibid., pp. 208 f.

[65]Cf., Ibid., pp. 209 ff.

[66]Edward Lewis Curtis and Albert Alonzo Madsen, The International Critical Commentary, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910); p. 46. Also cf., de Wette, Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 4 ff.; 80 ff.

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[67]Cf., I Chron. 3:19-24. Also, de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 210; and Beiträge, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 45 ff.

[68]Cf., K. H. Graf's "Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments", 1866 and also the brilliant chapter on the Chronicles in Wellhausen's "Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels."

[69]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 216 ff.

[70]Cf., Ibid., pp. 217 ff.

[71]Nehemiah probably wrote Chps. 1-7:5 and then quoted from a written source the genealogy thay follows.

[72]Cf., de Wette, AT Einleitung, op. cit., pp. 219 f.

[73]Cf., Ibid., pp. 221 ff.

[74]Cf., Ibid., pp. 225 ff.

[75]Cf., Ibid., pp. 229 ff.

[76]Cf., Ibid., pp. 237 f.

[77]Cf., Ibid., pp. 238 ff.

[78]Cf., Ibid., pp. 245 ff.

[79]Cf., Ibid., p. 249 ff.

[80]Cf., Ibid., pp. 275 ff.

[81]Cf., Ibid., pp. 285 ff.

[82]Cf., Ibid., pp. 297 ff.

[83]Cf., Ibid., pp. 299 ff.

[84]Cf., Ibid., pp. 303 ff.

[85]Cf., Ibid., pp. 307 ff.

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[86]Cf., Ibid., pp. 312 ff.

[87]W. M. L. de Wette, Commentar über die Psalmen (2nd ed.; Heidelberg, 1823), p. 2.

[88]Second ed., 1823; 3rd ed., 1829; 4th ed., 1836; and the 5th ed. was edited by G. Baur in 1856. Because the first edition was extremely difficult to obtain, the second edition was used in the following references.

[89]Psalm 45 is an example of non-religious poetry. Other examples are: the erotic poetry of the Song of Solomon, the song in Numbers 21:17 ff., and the poem of lament in II Samuel 1:19 ff.

[90]Cf., de Wette, Psalmen Commentar, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 33 ff. Also AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 289.

[91]Cf., de Wette, Psalmen Commentar, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 7 ff.

[92]Cf., Ibid., pp. 33 ff.

[93]Cf., Ibid., p. 476.

[94]Cf., Ibid., pp. 16 ff. and 30 ff. Also the introductory paragraphs to each of the Psalms mentioned.

[95]Cf., Ibid., pp. 21 ff.

[96]Cf., Ibid., pp. 24 ff. Also AT Einleitung, op. cit., p. 296.

[97]Cf., de Wette, Psalmen Commentar, op. cit., (2nd ed.), pp. 91 ff.

[98]Cf., Ibid., pp. 104, 125, 165, 175, 185, 193, 200, 238, 339, etc., where Paulus is referred to. Most of these references are to Paulus' Philologisches Clavis über dás Alte Testament. Die Psalmen (Jena, 1791).

[99]Cf., de Wette, Psalmen Commentar, op. cit., (2nd ed.), p. iv. The explanation of Psalm 16, pp. 193 ff. is a typical example.

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[100]Cf., Ibid., p. iii.

[101]Cf., Ibid., pp. 12 ff.

[102]Cf., Ibid., pp. 35 ff.

[103]Karl R. Hagenbach, Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette, Eine akademische Gedächtnissrede (Leipzig, 1850), p. 99.

[104]Eissfeldt, op. cit., pp. 188 f. Cf., Hagenbach, op. cit., p. 110.

[105]Cf., Cornill, op. cit., p. 4.

[106]Cf., Kraus, op. cit., p. 162.

[107]Cf., Ibid., p. 166 f.

[108]Cf., Ibid., p. 167, also p. 309 ff.

CHAPTER VI

[1]Cf., Chapter II of this dissertation for a more detailed account of de Wette's literary activity.

[2]Second edition, 1830; 3rd ed., 1834; 4th ed., 1842; and 5th ed., 1848. A sixth edition was published posthumously in 1860.

[3]Because of the time involved in publishing the complete work, the subsequent editions were not uniform, e. g. the Gospels were in their third edition (1845-1846) before the commentary on Revelation had reached the press (1848).

[4]The commentary appeared on June 20, 1848 and de Wette died on June 16, 1849.

[5]Cf., Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (2nd ed.; London: Adam and Charles Black, 1948), p. 13.

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[6]Cf., Ibid., pp. 15 ff.

[7]Cf., Ibid., pp. 14 ff.

[8]Ibid., p. 15.

[9]For Paulus' influence on de Wette, cf., Chapter II of this dissertation, pp. 59 ff. For the work of Paulus in general, cf., Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 48-57.

[10]Cf., W. M. L. de Wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen Bücher des Neuen Testaments (5th ed.; Berlin, 1848), pp. 64 ff.

[11]Strauss' work was published in two volumes, Vol. I, 1835; Vol. II, 1836.

[12]Cf., F. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1889), p. 321.

[13]Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 79.

[14]Cf., Ibid., pp. 97 ff.

[15]The Rationalists also had a preference for John's Gospel since it was relatively free of miracles. Cf., Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 85.

[16]W. M. L. de Wette, Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, I, Part I, "Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi," (3rd ed.; Leipzig, 1845), Vorwort, p. vi.

[17]Franck, G. and Kattenbusch, F., "De Wette," Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, (3rd ed.; Leipzig, 1908), Vol. XXI, p. 194.

[18]Cf., Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 121 ff.

[19]Cf., Ibid., pp. 137 ff.

[20]Lichtenberger, op. cit., p. 375.

[21]Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 144.

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[22]de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), Vorwort, p. vii.

[23]Franck and Kattenbusch, Realencyklopädie, op. cit., Vol. XXI, p. 195.

[24]Daniel Schenkel, W. M. L. de Wette und die Bedeutung seiner Theologie für unsere Zeit, (Schaffhausen, 1849), p. 32.

[25]W. M. L. de Wette, Ueber Religion und Theolgie; Erläuterungen zum Lehrbuche der Dogmatik, (Berlin, 1815), p. 153.

[26]W. M. L. de Wette, Zur christlichen Belehrung und Ermahnung. Theologische Aufsätze, (Berlin, 1819), pp. 54 f.

[27]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), Vorrede, p. v. Also Adolf Jülicher, Einleitung in das Neue Testament (4th ed.; Tübingen, 1901), p. 10. For a general history of textual criticism, cf., Marvin R. Vincent, A History of the Textual Criticism of the New Testament (New York, 1903), and A. T. Robertson, An Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament (London, 1925).

[28]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 50 ff.

[29]Cf., Ibid., pp. 52 ff.

[30]Cf., Ibid., p. 82. These are the rules that Griesbach established: "(1) Alle Zeugen, die zu Einer Recension gehören, und für dieselbe stimmen, sind nur für Einen Zeugen zu halten. (2) Die jenige Lesart, für welche alle alten Recensionen stimmen, ist für die ächte zu halten. (3) Wo die alexandrinische mit der occidentalischen gegen die konstantinopolitanische übereinstimmt, ist die älteste Lesart beurkundet. (4) Wo die alexandrinische Recension mit der konstantinopolitanischen gegen die occidentalische übereinstimmt, ist zu untersuchen, ob die Lesart der letztern zu ihren eigenthümlichen Fehlern gehört. Eben so, wenn die occidentalische Recension mit der konstantinopolitanischen gegen die alexandrinische

übereinstimmt. (5) Wenn alle drei Recensionen verschieden stimmen, so entscheidet nicht die Zahl der Zeugen, sondern das Uebergewicht der innern Gründe."

[31]de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis," (3rd ed.; Leipzig, 1846), p. 224.

[32]de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), Vorwort, p. viii.

[33]de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part I, "Matthäi," (3rd ed.), Vorwort, pp. vi-vii.

[34]Cf., Ibid., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), pp. 224-228.

[35]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 80 f.

[36]Cf., Ibid., pp. 81 f.

[37]Cf., Ibid., p. 83.

[38]Cf., C. F. G. Heinrici, "Exegesis," Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1909), pp. 237 ff.

[39]Cf., e.g., de Wette's exegesis of Matt. 17:24-27 and Matt. 14:13-21 in NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part I, (3rd ed.), pp. 189 ff. and 164 ff.

[40]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), Vorwart, pp. v and vii f. Also de Wette's dedicatory preface in NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.).

[41]Cf., Heinrici, Schaff-Herzog, op. cit., p. 245.

[42]Schenkel, op. cit., p. 4.

[43]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 137 ff.

[44]Cf., Ibid., p. 144. His footnote (a) is a good example.

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[45]Cf., Ibid., pp. 151 ff.

[46]Cf., Ibid., pp. 167 ff.

[47]Cf., Ibid., p. 181.

[48]Cf., Ibid., p. 185.

[49]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I Part I, "Matthäi," (3rd ed.), pp. 7-15.

[50]Cf., Ibid., pp. 20 f.

[51]Cf., Matt. 13:55; Luke 4:22; John 1:46; 6:42.

[52]Cf., Romans 1:3; 9:5. Also Acts 2:30.

[53]Cf., e.g., Isaac and Samson in Judaism. Also Romulus, Plato, Buddha, etc.

[54]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part I, "Matthäi," (3rd ed.), pp. 43-50.

[55]Cf., Ibid., pp. 55 ff. De Wette says that the Sermon on the Mount is a compendium of the teaching of Jesus and that four questions are basic to its understanding: (1) What is the relationship of the Sermon on the Mount to Luke 6:20 ff.? (2) Is this a true transmission of the words of Jesus? Did He even give such a sermon? (3) At what point in the ministry of Jesus did He preach this sermon? (4) To whom was it given?

[56]Cf., Ibid., pp. 164 ff.

[57]Cf., Ibid., pp. 183 ff. De Wette lists four possible interpretations: "(1) die buchstäblich-gläubige; (2) die natürlich-erklärende; (3) die symbolische; (4) die mythische."

[58]Cf., Ibid., pp. 191 ff.

[59]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 186 ff.

[60]This is a logical consequence of his solution to the Synoptic Problem.

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[61]de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part II, "Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus," (3rd ed., 1846), p. 171. Cf., pp. 3 ff.

[62]Cf., Ibid., p. 3. Also NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 190.

[63]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part II, "Lukas und Markus," (3rd ed.), pp. 12 ff.

[64]Cf., Ibid., pp. 53 ff.

[65]Cf., Ibid., p. 168. Also, I, Part IV, "Kurze Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte," (2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1841), pp. 9 ff.

[66]Cf., Ibid., I, Part IV, "Apostelgeschichte," (2nd ed.), p. 3.

[67]E.g., Acts 16:10-17; 20:5-15; 21:1-18; 27:1-28:16. Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I Part IV, "Apostelgeschichte," (2nd ed.), pp. 113 ff.; 136 ff.; 141 ff.; and 164 ff.

[68]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 228.

[69]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part II, "Lukas und Markus," (3rd ed.), p. 3.

[70]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 233.

[71]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part IV, "Apostelgeschichte," (2nd ed.), pp. 46 ff.

[72]Cf., Ibid., pp. 120 ff.

[73]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 196.

[74]Cf., Ibid., pp. 193 ff. Also NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), pp. 5 ff.

[75]Cf., de Sette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), p. 2.

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[76]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 207.

[77]Among those who questioned John's authorship of the Fourth Gospel were Henke, Bretschneider, Strauss, Weisse, Bruno Bauer, and Ferdinand Christian Baur.

[78]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 206 ff. Also, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), pp. 8 ff.

[79]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), pp. 11 ff.

[80]Cf., Ibid., p. 7 and pp. 155 ff.

[81]Cf., Ibid., p. 223.

[82]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 364 ff. Also, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I, Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), p. 234.

[83]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., I Part III, "Johannis," (3rd ed.), pp. 275 ff.

[84]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 247.

[85]Cf., Ibid., p. 251. Also NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part III, "Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Galater und der Briefe an die Thessalonicher," (2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1845), p. 91.

[86]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II Part III, "Galater und Thessalonicher," (2nd ed.), pp. 123 ff. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.) pp. 253 ff.

[87]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 257 ff. Also, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part III, "Galater und Thessalonicher," (2nd ed.), pp. 1 ff.

[88]Cf., I Cor. 1:12. The four parties apparently named themselves after Paul, Apollos, Cephas and Christ. The last party probably refused to recognize any apostolic

authority and considered themselves to be in the possession of direct revelation. Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part II, "Kurze Erklärung der Briefe an die Corinther," (3rd ed. by H. Messner; Leipzig, 1855), pp. 2 ff. For the date of writing, cf., NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 266 ff.

[89]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part II, "Corinther," (3rd ed.), pp. 166 ff.

[90]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 272 ff.

[91]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part I, "Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer," (4th ed.; Leipzig, 1847), pp. 3 ff. In the controversial Chapter 7 of Romans, de Wette maintains that Paul is speaking of his life "before" or "outside" of Christ, cf., p. 100.

[92]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part IV, "Kurze Erklärung der Briefe an die Colosser, an Philemon, an die Ephesier und Philipper," (2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1847), pp. 77 f. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 277 f.

[93]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part IV, "Colosser, etc.," (2nd ed.), pp. 9 ff. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 278 ff.

[94]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 282 ff. Also, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part IV, "Colosser, etc.," (2nd ed.), pp. 86 ff.

[95]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 295.

[96]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part IV, "Colosser, etc.," (2nd ed.), pp. 172 ff.

[97]Cf., Ibid., II, Part V, "Kurze Erklärung der Briefe an Titus, Timotheus und die Hebräer," (2nd ed.; Leipzig, 1847), pp. 1 ff.; 23 ff.; 60 ff.; and 116-121. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.) pp. 297-313.

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[98]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 313 ff.

[99]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., II, Part V, "Titus, etc.," (2nd ed.), p. 126.

[100]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 324.

[101]Cf., Ibid., p. 332.

[102]Cf., Ibid., p. 337. Also, NT Handbuch, op. cit., III, Part I, "Kurze Erklärung der Briefe des Petrus, Judas und Jakobus," (Leipzig, 1847), p. 103.

[103]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., III, Part I, "Petrus, etc.," pp. 1 ff. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 344 ff.

[104]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., III, Part I, "Petrus, etc.," pp. 77 f. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 356 ff.

[105]Cf., de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., III, Part I, "Petrus, etc.," p. 61. Also, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), pp. 373 ff.

[106]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 382. Also, NT Handbuch, op. cit., III, Part II, "Kurze Erklärung der Offenbarung Johannis," (Leipzig, 1848), pp. 1 ff.

[107]Cf., de Wette, NT Einleitung, op. cit., (5th ed.), p. 388.

[108]de Wette, NT Handbuch, op. cit., III, Part II, "Offenbarung," Vorwort, pp. vi-viii.

CHAPTER VII

[1]Cf., Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict, trans. E. H. Wahlstrom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), pp. 25 ff.

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[2]Cf., Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (2nd ed.; London: Adam and Charles Black, 1948), pp. 68-120.

[3]Cf., W. M. L. de Wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen Bücher des Neuen Testaments (5th ed.; Berlin, 1848), Vorwort,

[4]Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, trans, E. B. Dicker (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1931), p. 186.

[5]Robert F. Davidson, Rudolf Otto's Interpretation of Religion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 133.

[6]Ibid., p. 155. Cf., Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. J. W. Harvey, (9th impression; London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 150 f.

[7]Cf., Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, op. cit., pp. 116-182.

[8]The work of Nygren's directly referring to this problem was his Religiöst a priori, (Lund, 1921). Other articles and books of his that have general reference to this area of philosophy of religion are: "Det religionsfilosofiska grundproblemet," in Bibelforskaren, XXXVI (1919), pp. 290-313, and XXXVIII (1921), pp. 11-30, 88-103; Filosofisk och kristen etik, (Stockholm, 1923); Dogmatikens vetenskapliga grundläggning (1922); and Filosofi och motivforskning (Stockholm, 1940). Rudolf Otto first published Das Heilige (The Idea of the Holy) in 1917, so it is apparent that these two men were working in this area at approximately the same period. Both had their roots in the philosophy of idealism.

[9]Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, (Zürich, 1947), p. 434.

[10]Cf., W. M. L. de Wette, Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, III, Part II, "Offenbarung," (1848), Vorwort, p. viii.

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[11]Cf., Barth, op. cit., p. 441. Rudolf Otto, who was influenced by the Friesian revival, and others developed a strong department in the philosophy and history of religion at the University of Marburg. Perhaps it is more than coincidental that Rudolf Bultmann not only studied there but spent much of his life teaching at Marburg.

[12]Cf., Gustaf Wingren, op. cit., pp. 3-22, 66-107. Nygren's dependence upon Kant and Schleiermacher for his philosophical starting point, places his thought in the same general intellectual climate as that of de Wette and Otto.

[13]Cf., H. H. Rowley (ed.), The Old Testament and Modern Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), pp. 48-83.

[14]Emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, (Gütersloh, 1954), Vol. V, p. 47.

[15]Ibid., p. 45.

[16]Quoted by Hirsch, op. cit., p. 362.

[17]Cf., F. Lichtenberger, History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1889), p. 34.

[18]Cf., K. Barth, op. cit., p. 433.

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